Scruggs v. Wallace
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Joshua L. Scruggs. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioners petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 1 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah on 9/18/18. (KEK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA L. SCRUGGS,
Petitioner,
v.
IAN WALLACE,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 4:15-CV-576-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Missouri state prisoner Joshua Scruggs’ (“Petitioner’s”)
Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 15). For the following reasons, the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus will be denied.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following a bench trial, Petitioner was found guilty of thirteen different sexual offenses
involving two children, J.C. and E.B.: two counts of sexual misconduct involving a child (for
exposing his genitals to E.B. and J.C.), one count of statutory rape in the first degree (for sexual
intercourse with J.C), eight counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree (for six acts of deviate
sexual intercourse with J.C., and two acts of deviate sexual intercourse with E.B.), one count of
child molestation in the first degree (for sexual contact with J.C. by placing his penis on her
vagina), and one count of furnishing pornography to minors (J.C.). Resp’t Ex. A, Doc. 17-1, at
1
473-75; Resp’t Ex. E, Doc. 16-3, at 2. 1 The court sentenced Petitioner to four years on each of the
sexual misconduct convictions, twenty-five years on the statutory rape conviction, twenty-five
years on each of the eight statutory sodomy convictions, fifteen years on the child molestation
charge, and one year on the furnishing pornography conviction, with all of the sentences to run
concurrently. Resp’t Ex. A, at 483-85. In his direct appeal, Petitioner raised a single claim: that
the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the conviction of
statutory rape in the first degree. Resp’t Ex. B, Doc. 16-1, at 11. The Missouri Court of Appeals
denied the claim on its merits. Resp’t Ex. E. On June 24, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 29.15
motion for post-conviction relief. Resp’t Ex. F, Doc. 17-3, at 3-26. In his amended motion for postconviction relief, filed through counsel, Petitioner raised two claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 33-49. The motion court denied the claims on the merits. Id. at 53-61. On appeal,
Petitioner raised a single claim: that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert on
direct appeal that the trial court erred in admitting E.B.’s out-of-court statements to her counselor
on the grounds that the statements did not provide sufficient indicia of reliability. Resp’t Ex. G,
Doc. 16-4, at 12. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of this claim.
Resp’t Ex. I, Doc. 16-6.
On April 3, 2015, Petitioner filed his filed his pro se petition in the instant action. Petitioner
raises three claims: (1) that the trial court erred in overruling his trial counsel’s motion for
judgment of acquittal as to the statutory rape charge, because there was insufficient evidence of
penetration; (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal a challenge
to the admission of E.B.’s out-of-court statements to her counselor; and (3) that his trial counsel
1
Unless otherwise specified, page numbers refer to the page numbering of the electronically
filed document.
2
was ineffective in that his trial counsel elicited incriminating evidence from J.C. and E.B. during
cross-examination.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard for Reviewing Claims on the Merits
Federal habeas review exists only “as ‘a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.’” Woods v.
Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
102-03 (2011)). “[I]n the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by AEDPA [the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying
state court decisions.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant relief to a state prisoner with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings unless the state court’s
adjudication of a claim “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court
decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law
or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state
court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if it
“correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular
prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407-08; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “Finally, a state
3
court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that the state court’s presumptively
correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005,
1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice v. Collins, 546
U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006) (noting that state court factual findings are presumed correct unless the
habeas petitioner rebuts them through clear and convincing evidence) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1)).
B. Procedural Default
To preserve a claim for federal habeas review, a state prisoner must present that claim to
the state court and allow that court the opportunity to address the claim. Moore-El v. Luebbers,
446 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991)).
“Where a petitioner fails to follow applicable state procedural rules, any claims not properly raised
before the state court are procedurally defaulted.” Id. The federal habeas court will consider a
procedurally defaulted claim only “where the petitioner can establish either cause for the default
and actual prejudice, or that the default will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id.
(citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1992)). To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must
show that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the petitioner’s] efforts to
comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To
establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that the claimed errors “worked to his actual
and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Lastly, in order to assert the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception, a petitioner must “present new evidence that affirmatively
4
demonstrates that he is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.” Murphy v. King, 652
F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006)).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Ground One: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Statutory Rape
Conviction
In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in overruling his trial counsel’s
motion for judgment of acquittal as to the statutory rape count against him. He argues that he was
charged with both statutory rape and child molestation in the first degree for rubbing his penis
against J.C.’s vagina, but that a statutory rape charge requires proof of penetration. Petitioner’s
claim appears to be that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of statutory rape because
there was insufficient evidence of penetration. Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal, and
the Missouri Court of Appeals denied it on the merits. Resp’t Ex. E.
In reviewing challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). Accord Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S.
37, 43 (2012); Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011). “This familiar standard gives full play to
the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319. State law determines the specific elements of the crime at issue. Fenske v. Thalacker, 60
F.3d 478, 480 (8th Cir. 1995). The federal habeas court’s scope of review is very limited. The
Court “must presume that the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in the record in favor
of the state” and “must defer to that resolution.” Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th
Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “a state-court decision rejecting a sufficiency
5
challenge may not be overturned on federal habeas unless the decision was objectively
unreasonable.” Parker, 567 U.S. at 43 (quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating this claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals set forth the Jackson standard
described above. Resp’t Ex. E, at 4. It then stated:
In Appellant’s sole point on appeal, Appellant contends that the State’s
evidence was insufficient, specifically, the State’s evidence did not establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant penetrated J.C.’s vagina with his penis.
We disagree.
A person commits the crime of statutory rape in the first degree if he has
sexual intercourse with another person who is less than 14 years old. Section
566.032, RSMo 2000. Sexual intercourse is defined as penetration, however slight,
of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, whether or not an emission results.
Section 566.010(4) RSMo 2000. The female sexual organs include a woman’s
vulva and external genitals. State v. Dunn, 7 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Mo. App. W.D.
1999). Proof of penetration may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, and
slight proof of penetration is sufficient. Hill v. State, 808 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991).
Appellant asserts that placing the penis against the vagina is not enough to
constitute penetration. Appellant cites State v. DeMoss, which states that, though
penetration may be slight, there must be penetration to some extent, and proof that
there was such penetration must be adduced. 92 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Mo. 1936).
Generally, in sexual offense cases, the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to
sustain a conviction, even if uncorroborated. State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 666
(Mo. App. W.D. 2003).
Here, proof of penetration is clear. Appellant incorrectly characterizes
J.C.’s statement that Appellant put his penis in her “private part” to mean in J.C.’s
bottom. At trial, J.C. clearly distinguished her bottom from her “private part.”:
Q:
Okay. And when you’re referring to your private part, you’re
referring to your vagina, is that right?
A:
Yes.
Q:
Okay. And where did he touch you with his penis?
A:
In both parts, my bottom and my private part.
The fact that J.C. referred to her vagina as her “private part” was also corroborated
by Megan (Fitzgerald) Marietta of the Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”) who
testified on direct examination:
6
Q:
Okay. And what did [J.C.] refer to as—what did she refer to her
vagina as? What were her words?
A:
She called that her private part.
Also, J.C. said that Appellant put his penis “in” her private part. Appellant ignores
the clear language in J.C.’s testimony which a trial court could find that Appellant
touched J.C. with his penis inside her private part.
While Appellant’s argument focuses on whether rubbing against the labia
is penetration, Appellant only cites to De Moss, which is clearly distinguishable. In
De Moss, the alleged victim disclaimed at trial the rape having ever taken place
(she had since married the alleged rapist), and the state was left to rely upon the
testimony of the victim’s sister, who would have been nine years old at the time of
the rape. De Moss, 92 S.W.2d 720, 722. It was under these circumstances that the
court held that proof of penetration did not measure up to the standard. Id. at 722.
Whereas here, evidence of penetration is supported by the victim’s own testimony.
J.C.’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the trial court to reasonably find
penetration and thus statutory rape in the first degree.
Resp’t Ex. E, at 5-6.
The Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Missouri Court of Appeals correctly identified
Jackson v. Virginia as the applicable legal precedent, and it reasonably applied that standard by
examining whether the testimony presented at trial established the elements of the crime at issue
as defined under Missouri law. The Court’s review of the record shows that the Missouri Court of
Appeals’ determination of the facts is supported by the record. J.C. did testify that Petitioner
touched her with his penis “in” her “private part” and that her “private part” was her vagina. Resp’t
Ex. A, at 226. Megan Marietta also testified that J.C. referred to her vagina as her “private part.”
Id. at 273. It was reasonable for the Missouri Court of Appeals to find that this was sufficient proof
of penetration under Missouri law. Petitioner’s suggestion that there was no proof of penetration
because a nurse practitioner testified that the victims had no physical findings of abuse is without
merit. The nurse practitioner also testified that the absence of physical findings did not rule out
7
abuse; that 90 to 95% of all of her examinations are normal, even when penetration with a penis is
alleged; and that the reason is that this type of contact can occur without injury or can cause small
injuries that heal very quickly. Id. at 346-47.
For all of the above reasons, the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to,
or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor did it involve an
unreasonable determination of the facts. Therefore, Ground One will be denied.
B. Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Appellate Counsel’s Failure
to Challenge on Appeal the Admission of E.B.’s Out-of-Court Statements
In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective because
counsel failed to challenge the admission of out-of-court statements from one of the victims, E.B.
Petitioner asserts that the statements E.B. made to her counselor, which were admitted at trial,
were clearly not spontaneous or consistent with her earlier statements. Petitioner raised this claim
in his amended motion for post-conviction relief and in his appeal from the denial of that motion,
and the Missouri Court of Appeals denied it on the merits. Resp’t Ex. I, at 6-10.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Petitioner “must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient, and prejudice from that deficiency.” United States v.
Brown, 528 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2008). The standard for showing deficient performance
is rigorous, and “[e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal.” Id. at 1033 (citing Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)). Thus, “absent contrary evidence, ‘[the court] assume[s] that appellate
counsel’s failure to raise a claim was an exercise of sound appellate strategy.’” Id. (quoting Roe v.
Delo, 160 F.3d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1998)). See also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)
(“[A]ppellate counsel who files a merits brief need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous
claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on
8
appeal.”) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. 745). The standard for showing prejudice is also rigorous:
Petitioner “must show that ‘the result of the proceeding would have been different’ had he raised
[the issue] on direct appeal.” Brown, 528 F.3d at 1033 (citing Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541,
546 (8th Cir. 2005)). See also Pryor v. Norris, 103 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1997) (to demonstrate
prejudice based on counsel's failure to raise a claim on appeal, petitioner must show a “reasonable
probability that an appeal of [the] issue would have been successful and that the result of the appeal
would thereby have been different”).
In addressing this claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals first noted that Missouri law
provides an exception to the exclusionary hearsay rule and allows a witness to testify regarding
the out-of-court statements of a child sexual abuse victim if the statements are shown to be
sufficiently reliable. Resp’t Ex. I, at 7 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.075; State v. Lane, 415 S.W.3d
740, 748-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Hannon, 398 S.W.3d 108, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)). It
then discussed the factors Missouri courts use to determine whether a victim’s out-of-court
statements are sufficiently reliable to be admitted, which include (1) the spontaneity and consistent
repetition of the statements; (2) the mental state of the child-declarant; (3) the lack of a motive to
fabricate the statements; (4) the knowledge of subject matter unexpected of a child of similar age
to the child-declarant; (5) the lapse of time between when the acts occurred and when the child
reported the acts; and (6) the technique used by the interviewer. Resp’t Ex. I, at 8 (citing Hannon,
398 S.W.3d at 116). The Missouri Court of Appeals found that E.B.’s statements were sufficiently
reliable to be admitted, reasoning that whenever there are allegations of sexual abuse, a child must
be interviewed, and her statements to a professional interviewer are not unreliable simply because
the purpose of the interview is to discuss the sexual abuse; that the fact that a child first denies and
later admits she was sexually abused is not unusual and does not by itself render the child’s later
9
incriminating statements unreliable; that E.B.’s counselor testified at the hearing before the trial
court that E.B. had symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress reaction and used toys and
dolls to engage in “sexualized play”; that E.B. provided details to her counselor regarding Scruggs’
sexual contact; and that there was no evidence presented that E.B. had gained her knowledge of
those sexual acts from any source other than her own experiences. Id. at 8-9. The court concluded
that because the trial court had not erred admitting E.B’s out-of-court statements, “there is no
reasonable probability that, had that issue been raised on direct appeal, the outcome of Scruggs’
direct appeal would have been different.” Id. at 10.
The Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, nor did it involve an unreasonable determination of
the facts presented to the state court. Missouri law expressly provides for the admission of out-ofcourt statements of a sexual abuse victim where those statements are shown to be sufficiently
reliable. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.075. The Missouri Court of Appeals analyzed the facts presented
to the trial court and found that E.B.’s statements were sufficiently reliable to be admissible under
Missouri law, and that finding has support in the record. See Resp’t Ex. A, Doc. 17-1, at 86
(testimony of former forensic interviewer for the Child Advocacy Center that 72 percent of
children will initially deny that anything has happened to them but that most go on to disclose); id.
at 119 (testimony of E.B.’s therapist that E.B. experienced symptoms often associated with posttraumatic stress reaction and used toys and dolls to engage in sexualized play); id. at 126-27
(testimony of E.B.’s therapist that E.B. provided the details of her allegations and that the therapist
never gave her any details about what the therapist knew about the sexual abuse); id. at 132-33
(testimony of E.B.’s therapist regarding details of E.B.’s allegations). The Missouri Court of
Appeals reasonably analyzed the facts here in light of this Missouri law and concluded that the
10
evidence was properly admitted, and this Court cannot second-guess that decision. See Arnold v.
Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We do not second-guess the decision of a Missouri
state court on Missouri law.”); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not
the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state law
questions.”). Because there was no error in the admission of E.B.’s out-of-court statements, the
Missouri Court of Appeals’ reasonably found that there was no reasonable probability that, had
Petitioner’s counsel raised this claim on direct appeal, the outcome of his direct appeal would have
been different. Thus, the Missouri Court of Appeals reasonably denied this claim because
Petitioner could not establish the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance claim.
For all of the above reasons, Ground Two will be denied.
C. Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel—Eliciting
Incriminating Evidence from the Victims During Cross-Examination
In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that in cross-examining the victims, his trial counsel
unreasonably went into detail regarding the accusations against him, even when the prosecutor had
not gone into those details.
Respondent argues that Ground Three is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed
to present it to the Missouri state courts in accordance with Missouri’s procedural rules. The Court
agrees. “Missouri procedure requires that a claim be presented ‘at each step of the judicial process'
in order to avoid default.” Jolly v. Gammon, 28 F.3d 51, 53 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Benson v.
State, 611 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). Under Missouri law, claims of ineffective
assistance of trial or appellate counsel must be brought through a Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 29.15(a). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
procedurally defaulted if a petitioner fails to raise it in the appeal from the denial of a motion for
post-conviction relief. See Moore-El v. Luebbers, 446 F.3d 890, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2006) (Missouri
11
inmate’s failure to raise a claim on appeal from the denial of state post-conviction relief constitutes
a procedural default of that claim); Osborne v. Puckett, 411 F.3d 911, 919 (8th Cir. 2005) (same).
Petitioner admits that he did not raise this issue in the appeal from the denial of his motion for
post-conviction relief. Pet’n at 9. Thus, Ground Three is procedurally defaulted, and the Court
cannot reach the merits of this claim unless Petitioner can show “either cause for the default and
actual prejudice, or that the default will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Moore-El,
446 F.3d at 896.
Petitioner has not shown cause to excuse the procedural default of Ground Three.
Petitioner’s sole explanation for his failure to present this claim in his appeal from the denial of
his motion for post-conviction is that “appellate counsel determined that appealing this issue would
not have been meritorious.” Pet’n at 9. Even assuming, arguendo, that this statement could be
construed as an assertion that Petitioner’s post-conviction appeal counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this claim, it cannot constitute cause in this case. Although ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel may constitute cause for the failure to raise a claim in an initial postconviction proceeding, Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), ineffective assistance of postconviction appellate counsel does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. See Arnold,
675 F.3d at 1087 (“Martinez offers no support, however, for the contention that the failure to
preserve claims on appeal from a postconviction proceeding can constitute cause.”).
Further, Petitioner cannot avoid the procedural bar under the fundamental miscarriage of
justice exception. To satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, a petitioner must
“present new evidence that affirmatively demonstrates that he is innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted.” Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
12
Petitioner does not allege any facts to support the existence of new evidence affirmatively
demonstrating his innocence.
For all of the above reasons, Ground Three will be denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2253, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a 28
U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit judge or district judge issues a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To grant such a certificate, the judge must find that the
petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2);
Tiedman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). “A substantial showing is a showing that
issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the
issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted). The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not differ on Petitioner’s claim, so the Court
will not issue a certificate of appealability. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue because
Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. § 2253.
A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
13
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 18th day of September, 2018.
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?