Taylor v. Steele et al
Filing
96
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.63) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriateJudgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order. 63 Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 8/18/17. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SAMUEL LEWIS TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
TROY STEELE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 4:15CV1618 JCH
MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
February 10, 2017. (ECF No. 63). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition.1
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Samuel Lewis Taylor is an offender in the Missouri Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”). (Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (“Defendants’ Facts”), ¶
1). Plaintiff currently is incarcerated at Crossroads Correctional Center (“CRCC”). (Plaintiffs’
Statement of Controverted Material Facts in Support of Summary Judgment Motion (“Plaintiff’s
1 On March 23, 2017, Plaintiff submitted filings entitled “Plaintiff Motion for Summary
Judgment” and “Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion.” (ECF
Nos. 70, 71). In his motion, however, Plaintiff moves this Court not to grant summary judgment
in Defendants’ favor, as they “have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that there is no
dispute as to any material fact.” (ECF No. 70, P. 1). Plaintiff then asserts in his memorandum in
support that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because “there exist[s] a genuine issue
of material fact.” (ECF No. 71, P. 1). With these statements, Plaintiff appears to misunderstand
the purpose of a summary judgment motion, which is to show that a genuine issue of material
fact does not exist. The Court thus treats Plaintiff’s motion and materials in support of said
motion as documents supporting his opposition to Defendants’ motion.
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Response to Defendants’ Facts”), ¶ 1). At all times relevant to his Complaint, however, Plaintiff
was incarcerated at Potosi Correctional Center (“PCC”). (Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 1).
At the time of the alleged incidents, Defendants held the following positions at PCC:
Jason Crawford was a Corrections Officer II; Kevin Culton was a Corrections Officer I (“COI”);
Clive Hedrick was a COI; Michael Miller was an MDOC Corrections Caseworker Manager II;
and John Schneedle was a COI. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶¶ 2-6).
At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff had a lawsuit pending against Defendant Michael
Miller (and other Defendants not named in the instant Complaint), styled Taylor v. Miller, et al.,
Case No. 1:11CV174 SNLJ. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 12).2 According to Plaintiff, depositions in
the Miller case were held at PCC on January 16, 2013. (Compl., ECF No. 1, P. 7). Plaintiff
maintains the retaliation against him began soon after, and included the following incidents:
On February 16, 2013, Defendants Hedrick and Schneedle conducted a
cell search of Plaintiff’s cell. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Facts,
second ¶ 763). Plaintiff claims that said Defendants urinated in his pepper
container, put cigarette ashes in his food items, and confiscated his cable
cord and extension cord. (Defendants’ Facts, second ¶ 76).
On June 23, 2013, Defendants Hedrick and Schneedle again conducted a
cell search, and improperly strip searched Plaintiff for their own sexual
gratification. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 86).
During the June 23, 2013, cell search, Defendants Hedrick and Schneedle
confiscated Plaintiff’s tennis shoes and a summer sausage. (Defendants’
Facts, ¶ 91).
During the June 23, 2013, cell search, Defendants Hedrick and Schneedle
confiscated Plaintiff’s legal documents. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 98).
After the June 23, 2013, cell search, Plaintiff was escorted to
administrative segregation. (Compl., P. 10). Defendant Hedrick then
2 Taylor v. Miller was dismissed by the Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. on August 23,
2013. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 13).
3 In their facts, Defendants return to paragraph number 76, in lieu of successive paragraph 78.
(See Defendants’ Facts, P. 11).
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issued Plaintiff a 10.1 conduct violation, stating that by his actions
Plaintiff placed himself in violation of rules 10.1: Minor Assault, 12.1:
Threats, 19.1: Creating a Disturbance, and 21.1: Insulting Behavior.
(Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 106-107; Defendants’ Exh. AD).
Plaintiff eventually was sanctioned to over forty days disciplinary
segregation, and spent over six months in administrative segregation.
(Compl., P. 11). Plaintiff believes that although he did not participate in
the hearing for Plaintiff’s conduct violation issued after the June 23, 2013,
cell search, Defendant Miller influenced the outcome, i.e., Plaintiff’s
transfer to administrative segregation. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶¶ 60, 62).
In July, 2013, Plaintiff allegedly reported to Defendant Culton that he was
vomiting blood. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 18). Plaintiff claims he called out
to Defendant Culton three times to declare a medical emergency while
Defendant Culton was handing out food trays. (Id., ¶ 19). According to
Plaintiff, Defendant Culton refused to notify medical personnel. (Compl.,
P. 12).
After the Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. dismissed Taylor v. Miller,
Plaintiff was seen by an adjustment committee, of which Defendant Miller
was a member. (Compl., P. 13). Plaintiff maintains that in retaliation for
his filing of the lawsuit and grievances, he was transferred from PCC to
CRCC. (Id..).
When Plaintiff was transferred from PCC to CRCC in October of 2013,
Defendant Crawford refused to include the following personal property of
Plaintiff’s: legal documents confiscated on June 23, 2013, tennis shoes,
extension cord, cable cord, two typing ribbons, watch, crock pot, and
49er’s coat. (Defendants’ Facts, ¶¶ 34-36).4
As stated above, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on February
10, 2017, asserting that with respect to Defendant Culton, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, and with respect to all Defendants, Plaintiff failed to provide
4 Plaintiff apparently asserts one additional claim with respect to property items allegedly
missing upon his transfer to CRCC. (Compl., P. 14). Plaintiff does not contend any of the
instant Defendants were involved with the packing of his personal property, however, and so the
Court will not address this claim here. Furthermore, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy, negligence and replevin for the reasons
set forth in Defendants’ Suggestions in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Defendants’ Memo in Support”).
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affirmative evidence Defendants took adverse action against him and/or acted with a retaliatory
motive.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if, “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party
must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material
fact, not the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson,
477 U.S. at 247. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249.
DISCUSSION
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According to Plaintiff, the claims he raises all stem from alleged retaliation based on his
filing of the lawsuit against Defendant Miller. (See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment Motion, P. 2; Plaintiffs’ Declaration, ECF No. 72-16, ¶ 6).5 In order to
prevail on his Section 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, Plaintiff
must show: “(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the government official took
adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the
activity; and (3) that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the
protected activity.” Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “The
plaintiff’s evidentiary burden is a ‘heavy’ one, and ‘[m]erely alleging that an act was retaliatory
is insufficient.” Taylor v. Miller, Case No. 1:11CV174 SNLJ, 2013 WL 4504365, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 23, 2013) (quoting Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th
Cir. 2007)).
As noted above, Plaintiff claims Defendants retaliated against him because he filed a civil
rights lawsuit against Defendant Miller. Defendants do not dispute that by filing the suit,
Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (8th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007)) (“‘The filing of a prison
grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, is protected First Amendment activity.’”).
Defendants deny that Plaintiff has shown adverse actions or retaliatory motive, however.
A.
All Defendants Other Than Miller
In their Memo in Support, Defendants assert that with respect to all Defendants other
than Defendant Miller, Plaintiff fails to establish the existence of a retaliatory motive.
5 Although Plaintiff also vaguely mentions retaliation for his alleged redress of grievances, he
never articulates the specific grievances to which he refers, and so the Court will not address this
assertion in the instant Order.
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(Defendants’ Memo in Support, P. 7). In Taylor v. Miller, Case No. 4:15CV285 RWS, 2017 WL
513020 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2017), the Honorable Rodney W. Sippel described Plaintiff’s burden
with respect to retaliatory motive as follows:
“To avoid summary judgment, [Taylor] must submit ‘affirmative evidence
[of] a retaliatory motive.’” Lewis, 486 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Wilson v.
Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 592 (8th Cir. 2006)). Though “summary
judgment is not often appropriate when motive is at issue,” see Sisneros v.
Nix, 95 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1996), summary judgment is appropriate
even when motive is at issue if the plaintiff fails to “identify affirmative
evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or
her burden of proving the pertinent motive.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 600 (1998); see also Fender v. Bull, 166 Fed. Appx. 869, 874
(8th Cir. 2996) (citing Crawford-El for the proposition that “even when
motive is a critical issue, summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff
fails to” meet this burden); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir.
2004) (explaining that though the causal connection between adverse
action and protected activity is generally a jury question, “it can provide a
basis for summary judgment when the question is so free from doubt as to
justify taking it from the jury” (quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff's
unsupported belief that officials retaliated against him at someone else's
direction because he filed a lawsuit does not create a genuine issue of
fact. See Taylor v. Phillips, 2014 WL 251441, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22,
2014).
Taylor v. Miller, 2017 WL 513020 at *4.
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hedrick, Schneedle, Culton and
Crawford subjected him to a variety of adverse actions, allegedly in retaliation for his filing of a
lawsuit against Defendant Miller. Upon consideration, however, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to
provide any evidence upon which a jury could find that Plaintiff has carried his burden of
proving the pertinent motive. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. at 600. For example, with
respect to Defendants Hedrick and Schneedle, Plaintiff acknowledged during his deposition that
he had never seen said Defendants associate with Defendant Miller. (See Defendants’ Exh. A at
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28:20-29:1).6 Furthermore, while Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that Defendant Hedrick
stated the February 16, 2013, cell search was “done for Michael Miller” (Compl., P. 7), he
conversely testified during his deposition that neither Hedrick nor Schneedle made any
comments to him at all about Defendant Miller. (See Defendants’ Exh. A at 28:7-9). With
respect to Defendant Crawford, Plaintiff testified that neither Defendant Crawford nor anyone
else told Plaintiff he was acting out of retaliation; instead, Plaintiff simply assumed as much
based on Crawford’s actions. (Id. at 73:23-74:5).7 Finally, in his Answers to Interrogatories
Defendant Culton stated under oath that he was unaware Defendant Miller had a lawsuit pending
against him (see ECF No. 65-4, P. 3), and Plaintiff offers no evidence to contradict this assertion.
“[Plaintiff’s] unsupported beliefs—that adverse actions by officials who have no apparent
connection to his prior lawsuit must have been taken in retaliation for the lawsuit, that he
‘knows’ Miller was directing retaliation against him, or that because the defendants work
together and know each other, they must have conspired to retaliate against him—do not create a
genuine issue of fact from which a jury could find retaliatory motive.” Taylor v. Miller, 2017
WL 513020, at *5 (citing Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(explaining that speculative and conclusory allegations are insufficient to allow for an inference
of retaliatory animus); Brown v. Hickman, 2015 WL 1097392, at *11 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 11, 2015)
(“Because nearly every otherwise routine decision may potentially be viewed as a retaliatory act,
it has been recognized that ‘[r]etaliation claims by prisoners are prone to abuse since prisoners
can claim retaliation for every decision they dislike.’” (quoting Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d
6 Defendant Miller stated under oath that in 2013, he did not know Clive Hedrick or John
Schneedle. (Defendants’ Exh. V, ¶ 5).
7 During his deposition, Plaintiff repeatedly testified that he was never informed any Defendants
were acting out of retaliation, but instead simply assumed that to be the motive. (See
Defendants’ Exh. A at 27:6-8, 28:1-6, 52:22-53:10).
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75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)))).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to all
Defendants other than Miller must therefore be granted.8
B.
Defendant Miller
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Miller (a) influenced the outcome of the
disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s transfer to administrative segregation, and (b)
participated as a member of the adjustment committee that ordered Plaintiff’s transfer from PCC
to CRCC. Upon consideration the Court finds that with these claims, Plaintiff fails to establish
that Defendant Miller took adverse actions against him. For example, with respect to the
disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff admitted at deposition that Defendant Miller was not the
disciplinary officer in charge. (See Defendants’ Exh. A at 77:19-24). Plaintiff testified he was
“sure [Defendant Miller] had some influence over the recommendations”, but based his belief
solely on the fact that Defendant Miller and Disciplinary Officer Dunn were co-workers. (See
Id. at 77:25-78:14). The Court finds these unsupported assertions insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Miller took an adverse action against Plaintiff in
this regard.
With respect to Plaintiff’s transfer to CRCC, Plaintiff again offers no evidence supporting
his assumption that the transfer was in retaliation for his engagement in protected activity. In
contrast, Defendant Miller provides a sworn affidavit stating in relevant part as follows:
14.
I remember sitting on the administrative segregation committee that
recommended transfer for Mr. Taylor in October of 2013.9
8 In light of the foregoing, the Court need not address Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff fails
to establish these Defendants took adverse actions against him. The Court notes without
deciding, however, that Defendants provide ample evidence the actions were not adverse, but
rather non-retaliatory and supported by PCC policy.
9 Plaintiff admitted at deposition that Defendant Miller was not the only one on the
administrative segregation committee that recommended his transfer. (Defendants’ Exh. A at
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15.
In 2013 I was on the administrative segregation committee and Mr. Taylor
was continually requesting protective custody. As a member of this committee, I
received and was familiar with all of his requests.
16.
In 2013, Offender Taylor named numerous enemies in the general
population and also named numerous enemies in protective custody.
17.
We on the administrative segregation committee steadily ran out of
options of where to place Mr. Taylor based on his naming enemies and refusing to
sign enemy waivers until our only option was to keep him in administrative
segregation as he could not be placed amongst his enemies in general population
or protective custody.
18.
Mr. Taylor refused to sign enemy waivers for his numerous enemies in
general population and protective custody.
19.
We on the administrative segregation committee thought that it would be
best for Mr. Taylor’s safety and well-being to transfer him.
20.
If any inmate has too many enemies and blocks themselves in such that
they can’t go to general population and they can’t go to protective custody unit,
often they are transferred to another prison for safety purposes.
21.
If an offender is not transferred to another prison, they would have to sit in
administrative segregation. We want offenders to have the maximum freedom
they are entitled to and not have to sit in administrative segregation simply
because they have listed numerous enemies.
22.
In 2013, per transfer policy at Potosi, the recommendation was made to
put a transfer in for Mr. Taylor.
(Defendants’ Exh. V, ¶¶ 15-22).10 Defendants further note that Plaintiff himself requested to be
transferred because he feared for his life at PCC. (See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, PP. 13-17 and att. Exhs. A-G). Plaintiff does not
78:23-79:2). Instead, there were two other members, Mr. Pierson and Mr. Henson, neither of
whom are named as Defendants in the instant suit. (Id.).
10 Defendant Miller testified he did not make the ultimate decision as to whether Plaintiff was
transferred. (See Defendants’ Exh. V, ¶ 26).
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dispute these allegations, and so again the Court finds Plaintiff fails to establish that the transfer
effected by Defendant Miller and others constituted an adverse action against Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
63) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate
Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this
18th
Day of August, 2017.
\s\ Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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