St. Louis Glass and Allied Industries Health & Welfare Insurance Fund et al v. Wood River Glass Company

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for default judgment [Doc. #5] is granted. A separate judgment will be entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 12/2/2015. (KMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ST. LOUIS GLASS AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES HEALTH & WELFARE
INSURANCE FUND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WOOD RIVER GLASS CO.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:15-CV-1014-CEJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
I.

Background

Plaintiffs bring this action to collect delinquent fringe benefit contributions
pursuant to Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 et seq.

Plaintiffs are five employee

benefit plans (the Apprenticeship Training & Journeyman Education, Glazier Unit
Money Purchase, Pension, Vacation and Holiday, and Health & Welfare Insurance
funds) and their trustees (collectively, the plans).

Defendant Wood River Glass

Company is an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of
the ERISA.

Defendant employs individuals who are members of the Glaziers,

Architectural Metal and Glassworkers Local Union No. 513 (the Union).

Plaintiffs

allege that defendant failed to make timely contributions to the plans as required
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between defendant and the
Union.

II.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed the instant case on June 29, 2015. Service was achieved on
defendant on June 30, 2015. Under Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i), Fed. R. Civ. P., defendant
was required to file an answer or other responsive pleading within twenty-one days
of being served with the complaint. Because defendant failed to do so, the Clerk of
Court entered default against it on August 21, 2015. Defendant has not responded
to the entry of default, and plaintiffs moved for default judgment.
III.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, default judgment is appropriate when “a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise . . . .”
Granting default judgment is within a district court’s discretion. Weitz Co., LLC v.
MacKenzie House, LLC, 665 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2012).
When a party defaults, “the factual allegations of a complaint (except those
relating to the amount of damages) are taken as true, but ‘it remains for the court
to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action,
since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law.’” Murray v. Lene,
595 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2688, at 63 (3d ed. 1998)).

“The court may

conduct hearings or make referrals . . . when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it
needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C)
establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other
matter.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

However, where “‘the findings and judgment

regarding damages in the instant case are capable of being computed on the basis

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of facts of record’ . . . the district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of damages.” Taylor v. City of Ballwin, 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)).
IV.

Discussion

ERISA provides that employers shall make contributions when required by
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 1145. Employers who
fail to make the required contributions may be liable for the unpaid contributions,
interest, liquidated damages (or the value of the interest again, where that amount
is greater than the liquidated damages, or where liquidated damages have not been
provided for), attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id. § 1132(g)(2).
On December 24, 2008, defendant agreed to be bound by the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement with the Union (the Agreement), effective
retroactively from November 1, 2008, through October 31, 2013. [Doc. #9] The
Agreement requires defendant to make contributions to the plans for each hour
worked by employees covered by the Agreement. Id. arts. 11, 13–14, 16, 17. The
Agreement also incorporates by reference the plans’ trust documents, which
provide that failure to make timely contributions subjects defendant to interest,
court costs, attorneys’ fees, and accounting costs.

[Doc. ##1-4 § 3.13; 1-5 §§

4.4–5; 1-6 §§ 4.08, 7.25; 1-7 art. VII] The Agreement was later extended until
February 28, 2015. [Doc. #12] On February 27, 2015, defendant and the Union
entered into a new agreement that also incorporates the plans’ trust documents,
effective retroactively from November 1, 2014, until October 31, 2017. [Doc. #11]
Plaintiffs

submit

the

affidavit

of

Carol

Kaminski,

the

plans’

Fund

Representative, who is responsible for calculating delinquent amounts owed to the

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plans.

Kaminski attests that defendant has failed to remit contributions from

August 2014 through June 2015 in the amount of $108,976.28, based on a payroll
compliance examination she conducted.

This exhibit establishes that, for this

period, defendant owes $108,976.28 in unpaid contributions, $9,807.87 in interest,
and another $9,807.87 in interest (in lieu of liquidated damages), for a total of
$128,592.02.
Based on the documentation and affidavits submitted by plaintiffs, the Court
finds that defendant Wood River Glass Company was bound at all relevant times by
a valid collective bargaining agreement and that it breached its obligations by
failing to timely pay the required contributions.

Plaintiffs have established that

defendant is liable to them for $108,976.28 in unpaid contributions, $9,807.87 in
interest, and another $9,807.87 in interest (in lieu of liquidated damages), for a
total of $128,592.02.
Plaintiffs also submit the affidavit of attorney Daniel M. McLaughlin.
According to Mr. McLaughlin, a total of 5.9 hours was expended in connection with
this matter, for a total of $1,003.00 for legal services. Mr. McLaughlin attests that
he was the only person at his law firm who worked on the case, and that his hourly
billing rate is $170.00. The Court finds that the hourly rate and hours expended
are reasonable, and plaintiffs are therefore entitled to $1,003.00 in attorney’s fees.
In addition, the firm paid $400.00 for the filing fee and $109.04 for service of
process, for a total of $509.04.

Plaintiffs only seek to recover $409.04 of that

amount, however. They are entitled to $409.04 for costs.
Adding together the $128,592.02, the $1,003.00 in attorney’s fees, and the
$409.04 in costs, defendant owes plaintiffs $130,004.06. Furthermore, an audit of

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defendant’s payroll records from August 1, 2014, to the present is appropriate in
the instant case.

The Court will order defendant to pay plaintiffs the amounts

above, and will order an audit of defendant’s records.
*****
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment
[Doc. #5] is granted.
A separate judgment will be entered this same date.

CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 2nd day of December, 2015.

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