Henry v. J&M Securities, LLC et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (See Full Order.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 18 ] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's §§ 1692(e), (e)(10), (d), and (g) Claims [ECF No. 8 ] is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on 12/1/2015. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

Ronald Henry,
Plaintiff,

v.

J&M Securities, LLC,
and
Sansone Law, LLC, doing business as
Sansone & Lauber,
Defendants,

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Case No. 4:15-cv-01078-ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 18].
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ronald Henry (“Plaintiff”) initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint against

Defendants J&M Securities, LLC (“Defendant J&M”) and Sansone Law, LLC (“Defendant
Sansone”) on July 13, 2015 [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff’s single-count complaint alleged numerous
violations by Defendants of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleged Defendants engaged in false, deceptive, harassing, and unfair
conduct in collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692(d), (e), (e)(10), (f), and (g). On
August 4, 2014, Defendants jointly filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint [ECF No. 7] and a

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 8] for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) as well as
lack of ripeness. Plaintiff first filed for a Motion for Extension of Time to File Response [ECF
No. 10] on August 14, 2015. That motion was granted [ECF No. 11], extending the deadline to
file a response to September 11, 2015. On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed his second Motion
for Extension of Time to File Response [ECF No. 12], which was again granted, extending the
deadline to file a response to October 5, 2015 [ECF No. 13]. On October 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed
a Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiff voluntarily
abandoned its 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g) claim against Defendants, and alleged instead a claim for
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(2)(a). Defendants, on November 9, 2015, filed a Response in
Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [ECF No.
20].
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs amendment of pleadings. Sherman v.

Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 15(a), when leave to
amend is not sought “as a matter of course,”- i.e., before being served with a responsive pleading
or within 20 days after serving the pleading if no responsive pleading is allowed and trial has not
yet been set, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) - leave to amend pleadings should still be “freely given
when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In addition, “Parties should usually be
given at least one chance to amend their complaint.” Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank of Poplar
Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 409 (8th Cir. 1999). Even under this standard, however, “[a] district court
appropriately denies the movant leave to amend if ‘there are compelling reasons such as undue
delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.’ ”
Sherman, 532 F.3d at 715 (quoting Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc.,
406 F.3d 1052, 1065 (8th Cir. 2005); Baptist Health v. Smith, 477 F.3d 540, 544 (8th Cir. 2007).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his original complaint in order to substitute his 15 U.S.C. §

1692(g) claim for a claim against Defendants for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(2)(a).
Plaintiff alleges his motion is timely as “Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss, and the
Court has yet to hold a Rule 16 conference. The parties have not yet begun discovery or motion
practice. Accordingly, the leave Plaintiff requests prejudices no party.” [ECF No. 18 at 3].
Defendants, in their response, request a denial of Plaintiff’s motion as Plaintiff failed to file
either this motion or a response their Motion to Dismiss by the Court’s October 5, 2015 deadline.
Granting Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint so early in the proceedings will not cause
Defendants any undue prejudice. The substituted claim is closely related to Plaintiff’s other
claims against Defendants in this action. Discovery has not yet begun and no depositions have
yet taken place. Substituting this claim would require no additional discovery burden on either
party.
While Defendants are correct that Plaintiff filed his motion two days after the Court’s
deadline to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court has not yet ruled on
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court has also not yet scheduled a Rule 16 conference
which would establish a Case Management Order for both parties to follow. Finally, this is
Plaintiff’s first attempt to amend their complaint. Although Defendants suggest Plaintiff is
attempting to cause undue delay through this motion, the Court finds no evidence of such
suggestion.

Furthermore, “it is well-settled that delay alone is not a sufficient reason for denying
leave.” Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1981).
Instead, Courts must also show that grant of leave after such delay would result in prejudice to
other parties. See Mercantile Trust Co. Nat. Ass’n. v. Inland Marine Products Corp., 542 F.2d
1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1976). As stated above, the Court finds no prejudice to Defendants in
granting Plaintiff’s motion, even though it was filed two days after the Court’s response
deadline. Courts have consistently allowed amendments to complaints at much later stages of
litigation and at much greater prejudice to other parties. See, e.g., Buder, 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.
1981) (overturning a district court’s denial of motion to amend where district court ruled a two
and a half year delay between the filing of the original complaint and the filing of the motion to
amend precluded amendment for undue delay even though the motion did not demonstrate
prejudice as claims in both filings were substantially similar); See also Sanders v. Clemco
Industries, 823 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding district court’s refusal to permit amendment
was an abuse of discretion as no prejudice to opposing party could be found despite delay of
almost a year).
IV.

CONCLUSION
Though Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint two days after the deadline to respond to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss had passed, the Court finds that the delayed filing of the
amended complaint not result in prejudice to Defendants. The claims in the original complaint
and the amended complaint are substantially similar as Plaintiffs merely substituted one of their
three FDCPA claims with another FDCPA claim. Furthermore, no Rule 16 conference had yet
been scheduled and no discovery had begun. As such, this amended complaint would impose no
increased burden of discovery costs on either party.

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 18] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s §§ 1692(e),
(e)(10), (d), and (g) Claims [ECF No. 8] is DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated this 1st Day of December, 2015.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE