Huffman v. Missouri Department of Corrections

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Title II ADA Claims against MDOC. [Doc. 28] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defen dants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's official capacity claims against DeBose and Nieves. [Doc. 28] An order of partial dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 7/19/2016. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KENDALL LEE HUFFMAN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:15-CV-768 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28), filed by Defendants
Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), Defendant DeBose (“DeBose”) and Defendant
Nieves (“Nieves”) (collectively “Defendants”), directed at Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint.1 For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted in part, and denied in
part.
Background
Plaintiff is an offender in the custody of MDOC. MDOC is a state agency that operates the
St. Louis Community Release Center (“SLCRC”) and the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic &
Correctional Center (“ERDCC”). SLCRC is a low security correctional facility in MDOC’s
Probation and Parole division, and ERDCC is a prison for male offenders. Defendants DeBose and

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The “First Amended Complaint” at issue herein, filed on September 28, 2015 by appointed counsel
and docketed as Document 20, is the actually the second amended pleading filed in this case. Plaintiff
previously filed a pro se amended complaint on July 20, 2015. (Doc. 6). However, that pleading was given
the title “Amended Complaint,” and the September 28 pleading was given the title “First Amended
Complaint.” The Court will therefore use the title “First Amended Complaint” when referring to Document
20.

Nieves are SLCRC officers. From February 4 to February 13, 2015, Plaintiff was located at the
SLCRC, but at all other times relevant herein was incarcerated at ERDCC.
Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that he suffers from caudal regression syndrome, spina
bifida, scoliosis, sciatica, and severe back pain. He alleges that he has been confined to a wheelchair
for life, uses a colostomy bag, and wears diapers. Plaintiff alleges that he has been refused
reasonable accommodations required by his disability, causing him to suffer various injuries and to
be excluded from participating in MDOC’s medical services and programs. Plaintiff also alleges that
he has been subjected to physical abuse and ridicule.
The instant motion to dismiss is directed at Counts III and IV. In Count III, Plaintiff proceeds
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment
against DeBose and Nieves in their individual and official capacities. Defendants argue that the
official capacity claims against DeBose and Nieves should be dismissed because they are not
cognizable under § 1983. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that MDOC violated Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).2 Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution acts as a complete jurisdictional bar to Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff filed
a Memorandum opposing the instant Motion, in which he Plaintiff argued against dismissing his
Title II ADA claim against MDOC, but did not address Defendants’ argument in support of dismissal
of the official capacity claims against DeBose and Nieves.

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Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities, such as state prisons, from discriminating against
qualified persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or activities.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).

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Discussion
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency
of the challenged claim. When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the Complaint,
and review the Complaint to determine whether its allegations show the pleader to be entitled to
relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A claim
must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U .S. at 570. While the Complaint need not provide specific
facts in support of the claims contained therein, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam), it “must include sufficient factual information to provide the ‘grounds’ on which the claim
rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp.,
517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 & n.3). When determining
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
ADA Claim Against MDOC – Count IV
The Court will first consider Defendants’ arguments directed at Count IV of Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that MDOC violated Title II of the ADA by
deliberately refusing to accommodate his disability-related needs such as a handicap-accessible cell
and/or handicap-accessible sink, help with various types of cleaning, and assistance into his
wheelchair. Plaintiff also alleges that MDOC deliberately refused to provide him with necessary
medical supplies such as clean diapers and colostomy bags, and also refused to provide clean
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clothing and bedding. Plaintiff alleges that MDOC’s conduct has resulted in his exclusion from
programs and services offered by MDOC, and has also caused him to sustain various injuries,
including infection due to exposure to bodily waste. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and monetary relief.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against MDOC should be dismissed because the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal court jurisdiction over suits brought by private parties against
unconsenting states, including actions for money damages brought under Title II of the ADA.
Defendants’ argument is not well taken.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
While the Eleventh Amendment provides states with a strong defense against suit in federal
court, such immunity is not absolute. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to
abrogate sovereign immunity to enforce that Amendment’s provisions. Klingler v. Director, Dept.
of Revenue, State of Mo., 455 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2006).3
In support of the argument that sovereign immunity exists for actions for money damages
brought under Title II of the ADA, Defendants cite Alsbrook v. City Maumelle, 184 F.3d 99 (8th Cir.
1999). However, as Plaintiff correctly notes, the Eighth Circuit has since expressed a lack of
confidence that Alsbrook can serve as a reliable basis for resolving claims for money damages under
Title II of the ADA. See Klingler, 455 F.3d at 892.

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A state may also be subject to suit where it has unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity and
consented to suit in federal court. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). In the case at bar, neither
party raises the issue of whether MDOC has so consented.

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In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Title II
abrogates sovereign immunity in certain circumstances. The Court stated: “insofar as Title II creates
a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Id. at 159 (emphasis
in original).

The Eighth Circuit has also dealt specifically with the interaction between Eleventh

Amendment immunity and Title II of the ADA. In Dinkins v. Correctional Medical Services, 743
F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2014), the Court held that “Title II of the ADA abrogates both the State of
Missouri’s and the MDOC’s immunity for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 635.
Accepting as true the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Twombly, 550 U.S.
555–56, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has properly pleaded a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment via his allegations that MDOC has violated the Eighth Amendment. See Georgia, 546
U.S. at 157 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment”). Plaintiff alleges that he was
excluded from participation in MDOC’s programs and services, and that he was denied various
disability-related accommodations such as a handicap-accessible cell, a handicap-accessible sink,
and the necessary supplies and assistance to properly dispose of bodily waste and maintain adequate
hygiene. See Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 807-09 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding damages award
for Eighth Amendment violation where paraplegic inmates were denied necessary assistance with
eliminating bodily waste, and missed meals because their wheelchairs could not maneuver to the
door where food was placed); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 392-94 (4th Cir. 1987) (failure to
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ensure that mobility-impaired inmate had accessible toilet facilities and physical therapy violated the
Eighth Amendment). Because Plaintiff has alleged conduct by MDOC that violates the Eighth
Amendment – and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment – he is entitled to offer evidence to support
his Title II ADA claim against MDOC.
Official Capacity Claims Against DeBose and Nieves – Count III
Plaintiff, proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment against DeBose and Nieves in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff
seeks declaratory and monetary relief. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
against DeBose and Nieves should be dismissed because they are not cognizable under §1983.
Plaintiff offers no objection.
As Defendants correctly note, state officials sued for monetary relief in their official
capacities are not “persons” subject to § 1983 liability because such suits are in reality suits against
the state itself. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh
Amendment provides immunity to state officials who are sued in their official capacities. In re Sdds,
97 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit has held that § 1983 does not abrogate the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Williams v. State of Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 600 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Congress did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 2012) (§ 1983 provides no cause of
action against agents of the State acting in their official capacities). Plaintiff offers no argument to
support his official capacity claims against DeBose and Nieves, and Defendants’ arguments are well
taken.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED to the
extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title II ADA Claims against MDOC. [Doc. 28]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to
the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against DeBose and Nieves. [Doc.
28]
An order of partial dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

_________________________________
CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 19th day of July, 2016.

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