Rittinger v. Healthy Alliance Insurance Company et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Karen Rittinger's motion to remand is DENIED. [Doc. 16 ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. [Doc. 11 ] IT IS FURTHER ORDE RED that plaintiff's request to amend is GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff is granted fourteen days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to file an amended complaint stating her claims under ERISA. Plaintiff shall also corre ctly identify defendant Healthy Alliance Life Insurance Company in her caption. Failure to comply timely and fully with this order will result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 12/21/15. (JWD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KAREN A. RITTINGER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
HEALTHY ALLIANCE INSURANCE
)
COMPANY, d/b/a ANTHEM BLUE CROSS )
AND BLUE SHIELD, and ANTHEM UM
)
SERVICES, INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 4:15-CV-1548 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Karen A. Rittinger’s motion to remand and
defendants Healthy Alliance Life Insurance Company d/b/a Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield
and Anthem UM Services, Inc.’s (collectively “defendants”) motion to dismiss. The matters are
fully briefed and ready for decision. For the following reasons, the Court will deny plaintiff’s
motion to remand and grant defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I.

Background
Plaintiff brings this action to recover benefits and enforce rights owed under an employer

sponsored health insurance benefit plan (the “plan”).

Plaintiff alleges she was entitled to

payment of certain medical claims under the plan, and that these claims were wrongfully denied.
Plaintiff filed this action in state court alleging claims for declaratory judgment (Counts I and II);
breach of contract (Count III); vexatious refusal to pay (Count IV); and breach of fiduciary duty
(Count V). Defendants removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction, and moved to dismiss the claims as preempted by ERISA. In response, plaintiff
filed a motion to remand and an opposition to the motion to dismiss.

II.

Legal Standard
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to

jurisdiction are satisfied. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969).
Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of removal are
resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998).
III.

Discussion
A.

Motion to Remand
(1)

Timeliness

On July 16, 2015, plaintiff filed her petition in Missouri state court. Plaintiff did not
serve defendants then, but on August 10, 2015 she sent an e-mail to her personal friend, the CFO
of defendants.1 Her e-mail stated: “I wanted you to know that I have filed suit against Anthem.
I value our friendship but I had no alternative in light of the company’s actions. Hope all is
well.”2 Plaintiff officially served defendants under Missouri law with the summons and petition
on September 8, 2015 and October 6, 2015. On October 8, 2015, defendants removed this action
from state court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Plaintiff moves to remand the case on the ground that defendants filed their removal
notice 29 days late under § 1446(b), which specifies that the notice “shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
[complaint].” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Because the notice of removal had not been filed within 30

1

 Defendants do not deny that this employee is their CFO, but state that plaintiff has provided no
exhibit or explanation for the employee’s purported connection to defendant Anthem UM.
2

Although it is not relevant to the timeliness analysis, the Court notes that plaintiff did not attach
a copy of her state court petition to this e-mail.
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days of the date defendants’ CFO received plaintiff’s e-mail referencing her lawsuit, plaintiff
asserts the removal is untimely. Plaintiff’s interpretation of §1446(b) has been directly rejected
by the United States Supreme Court. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,
526 U.S. 344, 356 (1999) (rejecting the so-called “receipt rule,” which starts the time to remove
on receipt of a copy of the complaint, however informally, despite the absence of any formal
service).3 The Court finds the defendants filed their notice of removal timely on October 8,
2015.
(2) Preemption
In the notice of removal, defendants state federal question jurisdiction exists because
plaintiff’s claims to recover benefits and to enforce rights under the plan are completely
preempted under ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. Section 502 of ERISA provides a cause
of action for the recovery of benefits by a participant under an ERISA plan. See 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B). Consequently, defendants contend that plaintiff’s state law claims for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, vexatious refusal to pay, and breach of fiduciary duty are
completely preempted by ERISA because they are enforceable under ERISA § 501.
ERISA is a “comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1983). “The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee
benefit plans. To this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, see ERISA § 514,
29 U.S.C. § 1144, which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be

3

Plaintiff makes much of the fact that Murphy Brothers was decided prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Twombly
standard for pleadings is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of timeliness under § 1446(b).
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‘exclusively a federal concern.’” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoted
case omitted).
“There are two types of preemption under ERISA: ‘complete preemption’ under ERISA
§ 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and ‘express preemption’ under ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144.”
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. National Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 F.3d 897, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).
“Complete preemption occurs whenever Congress ‘so completely [preempts] a particular area
that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.’”
Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)). “Claims arising
under the civil enforcement provisions of Section 502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a),
including a claim to recover benefits or enforce rights under the terms of an ERISA plan,
implicate one such area of complete preemption.” Id. (citing Neumann v. AT&T Comm., Inc.,
376 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2004)). “Because of complete preemption, any claim filed by a plan
participant for the same relief provided under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, even a claim
purportedly raising only a state-law cause of action, arises under federal law and is removable to
federal court.” Id.
Plaintiff’s complaint brings state law claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract,
vexatious refusal to pay, and breach of fiduciary duty. Each claim challenges the denial of
benefits under the plan, and each seeks a declaration of coverage or actual payment of benefits
allegedly owed under the plan. As defendants state, these claims are paradigmatic examples of
ERISA-preempted claims, and are removable to federal court. The Court finds it unnecessary to
rehash this well-settled legal principle. Instead, it cites to the following cases for support:
Prudential Insurance Company, 413 F.3d at 907; Neumann, 376 F.3d at 779; Graham v. Hubbs
Machine & Manufacturing, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 600, 610 (E.D. Mo. 2014). Plaintiff’s claims

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arise under federal law and are removable to federal court. The Court will deny plaintiff’s
motion to remand.
B.

Motion to Dismiss

Claims that arise under the civil enforcement provision of § 502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a), including claims to recover benefits or enforce rights under the terms of an ERISA
plan, are completely preempted. Neumann, 376 F.3d at 779. “Congress intended that an action
brought to recover benefits or enforce rights that were allegedly denied contrary to the terms of
an ERISA benefit plan will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, even if the
complaint filed by the plan beneficiary purports to raise only a state-law cause of action.” Id.
(citing Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66-67). As a result, where a claim “relate[s] to an
employee benefit plan,” and seeks to recover benefits due or to enforce rights under the terms of
the plan, that claim is preempted by federal law and the exclusive cause of action is under federal
law. Neumann, 376 F.3d at 779-80 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48
(1987)).
Each of plaintiff’s counts are premised on the denial of benefits or the administration of
benefit claims. Regardless of how the counts are captioned, the nature of each claim depends on
the ERISA plan. The Court cannot resolve any of the claims without first analyzing the plan.
These types of claims are completely preempted under ERISA and can only be asserted under
federal law. See Neumann, 376 F.3d at 779.
In her opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff seeks leave to amend her
complaint rather than dismissal. The Court will grant plaintiff leave to amend. In the future, the
Court requests that plaintiff refrain from using the type of overheated rhetoric that has appeared

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in her filings. Such rhetoric is of no use to the Court in resolving the issues presented by this
case, and serves only to detract from the persuasiveness of plaintiff’s arguments.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss based on

ERISA preemption. Because this action was properly removed to federal court, the Court will
deny plaintiff’s motion to remand. Plaintiff’s request to amend will be granted to the extent that
plaintiff may file an amended complaint stating her claims under ERISA.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Karen Rittinger’s motion to remand is
DENIED. [Doc. 16]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. [Doc.
11]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s request to amend is GRANTED to the
extent that plaintiff is granted fourteen days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to file
an amended complaint stating her claims under ERISA. Plaintiff shall also correctly identify
defendant Healthy Alliance Life Insurance Company in her caption. Failure to comply timely
and fully with this order will result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice.

___________________________________
CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 21st day of December, 2015.

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