Collins et al v. Veolia ES Industrial Services, Inc.

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties joint motion to approve settlement is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 35 .) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, the parties shall file dismissal papers dismissing the case. Failure to comply may result in the dismissal of the case by the Court. ( Dismissal Paper(s) due by 4/8/2016.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/1/2016. (KCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ARNOLD DALE COLLINS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VEOLIA ES INDUSTRIAL SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:15-CV-00743-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the parties’ joint motion (Doc. No. 35) to
approve the settlement of Plaintiffs’ individual Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
claims. In addition to the settlement agreement and upon request of the Court, the parties
have submitted information under seal from which the Court can assess the fairness of the
proposed settlement and the attorneys’ fees requested. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion to approve the settlement shall be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Arnold Dale Collins and Mark Neidert assert FLSA claims1 to recover
for unpaid travel time to and from their assigned work site in the course of their
employment with Defendant Veolia ES Industrial Services, Inc., an environmental and
industrial services corporation. The FLSA claims request collection of unpaid wages
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Plaintiffs originally also asserted common law claims for breach of contract,
quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, but the Court granted Defendant’s motion to
dismiss these claims.

dating back to March 27, 2012, three years prior to the filing of the complaint. However,
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendant began compensating them for travel time in March
2013, so Plaintiffs’ recovery would be limited to approximately one year of unpaid
wages. Defendant denies any liability for the unpaid travel time alleged. The parties
have now reached a private settlement, which provides for separate payments to each
Plaintiff and an award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel.
DISCUSSION
“[T]he law is unsettled as to whether judicial approval of a proposed settlement of
FLSA claims is required in the absence of a certified class.” King v. Raineri Constr.,
LLC, No. 4:14–CV–1828 (CEJ), 2015 WL 631253, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2015)
(citing cases). In Copeland v. ABB, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that “FLSA rights are
statutory and cannot be waived,” and that “[t]here are only two statutory exceptions to
this general rule”: (1) “an employee may accept payment of unpaid wages under the
supervision of the Secretary of Labor and if the back wages are paid in full”; and (2) “if
an employee brings suit directly against a private employer pursuant to § 216(b) of the
statute, and the district court enters a stipulated judgment, it will have res judicata effect
on any subsequent claim for damages.” 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982)). But
neither this case nor the cases cited therein inform the Court whether it must evaluate and
approve a private FLSA settlement, or whether such approval is a prerequisite for
subsequent judicial enforcement of a private settlement. See Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51
F. Supp. 3d 124, 131 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing Lynn’s Food and its progeny and finding
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that the issues addressed therein—whether an FLSA settlement is legally enforceable—
“is distinct from whether a court must—or should—evaluate such a proposed settlement
ex ante,” and noting that “no binding caselaw in this Circuit requires a district court to
assess proposed FLSA settlements ex ante”).
Nevertheless, because the parties have mutually sought judicial approval of their
proposed settlement, and because declining to review the settlement would leave the
parties in an uncertain position, the Court will review the settlement’s FLSA-related
terms for fairness. See King, 2015 WL 631253, at *2 (reviewing settlement’s FLSArelated terms, notwithstanding lack of clear requirement to do so); Carrillo, 51 F. Supp.
3d at 131 (same).
“A district court may only approve a settlement agreement in a case brought under
§ 216(b) of the FLSA after it determines that the litigation involves a bona fide dispute
and that the proposed settlement is fair and equitable to all parties.” Williams v. BPV
Mkt. Place Investors, L.L.C., No. 4:14-CV-1047 CAS, 2014 WL 5017934, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 7, 2014). Among the factors the court may consider in evaluating the
settlement’s fairness are “the stage of the litigation, the amount of discovery exchanged,
the experience of counsel, and the reasonableness of the settlement amount based on the
probability of plaintiffs’ success with respect to any potential recovery.” Id.
Normally, the Court must also assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees. Williams, 2014 WL 5017934, at *2. “Attorney’s fees in FLSA
settlements are examined to ensure that the interest of plaintiffs’ counsel in counsel’s
own compensation did not adversely affect the extent of the relief counsel procured for
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the clients.” King, 2015 WL 631253, at *3 (citation omitted). “In a private FLSA action
where the parties settled on the fee through negotiation, there is a greater range of
reasonableness for approving attorney’s fees.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Dail v.
George A. Arab Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1146 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“In an individual
FLSA claim, where separate amounts are set forth for the payments of unpaid wages and
payments for attorneys’ fees, the Court has greater flexibility in exercising its discretion
in determining the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee.”).
In this case, the Court finds that the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable to
all parties. The settlement is the product of a bona fide dispute between the parties, and
was reached after an arm’s length negotiation by counsel. The settlement agreements
provide for payment of unpaid wages to each Plaintiff in an amount representing
approximately 80% of each Plaintiff’s maximum alleged damages, which the Court finds
to be fair and reasonable.
The Court also finds that the requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable. Plaintiffs’
counsel submitted a memorandum describing counsel’s fee agreements with Plaintiffs
and noting that the amount of fees requested is less than the total amount permitted by the
agreements. The Court finds that amount of attorneys’ fees requested by Plaintiffs’
counsel is in accordance with counsel’s fee agreements and is reasonable, based on the
amount of time and effort expended on this case.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties’ joint motion to approve settlement
is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 35.)
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within seven (7) days of the date of this
Order, the parties shall file dismissal papers dismissing the case. Failure to comply may
result in the dismissal of the case by the Court.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 1st day of April, 2016.

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