Carson v. Griffith
Filing
16
OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Doc.No. 1 ], is dismissed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue. A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 9/11/18. (KJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM C. CARSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
CINDY GRIFFITH,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
) Case No: 4:15CV01442 HEA
)
)
)
)
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 [Doc. No.1] on September 21, 2015. Respondent filed a Response to the
Court’s Order to Show Cause Why Relief Should Not be Granted [Doc. No. 13] on
January 5, 2016. On February 29, 2016, Petitioner filed his Reply to Response to
Order to Show Cause [Doc. No.14]. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, this Court has determined
that there are no issues asserted that give rise to an evidentiary hearing and
therefore one is not warranted. For the reasons explained below, the Response to
the Order to Show Cause Why Relief Should not be Granted is well taken and the
petition will be dismissed.
Procedural Background
Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on September 14, 2011 of seconddegree murder, armed criminal action and unlawful use of a weapon. Petitioner
was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences. On December 29, 2011 Petitioner
timely filed his Notice of Appeal.
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals Petitioner asserted the trial court
for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, City of St. Louis, erred by allowing the
testimony of a state investigator that impeached James Butler’s trial testimony. He
argued that the testimony contained speculation and hearsay. The Missouri Court
of Appeals concluded the point not reviewable as there was no specific objection to
any testimony from the investigator, on a hearsay basis or any other basis. The
Missouri Court of Appeals also refused to review the point under plain error
considerations.
Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (“AEDPA”) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners
after the statute’s effective date of April 24, 1996. When reviewing a claim that
has been decided on the merits by a state court, AEDPA limits the scope of judicial
review in a habeas proceeding as follows:
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted
-2-
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In construing AEDPA, the United States Supreme Court, in Williams v.
Taylor, held that:
Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the ‘unreasonable
application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
U.S. Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). Furthermore, the Williams Court held that “a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” 529 U.S. at 409.
A state court decision must be left undisturbed unless the decision was
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
-3-
law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or the decision was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in state court. Colvin v. Taylor, 324 F.3d 583, 586-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
A decision is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent if it
decides a case based on a different rule of law than the rule dictated by United
States Supreme Court precedent, or it decides a case differently than the United
States Supreme Court did on materially indistinguishable facts. Id. A decision may
only be overturned, as an unreasonable application of clearly established United
States Supreme Court precedent, if the decision is both wrong and an objectively
unreasonable interpretation or application of United States Supreme Court
precedent. Id. A federal habeas court may not disturb an objectively reasonable
state court decision on a question of federal law even if the decision is, in the
federal court’s view, wrong under Eighth Circuit precedent, and even if the habeas
court would have decided the case differently on a clean slate. Id. State court
factual determinations are presumed to be correct and this presumption can only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).
Statute of Limitations
Congress provides a one-year window in which a habeas applicant can file a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. That window opens at the conclusion of direct
review. The window closes a year later. Failure to file within that one year
-4-
window requires the court to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28
U.S.C. §2244(d) (1) (A); See Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971 (2003). If an inmate does not seek a writ of certiorari on
direct review, direct review concludes when the time limit for seeking further
review expires. Gonzales v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). Under Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 30.01, Rule 30.03, Rule 81.04, and Rule 81.08, the time limit
for filing a notice of appeal is ten days after sentencing.
Procedural Bar
One who pursues relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A) must have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. In order to effectuate
the fulfillment of this requirement, “state prisoners must give the state courts one
full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete
round of the State’s established appellate review process” before presenting those
issues as application for federal habeas relief in federal court. O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999). “A federal
habeas petitioner’s claims must rely on the same factual and legal bases relied on
in state court”; otherwise, they are defaulted. Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026,
1034 (8th Cir. 2006).
Exhaustion “refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal
petition.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d
-5-
783 (1982). Thus, “if it is clear that [the habeas petitioner’s] claims are now
procedurally barred under [state] law,” the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.
Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 103 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1989).
“[T]he procedural bar that gives rise to exhaustion provides an independent and
adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence, and thus prevents
federal habeas corpus review of the defaulted claim, unless the petitioner can
demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S.
152, 161-62, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 135 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1996).
In Missouri, “habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or post-conviction
proceedings.” State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc
1993). “Missouri law requires that a habeas petitioner bring any claim that a
conviction violates the federal or state constitution, including a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, in a motion for post-conviction relief.” Moore-El v.
Luebbers, 446 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, an offender who fails to
raise his claims on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings has procedurally
defaulted those claims “and cannot raise [the waived claims] in a subsequent
petition for habeas corpus.” State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo.
banc 2001).
There are circumstances where a court may nonetheless reach the merits of a
procedurally barred claim, but only if “the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the
-6-
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546,
115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991). In order to satisfy the “cause” requirement, Petitioner
must show that an “external” impediment prevented him from presenting his claim
to the state court in a procedurally proper manner. Id. at 753. In this case,
Petitioner does not allege facts supporting cause and prejudice, or actual
innocence. The claims contained in Petitioner’s Petition are therefore procedurally
barred.
As Petitioner has failed to fall within the ambit of reviewable applications
for writ of habeas corpus the court will not address his claims relating to the merits
of his application.
Discussion
Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is a review to determine whether a person
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Here, Petitioner’s allegations are set forth in Ground
One: that trial court erred by allowing the testimony of the state investigator to
impeach the testimony of another witness. Consequently the testimony contained
hearsay and speculation to be presented to the jury.
-7-
There was no objection at trial to the alleged legally onerous testimony. The
volley fire upon the testimony came first, and only, in the appeal of the verdict to
the Missouri Court of Appeals. As noted previously this assault was roundly
rejected by that court since the failure to raise it at trial placed the issue in default.
As a defaulted claim a federal court cannot review it without a showing of good
cause and actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). In order to
satisfy the “cause” requirement, Petitioner must show that an “external”
impediment prevented him from presenting his claim to the state court in a
procedurally proper manner. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct.
2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991).
Additionally, the Missouri court determined there was no manifest injustice
from the putative hearsay. It reasoned that the testimony was cumulative to other
testimony, particularly because that other testimony was subject to crossexamination (Respondent’s Exhibit E, p. 7-8). As to the claim of speculation, the
appellate court stated that Carson invited the putative error because the statement
was in response to Carson’s question on cross-examination (Doc.1, p. 8). These
determinations are reasonable and entitled to the cloak deferential review under 28
U.S.C. §2254(d).
-8-
In this case, Petitioner does not allege facts supporting cause and prejudice,
or actual innocence. The claims contained in Petitioner’s Petition are therefore
procedurally barred.
As Petitioner has failed to fall within the ambit of reviewable applications
for writ of habeas corpus the claim is denied.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing discussion and analysis the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus must be dismissed.
Certificate of Appealability
When a district court issues an order under § 2254 adverse to the applicant it
“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability.” R. Governing Section 2254
Cases in the U.S. Dist. Cts., R. 11. If a federal court denies a habeas application on
procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, the court
should issue a certificate of appealability if the prisoner has shown “that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district
court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not
-9-
conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the
petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id.; see also Khaimov v. Crist,
297 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (interpreting Slack in the following manner: “1)
if the claim is clearly procedurally defaulted, the certificate should not be issued;
2) even if the procedural default is not clear, if there is no merit to the substantive
constitutional claims, the certificate should not be issued; but, 3) if the procedural
default is not clear and the substantive constitutional claims are debatable among
jurists of reason, the certificate should be granted”). Petitioner’s federal habeas
petition is clearly time-barred under AEDPA, and no reasonable jurist could that
find this case is timely filed. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; Khaimov, 297 F.3d at 786
Hence, no certificate of appealability will be issued.
Accordingly
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
[Doc.No. 1], is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and Order
is entered this same date.
Dated this 11th day of September, 2018.
______________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
- 10 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?