Thompson et al v. St. Peters, Missouri, City of, et al.

Filing 92

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of St. Peters' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57 ) is GRANTED. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 10/24/2016. (NEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
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GINA THOMPSON and KAREN MCCABE,
on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF ST. PETERS, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:15CV404 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of St. Peters, Missouri's Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
I. Background

Plaintiffs Gina Thompson and Karen McCabe ("Plaintiffs") filed a Class Action
Complaint in this Court on March 4, 2015, against Defendants City of St. Peters, Missouri ("St.
Peters), Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. ("Redflex"), and Does 1 through 24 alleging that the red
light camera program is unconstitutional. (Compl.

iii! 1-2, ECF No. 4)

In their Complaint,

Plaintiffs assert nine counts: (I) Declaratory judgment; (II) Unjust Enrichment against Defendant
St. Peters; (III) Violation of Article I § 19 of the Missouri Constitution against Defendant St.
Peters; (IV) Violation of Article I § 10 of the Missouri Constitution against Defendant St. Peters;
(V) Unjust Enrichment against Defendant Redflex; (VI) Abuse of Process against all Defendants;
(VII) Damages for Violations of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.010, et seq., against Defendant Redflex;
(VIII) Money Had and Received against Defendants by Subclass 1; and (IX) Money Had and
Received against Defendants by Subclass 2. (Compl. , ECF No. 4)
1

On February 16, 2016, Defendant St. Peters filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all
of Plaintiffs claims against the City. (ECF No. 57) Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to
Defendant's motion, asserting that genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to the
allegations contained in the Complaint. (ECF No. 67)
This case stems from Ordinances allowing the automated enforcement of traffic
regulations by using cameras at red lights to photograph traffic violations. 1 Plaintiff Thompson
paid a $110.00 penalty after she received at least one Citation in the mail pursuant to St. Peter's
Ordinance 335.095 around 2012 and/or 2013 . (Compl.

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13, ECF No. 4) Plaintiff McCabe paid

a $110.00 penalty after receiving at least one Citation in the mail pursuant to St. Peter's
Ordinance 335.097 in 2013 and/or 2014. (Compl.

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14)

On June 8, 2006, the City of St. Peters adopted Ordinance No. 4536, which amended
Section 335.095 of the City Code of the City of St. Peters, Missouri, entitled "Automated
Enforcement of Traffic Control Signal Regulations." (Compl.

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32; Def. St. Peters' Ex. A, 2006

Ordinance, ECF. No. 59-1) On November 7, 2013, the City adopted Ordinance No. 6014, which
amended Section 335.097, entitled "Automated Photo Enforcement of Traffic Regulations."
(Compl.

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53; Def. St. Peters' Ex. B, 2013 Ordinance, ECF No. 59-2) Ordinance Nos. 4536 and

6014 (collectively "Ordinances") authorized the installation and operation of an automated red
The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and grants
that party all reasonable inferences. Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted). However, under Local Rule 4.0l(E) of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri, " [a]ll matters set forth in the statement of the movant shall
be deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party." E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.0l(E). Here, Defendant has submitted a Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts, which Plaintiffs have not specifically controverted. (Def. St. Peters'
Statement ofUncontroverted Facts ("SUMF"), ECF No. 59) The Court will therefore deem
those facts as admitted. See Tramp v. Assoc. Underwriters, Inc., 768 F.3d 793 , 799 (8th Cir.
2014) (finding no error in district court' s application of similar local rule when ruling on a
motion for summary judgment).
2

light enforcement system (" Camera System"). (Def. St. Peters ' Exs. A & B, ECF Nos. 59-1 , 592) These Camera Systems consisted of cameras and vehicle sensors working in conjunction with
a traffic control signal to produce images and a video recording of a motor vehicle running a red
light. (Def. St. Peters ' SUMF if 3, ECF No. 59) An officer employed by the St. Peters Police
Department would examine the recorded images and determine whether the vehicle operator
violated the City' s Traffic Code. (Id. at ifif 4-5) Upon filing an information, a summons would
be served on the vehicle ' s owner. (Id. at if 6)
Plaintiff Thompson received notices of violation and summonses for four separate
violations of Section 335.095 . (Id. at ifif 7-30; Def. St. Peters ' Exs. E-H, ECF Nos. 59-5 through
59-8) The citations included a court date, instructions how to access the photos and video
footage online, and an option to pay the $110.00 fine in lieu of appearing in court. (Def. St.
Peters' Ex. E, ECF No. 59-5) On all four occasions, Ms. Thompson elected to pay the fine .
(Def. St. Peters ' SUMF ifif 12, 18, 24, 30)
Ordinance 6014 enacted new provisions related to the Camera System.2 (Def. St. Peters'
SUMF if 33 ; Def. St. Peters ' Ex. B, 2013 Ordinance, ECF No . 59-2) Plaintiff McCabe received a
notice of violation and summons for an alleged violation of Section 335 .097 that occurred on
July 3, 2014. (Def. St. Peters' SUMF if 34; Def. St. Peters' Ex. I, ECF No . 59-9) The citation
included a court date, instructions on accessing the photos and video footage, and instructions for
paying the $110.00 fine. (Def. St. Peters' Ex. I, ECF No. 59-9) Ms. McCabe paid the fine.
(Def. St. Peters' SUMF if 39)
Ordinance 6014 removed the provision from the earlier Ordinance that assessed no points
against the violator, which conflicted with state law. (Def. St. Peters ' SUMF Ex. B, 2013
Ordinance, ECF No. 59-2); see also City of St. Peters v. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538, 548-49 (Mo.
2015) (finding the 2006 ordinance conflicted with state law by not assessing points but finding
the remainder of the ordinance valid).
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II. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for
summary judgment only if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771 , 775 (8th Cir. 1995).
The moving party has the initial burden to establish the non-existence of any genuine
issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its favor. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v.

Associated Elec. Co-op. , Inc., 83 8 F .2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). Once this burden is
discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then
shifts to the non-moving party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts
showing there is a genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986).
When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its
pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ .P. 56(e). The non-moving party "must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S . 574, 586 (1986). In fact, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party which would
enable a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S . at 249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324.

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III. Discussion
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant St. Peters first argues that all of
Plaintiffs' claims fail to the extent they are premised on a red light camera enforcement system
other than that utilized by St. Peters. Defendant next asserts that Plaintiffs' claims for money
damages in Counts II, VIII, and IX fail because they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and the voluntary payment doctrine. St. Peters also avers that the claims for money
damages for violation of the Missouri Constitution in Counts III and IV are not cognizable.
Further, St. Peters contends that Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment in Count I fails
because Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs
are precluded from raising constitutional claims in Counts I, III, and IV on the grounds of waiver
and estoppel. St. Peters further maintains that the red light camera sections did not violate any
constitutional rights or state law. Finally, St. Peters asserts that Plaintiffs' claim for abuse of
process in Count VI fails because Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that the City made
use of process for some collateral purpose.

A. Sovereign Immunity
Defendant St. Peters argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs'
claims for money damages because the claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
"Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600, public entities enjoy sovereign immunity ... unless immunity
is waived, abrogated, or modified by statute." Richardson v. City ofSt. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133,
136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). "A municipality has sovereign immunity from
actions at common law tort in all but four cases." Bennartz v. City of Columbia, 300 S.W.3d
251 , 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). These four exceptions include:

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(1) where a plaintiffs injury arises from a public employee' s negligent operation
of a motor vehicle in the course of his employment (section 537.600.1(1)); (2)
where the injury is caused by the dangerous condition of the municipality' s
property (section 537.600.1(2)); (3) where the injury is caused by the municipality
performing a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental function (State ex
rel. Board of Trustees of the City ofNorth Kansas City Memorial Hospital, 843
S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. bane 1993)); and (4) to the extent the municipality has
procured insurance, thereby waiving sovereign immunity up to but not beyond the
policy limit and only for acts covered by the policy (section 537.610).

Id. at 259. "When bringing claims against a public entity, a plaintiff ' bears the burden of
pleading with specificity facts giving rise to an exception to the rule of sovereign immunity[.]'"
Wann v. St. Francois Cty., Missouri, No. 4:15CV895 CDP, 2016 WL 866089, at *7 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting Richardson, 293 S.W.3d at 136-37).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant St. Peters is not entitled to sovereign immunity
because it entered into a contract for profit with Redflex and acted as if it were a private
corporation. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that the third exception applies in that St. Peters was
performing a proprietary and not a governmental function. "Governmental functions are those
performed for the common good of all unlike proprietary functions which are performed for the
benefit or profit of the municipality as a corporate entity." Blair v. City of Hannibal, No.
2:15CV00061 ERW, 2016 WL 3682992, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016) (citation omitted).
Further, " [e]nforcing laws and ordinances is a governmental function entitling municipalities to
immunity from liability." Id. (citing Gregg v. City of Kansas City, 272 S.W.3d 353 , 361 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2008)).
The Court finds that the sovereign immunity doctrine applies to Plaintiffs' tort claims
against Defendant St. Peters in this case. Plaintiffs request money damages under the theories of
unjust emichment in Count II and money had and received in Counts VIII and IX. "In
examining the question of whether an activity is governmental or proprietary, the nature of the
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particular defendant's conduct is often less important than the generic nature of the activity."

State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of City ofN Kansas City Mem. Hosp. v. Russell, 843 S.W.2d 353,
359 (Mo. 1992). Indeed, the focus is not on the motives of those performing the function but on
the motives of the legislature that conferred the power upon the municipality. Id.; see also

Crouch v. City of Kansas City, 444 S.W.3d 517, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (same). " [F]unctions
that are otherwise governmental are not transformed into proprietary functions merely because
they generate a profit or are accompanied by a fee. " Crouch, 444 S.W.3d at 524.
Here, St. Peters asserts, and the Ordinances demonstrate, that the Board of Aldermen
enacted the law to "improve public safety by decreasing the likelihood of intersection accidents;"
. . . "to protect the public health, safety and welfare of the residents of the city;" and .. . "to
promote public safety through its implementation of safety programs which are proven to
increase intersection safety and decrease the likelihood of intersection accidents .... " (Def. St.
Peters' Ex. B, 2013 Ordinance, ECF No. 59-2) The earlier Ordinance contained similar language
pertaining to reducing vehicle collisions and personal injuries from red light running, improving
public safety, and enforcing public safety by implementing safety programs, including an
automated red light enforcement system. (Def. St. Peters ' Ex. A, 2006 Ordinance, ECF No. 591) Further, the Missouri Supreme Court in City of St. Peters v. Roeder, noted the board of
aldermen' s reasoning for enacting the 2006 Ordinance, which "was to authorize the installation
and use of automated red light enforcement systems as a means to enforce its traffic law
prohibiting the running of a red light." 466 S. W.3d at 548 (holding only the "no points" portion
of the ordinance invalid).
Although Plaintiffs contend that "the ordinance is actually a revenue-generating scheme
put into motion by the Defendants under the guise of legitimate municipal action," they provide
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no further evidence or support for this argument. (Compl.

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20, ECF No. 4) Indeed, Plaintiffs

merely rely on previous allegations and unsupported conclusions to refute the language in St.
Peters' Ordinances stating that they were enacted to promote public safety, which is a
government function. Such conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated beliefs are insufficient to
establish a material question of fact. Robbins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 997 (8th Cir. 2015). As
found by another court in this district, " [t]he generic nature of the activity at issue is
governmental, and with absence of facts to suggest otherwise, the Court must conclude the red
light program is a governmental function. " Blair, 2016 WL 3682922, at *5. Therefore, the
Court finds that Defendant St. Peters is entitled to sovereign immunity, as it was engaged in a
governmental function, and Plaintiffs have failed to show that an exception applies. Id. As such,
summary judgment in favor of Defendant St. Peters on Count II for unjust enrichment and
Counts VIII and IX for money had and received. 3

B. Constitutional Claims

Next, Defendant St. Peters argues that Plaintiffs' claims for money damages for alleged
violations of the Missouri Constitution in Counts III and IV are not cognizable. They also assert
that Plaintiffs are precluded from raising these claims on the grounds of waiver and estoppel.
Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant St. Peters violated their right to due process and right against
self-incrimination under Article 1 of the Missouri Constitution, Sections 10 and 19, respectively.
Defendant St. Peters asserts that Plaintiffs waived these claims and are estopped from presenting
them now because they were not presented at the earliest possible moment, which was in the

Defendant St. Peters also contends that the claims for damages are barred by the
voluntary payment doctrine. However, because the Court finds that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity applies, the Court will not address this argument.
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municipal court. Plaintiffs respond that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to previously
raise the constitutional objections because Plaintiffs were not given guidance as to how to
dispute the violation.
"It is firmly established that a constitutional question must be presented at the earliest

possible moment 'that good pleading and orderly procedure will admit under the circumstances
of the given case, otherwise it will be waived."' Meadowbrook Country Club v. Davis, 384
S.W.2d 611, 612 (Mo. 1964) (quoting Secs. Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 326 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Mo.
1959)). "'The critical question in determining whether waiver occurs is whether the party
affected had a reasonable opportunity to raise the unconstitutional act or statute by timely
asserting the claim before a court oflaw."' Edwards v. City of Ellisville, 426 S.W.3d 644, 654
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting State ex rel. Yorkv. Daugherty, 969 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo. 1998)).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise their
constitutional claims because they did not receive guidance regarding challenging the alleged
violations. Plaintiffs rely upon Unverferth v. City of Florissant in support of their proposition.
419 S.W.3d 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Moline Acres v. Brennan,
470 S.W.3d 367 (Mo. 2015). In Unverferth, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's finding that the plaintiff waived her constitutional due process claims by failing to assert
those claims at a municipal court proceeding. Unverferth, 419 S.W.3d at 88. The court found
that the Notice of Violation did not contain a court date wherein the plaintiff could challenge the
violation. Id. The court specifically held, "[b]ecause [plaintiff] has pleaded that the Notice of
Violation failed to provide her with a court date, we reject the suggestion that her payment of the
fine as directed by the Notice of Violation somehow constituted a conscious decision by
[plaintiff] not to assert any defenses to the alleged violation." Id.
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Defendant St. Peters argues, and the Court agrees, that the facts of the present case are
distinguishable from Unverferth because Plaintiffs' Notices of Violation contained a court date
and time to appear before the municipal court and also contained information that the alleged
violators "may appear in court on your scheduled date to have the matter reviewed by the
Municipal Judge." (Def. St. Peters' Ex. E, pp. 3-4, ECF No. 59-5; Ex. I, pp. 3-4, ECF No. 59-9)
The Court finds this case is similar to Edwards v. City Ellisville, 426 S.W.3d 644 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013). In Edwards, the notices of violation issued by the City of Ellisville expressly informed
the alleged violators how to obtain a court hearing to challenge the violation. Id. at 654-55.
Alleged violators were told not to send payment if they desired to dispute the Notice of
Violation. Id. Instead, the recipient of the notice could request a hearing in municipal court,
after which time the court would schedule an arraignment and the car owner would receive
notice of the time and date of the hearing. Id. at 655. The Edwards court distinguished the
Florissant red light camera enforcement mechanism from the Ellisville Ordinance and Notice of
Violation because Ellisville clearly notified the plaintiffs of their option to appear in court. Id.
Specifically, the plaintiffs did not need to speculate as to how to challenge the Ordinance, and
the Edwards court found that the plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to raise the alleged
unconstitutionality of the Ordinance prior to filing their action in state court. Id. Thus, the court
held, " [b]y choosing not to raise their constitutional concerns at the earliest opportunity, they
have waived whatever constitutional claims they may have had." Id. (citation omitted).
Likewise, in the instant case, Plaintiffs had the opportunity to decline paying the fine and
instead attend a municipal hearing, during which time they could challenge the constitutionality
of the Ordinances. However, both Plaintiffs, and the putative class-members, paid the fine and
did not challenge the Ordinances at their scheduled hearings. Therefore, the Court finds that
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Plaintiffs waived their constitutional claims by failing to present them at the earliest possible
moment. Id. ; see also Blair, 2016 WL 3682922, at *6 ("By paying the fine and pleading guilty,
Plaintiffs waived their right to allege any constitutional violations."). Because the Court finds
that Plaintiffs' waived their constitutional claims, the Court need not address Defendant's other
arguments pertaining to the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, Defendant St. Peters
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts III and IV for alleged violations of Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights under the Missouri Constitution.
C. Declaratory Judgment
In Count I, Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment that the Ordinances are invalid and
that the Defendants' conduct was unlawful. Defendant St. Peters argues that Plaintiffs' claim for
declaratory judgment fails because they had an adequate remedy at law. In order to maintain an
action for declaratory judgment, plaintiff must present:
(1) a justiciable controversy that presents a real, substantial, presently-existing
controversy admitting of specific relief, as distinguished from an advisory decree
upon a purely hypothetical situation; (2) a plaintiff with a legally protectable
interest at stake, "consisting of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue
and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief;" (3) a controversy
ripe for judicial determination; and (4) an inadequate remedy at law.

Missouri SoybeanAss'n v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 25 (Mo. 2003)
(quoting Northgate Apartments, L.P. v. City of North Kansas City, 45 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Mo.
App. 2001)). "A declaratory judgment 'should be used with caution and, except in exceptional
circumstances plainly appearing, it is not to be used and applied where an adequate remedy
already exists."' Edwards, 426 S.W.3d at 656-57 (quoting State ex rel. Freeway Media, L.L.C.

v. City of Kansas City, 14 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Mo. App. 2000)). Further, where a different and

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specific statutory method of review is provided, the procedure for declaratory judgment may not
be utilized. Id. at 657.
St. Peters maintains that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy of law, namely raising their
claims in the municipal court, such that declaratory relief is not warranted. However, Plaintiffs
claim that because the Ordinances and St. Peters prohibit Plaintiffs and others in the putative
class from asserting certain legal and factual defenses, no alternative remedy exists to redress
their injuries and/or rights. Plaintiffs state that only Circuit Courts, not the municipal court, have
the power to declare the rights affected by the Ordinances. (Compl.

iii! 160-161 , ECF No. 4)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law to redress their claims.
Plaintiffs were provided a date for a hearing before the municipal court. Other than conclusory
allegations, Plaintiffs have provided no legal authority suggesting that they are precluded from
attacking the constitutionality and validity of the Ordinances in the municipal court. Smith v.
City of St. Louis, 409 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). Indeed, in Tupper v. City ofSt.
Louis, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that the municipal division has subject matter
jurisdiction over challenges to the ordinance upon which the prosecution is based. 468 S.W.3d
360, 369 (Mo. 2015); see also Schaefer v. Koster, 342 S.W.3d 299, 300 (Mo. 2011) (finding
municipal division proceedings provide an adequate legal remedy for constitutional challenges
sufficient to preclude declaratory judgment). Here, Plaintiffs elected not to attend the scheduled
hearing and present their claims regarding the invalidity of the Ordinances. Thus, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy of law such that they are not entitled to declaratory
judgment. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant St. Peters is therefore warranted with
respect to Count I.

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D. Abuse of Process
Last, St. Peters claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for
abuse of process because Plaintiffs are unable to offer evidence that St. Peters made use of
process for some collateral purpose. However, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants had no authority
to pursue legal action against Plaintiffs when Defendants knew the Ordinances and/or the
collection procedure was illegal.
"The elements of an abuse of process claim are: (1) the present defendant made an
improper, illegal, perverted use of process, which use was neither warranted nor authorized by
the process; (2) the defendant had an illegal purpose in doing so; and (3) damage resulted."

Crow v. Crawford & Co., 259 S.W.3d 104, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). "'It is
where the claim is brought not to recover on the cause of action stated, but to accomplish a
purpose for which the process was not designed that there is an abuse of process. '" Simms v.

Nationstar Mortg. , LLC, 44 F. Supp. 3d 927, 939 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (quoting Misischia v. St.
John 's Mercy Med. Ctr. , 30 S.W.3d 848, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated on other grounds
by Ellison v. Fry, 437 S.W.3d 762, 769-72 (Mo. 2014)).
Here, Plaintiffs claim that " [i]f [the citations] written and sent by Redflex constituted
legal process by seemingly emanating from the court and purporting to demand that recipients
such as Plaintiffs and Class appear before the St. Peters Municipal Court (or pay it), then they
were fraudulent. " (Pls.'Mem. in Opp. pp. 13-14, ECF No. 67) The statement ofuncontroverted
facts belies Plaintiffs' claim, however. The record demonstrates that the City of St. Peters issued
the Notice of Violation, not Defendant Redflex. (Def. St. Peters' Ex. E, ECF No. 59-5; Def. ' s
Ex. I, ECF No. 59-9) Plaintiffs do not dispute this. However, Plaintiffs contend that the
Missouri Supreme Court clarified in Roeder that operating a red light camera program under an
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ordinance that contravenes Missouri law is illegal. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the Roeder
court held that only the portion of the Ordinance assessing no points against a motorist's driver's
license conflicted with state law and was thus invalid. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d at 547. The Roeder
court then found the remainder of the Ordinance valid. Id. at 549. Nothing in the Roeder case
addresses the propriety of the issuance of the citations, and, as stated above, Defendant St.
Peters, not Redflex, issued the citations. Furthermore, Missouri courts have recognized "that a
red light camera ordinance that reduces the dangerousness of intersections by targeting vehicles
that violate traffic regulations is rationally and substantially related to the health, safety, peace,
comfort, and general welfare of the pubic and is a valid exercise of a city's police power."
Edwards, 426 S.W.3d at 659. The Court therefore finds that summary judgment in favor of

Defendant St. Peters is warranted.
Based on the analysis set forth above, the Court holds that Defendant St. Peters is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on Count I for declaratory judgment; Count II for unjust
enrichment; Counts III and IV for violations of the Missouri Constitution; Count VI for abuse of
process; and Counts VIII and IX for money had and received. Thus, all of Plaintiffs' claims
against Defendant St. Peters will be dismissed.
According! y,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of St. Peters' Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 57) is GRANTED. A separate Judgment shall accompany this
Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 24th day of October, 2016.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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