State of Missouri v. Republic Services, Inc. et al

Filing 96

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, Costs, and Attorneys' Fees (ECF No. 38 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this Memorandum and Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendan ts' Motion for Oral Argument (ECF No. 56 ) and Plaintiff's Joinder in Defendants' Motion for Oral Argument on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 87 ) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, State of Missouri. An appropriate Order of Remand shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 04/26/2016. (KCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel.
Attorney General Chris Koster, et al.,
Plaintiff,
V.

REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:15CV1506 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, Costs, and Attorneys'
Fees (ECF No. 38). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. Because the Court
finds the pleadings are sufficient to make a determination, the parties' motion for oral argument
will be denied.

Background
This case stems from an uncontrolled, underground trash fire, or "subsurface smoldering
event," occurring at the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill in north St. Louis County. (First Am. Pet.

iii!

11-17, ECF No. 18) The Bridgeton Landfill is part of the "West Lake Landfill Superfund Site"
("Superfund site") which is owned and operated by the Defendants Republic Services, Inc.;
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Allied Services, LLC, d/b/a Republic Services of Bridgeton; and Bridgeton Landfill, LLC. (First
Am. Pet.

if 13; Pl.'s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Remand 3, ECF No. 39)

The Environmental

Protection Agency ("EPA") has jurisdiction over the Superfund site pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
(Defs.' Response in Opp. 2, ECF No. 48) The Bridgeton Landfill is an unlined former rock
quarry filled with residential, commercial, and other waste, and is designated as Operable Unit 2

("OU-2) of the Superfund site. (First Am. Pet.

if 12; Pl.'s Mem. in Support 3)

Operable Unit 1

("OU-1 ") adjoins the Bridgeton Landfill to the north and contains industrial waste and illegally
deposited radioactive material left over from the Manhattan Project. (Pl.'s Mem. in Support 3)
The EPA deferred certain authority over the Bridgeton Landfill to the State of Missouri in the
ordinary course of its administrative regulation of inactive landfills. (Defs.' Response in Opp. 3;

Record of Decision, Defs.' Ex. 3 p. 1, ECF No. 2-2)
In December 2010, Defendants reported to the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources ("Department") that the Bridgeton Landfill was experiencing elevated temperatures
within landfill gas extraction wells, indicating the existence of a "subsurface smoldering event"
and fire. (First Am. Pet.

iii! 2, 17-18)

The fire then intensified, as evidenced by rapid surface

soil and landfill debris settlement, increased odors, elevated gas levels, changes in the
composition of landfill gas, increased production of leachate, and elevated temperatures. (First
Am. Pet. if 18; Pl.'s Mem. in Support 3) Beginning in July 2012, the State of Missouri received
complaints from nearby residents and businesses regarding the odors coming from the Bridgeton
Landfill that undermined the quality of life for people living and working near the landfill. (First
Am. Pet.

iii! 19-20)

Since January 2011 , the subsurface fire has increased the volume of leachate, liquid that
has contacted waste, generated within the landfill to over 150,000 gallons per day. (First Am.
Pet. if 25; Pl.'s Mem. in Support 4) The leachate travels into the limestone rock that makes up
the floor and walls of the landfill, flowing into the surrounding groundwater. (First Am. Pet. if
23; Pl.'s Mem. in Support 4) On at least one occasion in February 2013, black leachate escaped
onto the surface and flowed into a nearby forested area and intermittent stream near the landfill.
(First Am. Pet.

if 22; Pl.'s Mem. in Support 4)

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On March 27, 2012, the State of Missouri filed a Petition against Defendants in the
Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, alleging violations of the Missouri Solid Waste
Management, Clean Water, Air Conservation, and Hazardous Waste Management Laws, along
with claims for nuisance, cost recovery, and natural resource damages. (Pet., ECF No. 12) The
State amended its Petition on October 21 , 2014, adding agency liability, veil piercing,
negligence, and strict liability, and demanding punitive damages and a jury trial. The State seeks
monetary and injunctive relief. (First Am. Pet., ECF No. 18) Defendants removed the action to
federal court on October 1, 2015, on the grounds that Plaintiff's expert reports indicated that
Plaintiff was expanding the injunctive relief sought to include asserting control over
radiologically impacted materials ("RIM"), proposing construction of an isolation barrier at the
Bridgeton Landfill, and compelling action on groundwater at the landfill, issues over which the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has exclusive jurisdiction. (Defs.' Notice of
Removal~~

3-4, ECF No. 1) Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Remand, Costs, and Attorneys'

Fees. (ECF No. 38)
Legal Standards

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute . ... " Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994) (citations omitted). A party may remove an action to federal court only if it could
have been brought in federal court originally. Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 80 F.3d 257, 260
(8th Cir. 1996). " [I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice ofremoval
may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant .. . of a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is
or has become removable. " 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). The time limit for removal "begins running

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when a plaintiff 'explicitly discloses' she is seeking a remedy that affords a basis for federal
jurisdiction." Atwell v. Boston Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1162 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2011)). "Other paper" may include
an expert report for purposes ofremoval under 28 U.S .C. § 1446(b)(3). Hernandez v. Cooper

Tire & Rubber Co., No. 12-1399-JWL, 2013 WL 141648, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 11 , 2013);
Maxwell v. E-Z-Go, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
In removal cases, the Court reviews the state court petition and the notice of removal in
order to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Branch v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., No. 4:14-CV01735, 2014 WL 6461372, at* 1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2014). "Where the defendant seeks to
invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, ... , it bears the burden of proving that the
jurisdictional threshold is satisfied." Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953 , 956 (8th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). District courts are to resolve all doubts regarding federal jurisdiction in favor
ofremand. In re Business Men 's Assur. Co. ofAm., 992 F.3d 181 , 183 (8th Cir. 1993).
Defendants have removed this case based on federal question jurisdiction. Under 28
U.S .C. § 1331 , " [t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." "Whether a defendant may
remove a case based on federal question jurisdiction is determined by the ' well-pleaded
complaint' rule." Kaufman v. Boone Ctr., Inc., No. 4:11CV286 CDP, 2011WL1564052, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2011) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 9 (1983)). This rule makes plaintiff the master of his or her claim such that the plaintiff
may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying on state law exclusively. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). " [A] case is ordinarily not removable on federal question grounds
unless the federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's complaint." Kaufman, 2011

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WL 1564052, at *1. To state a claim, a well-pleaded complaint "must include sufficient factual
information to provide the ' grounds' on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above
a speculative level." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 & n.3 (2007)).
However, an independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the complete
preemption doctrine. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 2430. This doctrine applies where "the preemptive force of a statute is so ' extraordinary' that it ' converts an ordinary state common-law
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule."' Id.
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). In addition, federal question
jurisdiction exists where state law claims implicate significant federal issues. Grable & Sons

Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng 'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). "This doctrine captures
the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under
state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law .... " Id. While there is
no single test for jurisdiction over federal issues rooted in state law claims between non-diverse
parties, "the question is, does the state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Id. at 314; see

also Baker v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 745 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2014).
Discussion
In the Motion for Remand, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants have not established any
basis for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. 1

' Plaintiff also raises a timeliness argument. However, Plaintiff did not reply to Defendants'
assertion that the removal was timely because, until service of the expert reports, the Petition had
not invaded the EPA' s jurisdiction over the federal Superfund site and had remained within the
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Plaintiff contends that Missouri is not seeking control over RIM, nor do any of the State' s expert
reports raise a CERCLA challenge. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiffs expert
reports include requests giving rise to federal jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants maintain that
the expert reports demonstrate that Plaintiff has made a CERCLA challenge because the relief
sought would interfere with the EPA' s remediation plans at the federal Superfund site.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff intends to introduce evidence that supports remedies regarding
RIM, an isolation barrier between OU-2 and OU-1 , and the RIM in the groundwater.
First, Defendants assert that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in this case to address
RIM. Defendants contend that the report from Professor Joel G. Burken explained that he and
others were asked to investigate both non-radioactive substances and RIM. (West Lake Landfill
Organic Pollutant Phytoforensic Assessment p. 3, Defs.' Ex. 9, ECF No. 2-8) Further,

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff identified another phytoforensic witness that was devoted
exclusively to opinions concerning offsite RIM. In the beginning summary of his report,
Professor Shoaib Usman discussed the presence of RIM throughout the area near the Bridgeton
Landfill. (Report on Westlake Landfill Phy toforensic Assessment using Gamma Spectroscopy p.
1, Defs. ' Ex. 10, ECF No. 2-9) He specifically stated that the West Lake Landfill had two areas,
Radiological Area 1 and 2 which contained radioactive material. He found trace amounts of
radioactivity in samples of tree cores. (Id.) Professor Usman further mentioned that he
performed the radiological investigation of the plant samples. (Id.) Defendants argue that these
witnesses will be presented at trial to suggest operations at the federal Superfund site are the
source of offsite contamination, including offsite RIM.

jurisdiction the EPA delegated to the Department. As stated above, expert reports can constitute
"other papers" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Hernandez, 2013 WL 141648, at *1 ; Maxwell, 843
F. Supp. 2d at 1216. The Court will therefore address only the federal question jurisdiction
issue.
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Defendants also point to a press release from the Missouri Attorney General's office
noting that Professors Burken and Usman detected radiological and organic contamination in
trees on the property of neighboring land owners, indicating the off-site migration of RIM either
in groundwater or aerial transport. (News Release, Defs.' Ex. 12, ECF No. 2-11) Defendants
assert that this demonstrates Plaintiff's intention to offer at trial evidence from Burken and
Usman that addresses RIM from OU-1. Further, Defendants argue that this evidence is only
relevant to the question of whether a remedy is necessary to remove RIM from OU-1 and can
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only be offered to support relief that Plaintiff intends to request from the Court.
In addition, Defendants highlight Tony Sperling' s report which recommends the
construction of an isolation barrier to isolate OU-1 from the threat of landfill fire. (Review of
Subsurface Self Sustaining Exothermic Reaction Incident at Bridgeton Landfill, with a Focus on
Causes, Suppression Actions Taken and Future Liabilities p. 105, Defs.' Ex. 11 , ECF No. 2-10)

Sperling further stated that he did not believe that delaying the construction of the barrier
between OU-1 and the North Quarry was in the best interest of Defendants and their
shareholders, as those parties could be exposed to liabilities should the worst case scenario occur.
(Id. at 113) Defendants contend that the report was pursuant to a specific request from Plaintiff

for Sperling' s company to comment on any additional measures that should be taken to prevent
the fire from migrating into the North Quarry and ultimately toward the radiological waste in
OU-1. (Id. at 5) Defendants argue that this report demonstrates Plaintiff's intention to seek
construction of a barrier to isolate OU-1.
Finally, Defendants assert that multiple reports served by Plaintiff raise issues implicating
groundwater from OU-1. Defendants frrst highlight a report from the U.S. Geological Survey
pertaining to groundwater quality at the West Lake Landfill Site. (Background Groundwater

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Quality, Review of2012-14 Groundwater Data, and Potential Origin ofradium at the West Lake
Landfill Site, St. Louis County, Missouri, Defs. ' Ex. 17, ECF No. 2-16) According to
Defendants, Plaintiff has not yet succeeded in persuading to U.S. Geological Survey to provide a
witness to testify consistent with the report but does plan to introduce such evidence and seek
reli.ef on the contents of the report. Defendants argue that these contents "make it clear' that
Plaintiff "plans to trample all over the issue of RIM from OU-1 " because the EPA asked the U.S.
Geological Survey to focus on RIM in the groundwater. (Defs. ' Response in Opp. p. 20, ECF
No. 48)
Defendants also rely upon a report from Kenny Hemmen, which provides possible
alternative remedies for groundwater contamination that encompass the entire Superfund site, not
just the Bridgeton Landfill. (Feasibility Study Report Groundwater Remediation, Bridgeton

Landfill St. Louis County, Missouri, Defs. ' Ex. 16, ECF No. 2-15) Defendants argue that
Hemmen "plainly intruded into subjects that EPA had reserved for itself, and plainly raised
issues under federal law." (Defs. ' Response in Opp. p. 21 , ECF No. 48) Defendants contend
that the report' s avowed purpose is to evaluate groundwater remedial alternatives and costs to be
used as part of the litigation between Plaintiff and the Defendants. (Defs.' Ex. 16 p. 4, ECF No.
2-15)
Plaintiff, however, argues that Defendants have failed to establish any basis for the Court
to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has
failed to identify one sentence in any of the expert reports where the State of Missouri explicitly
discloses that it is seeking a remedy that provides a basis for federal jurisdiction. Indeed,
Plaintiff contends that it has not prayed for and is not seeking injunctive relief to require
Defendants to address alleged harms stemming from RIM allegedly found at the federal

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Superfund site; build an isolation barrier at the Superfund site to separate the Bridgeton landfill
from the rest of the site; or take action on groundwater outside the Bridgeton landfill that would
overlap with EPA-mandated remedies that EPA is reviewing pursuant to its exclusive
jurisdiction under CERCLA. Plaintiff asserts that the press release issued by the Attorney
General's Office merely disclosed the State' s expert reports to the public and forwarded said
reports to other agencies, including the EPA, encouraging them to review the information and
take appropriate remedial action. (News Release, Defs. ' Ex. 12, ECF No. 2-11)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that none of the expert reports raises a CERCLA
challenge. Defendants merely extract sentences from lengthy reports that mention radioactive
materials. For instance, Dr. Burken and Dr. Usman reference radioactive material in their reports
and refer to RIM within the Superfund site. However, nothing in these reports demonstrates
Plaintiffs intent to seek injunctive relief to remedy RIM. Introducing evidence of RIM around
the site is not akin to requesting relief to take RIM away from the EPA' s jurisdiction. Indeed,
the relief Plaintiff seeks is solely under state law and allows the EPA to pursue its remedies
under CERCLA. See, ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L. C. v. Dep 't of Health & Envtl. Quality of

Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiffs right to relief pertaining to the
public' s right to access information regarding the cleanup was not predicated on federal law but
depended on state law; thus, the claims did not arise under CERCLA).
Further, while Sperling recommends a barrier wall to isolate OU-1 , nothing in his report
demands that Defendants build this barrier. In addition, the report does not explicitly disclose
Plaintiffs intent to seek injunctive relief ordering Defendants to construct such a barrier. With
regard to the groundwater, Plaintiff correctly notes that neither the report from the USGS, which
the EPA commissioned, nor the report from Mr. Hemmen, demonstrate an intent to pursue

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injunctive or remediation relief related to the RIM in the groundwater. The only relief that
Plaintiff requests with respect to the groundwater is for damages, investigative and oversight
costs, and cleanup costs from dumping solid waste into the waters in violation of Missouri law.
(Pl. ' s Am. Compl. iii! 139-48, ECF No. 54) Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint does not
involve RIM contamination in the Bridgeton Landfill, nor does it request any injunctive relief
related to the remediation of RIM under the exclusive jurisdiction of the EPA. The report from

Mr. Hemmen in particular, while presenting alternatives for groundwater remediation and
summarizing EPA criteria for selecting an applicable remedial alternative, does not demonstrate
an "explicit disclosure" by Plaintiff of its intent to take away the EPA' s choice of remedy for
RIM in the groundwater. See ARCO, 213 F.3d at 1113 ("The fact that [plaintiffs] complaint
makes repeated references to CERCLA does not mean that CERCLA creates the cause of action
under which [plaintiff] sues."); Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding plaintiff's complaint did not seek review of or injunction against any remedial
activity on the site and thus was not a challenge to the CERCLA removal action).
Defendants' reliance on hand-picked excerpts from lengthy expert reports amounts to an
injection of '" a federal question into an otherwise state-law claim . .. [to] transform the action
into one arising under federal law. "' Baker, 745 F.3d at 924 (quoting Gore v. Trans World

Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2000). "'Congress clearly expressed its intent that
CERCLA should work in conjunction with other federal and state hazardous waste laws in order
to solve this country' s hazardous waste cleanup problem. "' New Mexico v. General Elec. Co. ,
467 F.3d 1223, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575
(10th Cir. 1993). This is precisely what Plaintiff is attempting to do in this case, and the
Missouri statutes and Missouri law upon which Plaintiff relies do not implicate federal law. See,

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e.g. , ARCO, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113-116 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the case did not fall within
the federal courts' federal question jurisdiction or exclusive original jurisdiction under CERCLA
where the claims did not arise under any federal law, and the propriety of the claims would be
determined under Montana law alone); Abba-Bradley v. City ofNiagara Falls, No. 13-CV-487JTC, 2013 WL 4505454, at *10-11 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2013) (granting plaintiffs' motion to
remand where the claims did not expressly challenge the effectiveness of the Landfill remedy,
request modification of its remedial components, or seek specific action that could conflict with
the remediation process).
" [T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically
confer federal-question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 813
(1986); see also MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that
neither CERCLA nor a federal consent decree created federal "arising under" jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' state law claim). Here, nothing in the First Amended Petition or in the expert reports
demonstrates that Plaintiff is making a CERCLA challenge by requesting relief that would
interfere with the EPA' s remediation plans. Thus, resolving all doubts against removal, the
Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that the First
Amended Complaint raises any actually disputed and substantial issue of federal law. Grable &
Sons, 545 U.S. at 314. As a result, the Court will grant Plaintiffs Motion to Remand and send
the action to the Circuit Court for St. Louis County.
Plaintiff also requests an award of costs and attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the
removal, arguing that Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal. Martin v.
Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants waited to
remove the case until the state court trial setting was less than six months away and that this

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conduct warrants an award of fees and costs. However, "[i]n determining whether the removing
party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal, 'the district court do[ es] not
consider the motive of the removing defendant.'" Convent Corp. v. City ofN Little Rock, Ark.,
784 F.3d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Diaz v. Cameron Cty. Tex., 300 Fed. App'x 280, 281
(5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted)). Instead, the Court considers the objective merits of
removal at the time the party removed the case, irrespective of the ultimate remand. Id (citation
omitted). Upon careful consideration of the record, the Court finds that Defendants' basis for
removal was not objectively unreasonable, and therefore an award of attorneys ' fees and costs in
favor of the Plaintiff is not warranted. Bowler v. Alliedbarton Sec. Servs., LLC, 123 F. Supp. 3d
1152, 1160 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, Costs, and Attorneys'
Fees (ECF No. 38) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this
Memorandum and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Oral Argument (ECF No.
56) and Plaintiff's Joinder in Defendants' Motion for Oral Argument on Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand (ECF No. 87) are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of St.
Louis County, State of Missouri. An appropriate Order of Remand shall accompany this
Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 26th day of April, 2016.

~~J#o

RONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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