Potter v. Colvin

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this matter is affirmed, and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. A separate judgment is entered this day. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Bodenhausen on 6/14/17. (CAR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JARVIS KEITH POTTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 4:15 CV 1896 JMB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER2
Plaintiff Jarvis Keith Potter (“Plaintiff”) appeals the decision of the Acting Commissioner
of Social Security (“Defendant”) denying his applications for disability benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and supplemental security income under
Title XVI, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision, and therefore it is affirmed. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Background
A. Procedural History
On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed applications for disability benefits, arguing that his

disability began on April 21, 2013, as a result of injuries sustained in a car accident, including
bleeding of the brain, punctured lungs, and left ear deafness. (Tr. 98-99, 154-60) On October
22, 2013, Plaintiff’s claims were denied upon initial consideration. (Tr. 98-99, 106-07) Plaintiff
1

Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill should be substituted for
Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs
to be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2

This case is before the undersigned for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
with the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Plaintiff appeared at the
hearing (with counsel) on May 23, 2014, and testified concerning the nature of his disability, his
functional limitations, and his past work. (Tr. 41-46, 48-58) A vocational expert (“VE”) also
testified. (Tr. 59-68) The VE testified about the nature of Plaintiff’s past work, and opined as to
Plaintiff’s ability to secure other work in the national economy, based upon his functional
limitations, age, and education. (Id.) After taking the testimony of Plaintiff and the VE, and
after reviewing the rest of the evidence of record, the ALJ issued a decision on June 27, 2014,
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled, and therefore denying Plaintiff’s benefits.
Plaintiff then sought review of the ALJ’s decision before the Appeals Council of the
Social Security Administration. (Tr. 1-5) On October 21, 2015, the Appeals Council denied
review of Plaintiff’s claims, (Tr. 1-3), therefore making the June 2014 decision of the ALJ the
final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff has therefore exhausted his administrative
remedies, and his appeal is properly before this Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In his brief to this Court, Plaintiff raises two issues: the ALJ committed reversible error
by failing to give any weight to Plaintiff’s low GAF scores inasmuch these scores establish his
mental functional limitations, and by failing to account for Plaintiff’s serious psychological
impairments in his RFC determination. The Commissioner filed a detailed brief in opposition
contending that the ALJ’s decision is based upon substantial evidence.
As explained below, the Court has considered the entire record in this matter. Because
the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, it will be affirmed.
B. Administrative Hearing Testimony
The ALJ conducted a hearing on May 23, 2014. (Tr. 26) At the hearing, both Plaintiff
and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Both witnesses were questioned by the ALJ and by

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Plaintiff’s attorney. Plaintiff testified generally as to his impairments, activities of daily living,
functional abilities, and prior work history. The VE testified regarding Plaintiff’s vocational
abilities, and the existence of jobs appropriate to Plaintiff’s RFC, educational, and work history.
1)

Plaintiff’s Testimony (Tr. 39-59)

Plaintiff testified that his April 19, 2013, car accident resulted in injuries to his brain,
lungs, and back. (Tr. 41) Although his driver’s license was revoked after the accident, Plaintiff
indicated that he has a current Missouri driver’s license without any restrictions. (Tr. 43-44)
Plaintiff is a college graduate with a degree in general studies. Plaintiff described his past
work as a loan processor for one year, grossing $2,000. (Tr. 45)
As to his symptoms and medical treatment, Plaintiff testified that he has less than full
hearing in his left ear. (Tr. 48) Plaintiff takes medications daily for his depression and anxiety.
(Tr. 55) Plaintiff also claims that he experiences headaches every other day and lying down
helps alleviate the pain. (Tr. 57-58) Plaintiff admitted that he no longer takes headache
medication because he ran out of the medication. Plaintiff testified that he is treated by a
psychiatrist once a month. (Tr. 58)
As to his physical limitations, Plaintiff stated that he cannot sit in the same position for
more than twenty minutes without changing positions; that he experiences lower back and leg
pain when he sits; that he can stand for the thirty minutes; that he can walk a half a mile without
pain; and that he can crouch down, bend at the hip, bend at the knees, and reach in all directions.
(Tr. 51)

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2)

Vocational Expert Testimony (Tr. 61-75)

After Plaintiff testified, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified concerning Plaintiff’s past
work, and Plaintiff’s current ability to work. First, the VE found that Plaintiff would not be able
to perform his past relevant work as a bank loan processor. (Tr. 60-61)
Next, the ALJ asked the VE a series of hypothetical questions, asking whether someone
with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and functional limitations would be able to find
a job in the local or national economy. (Tr. 61-66) The VE responded that such a hypothetical
person would be able to do the jobs of a sorter, an assembler, and a packager. (Tr. 69-70)
In response to questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney, the VE testified that if Plaintiff would
be off-task 25-30% if the work day, he would be unemployable. (Tr. 66-67) But in response to
the ALJ’s question, the VE testified that Plaintiff would be employable if he was off-task 9% of
the work day. (Tr. 68)
C. Relevant Medical Evidence
Plaintiff sustained injuries from a motor vehicle accident in April 2013, and was
hospitalized for five days due to rib fractures, closed head injury, and trauma. (Tr. 246-380)
Plaintiff experienced frequent, severe headaches. In follow-up treatment, Plaintiff reported
doing well with improved speech, headaches, and memory issues. (Tr. 456-57)
In the Psychological Report completed on October 3, 2013, Dr. Michael Armour found
Plaintiff’s long-term memory was grossly intact, with his immediate memory mildly better than
his delayed memory. Dr. Armour also found Plaintiff’s speech was of normal rate, and his
responses were relevant and coherent. Dr. Armour estimated that Plaintiff’s intellect fell within
at least the average range. Dr. Armour opined that Plaintiff’s insight and judgment were
adequate but Plaintiff and his family member reported anger management problems. Dr. Armour

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found that Plaintiff was moderately impaired in his ability to understand and recall instructions,
in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, and in social functioning and in adapting to
his environment. Dr. Armour diagnosed Plaintiff with cognitive disorder, alcohol abuse in
remission, and depressive disorder, and assessed a GAF score of 45. (Tr. 533-40)
Dr. Robert Cottone, Ph.D., a state agency medical consultant, found that Plaintiff could
understand, remember, carry out, and persist at simple tasks; make simple work-related
judgments; relate adequately to co-workers and supervisors; and adjust to ordinary changes in
routine and settings. Dr. Cottone further opined that Plaintiff should avoid work requiring
intense or extensive interpersonal interaction, handling complaints or dissatisfied customers,
close proximity to co-workers, or close proximity to available controlled substances. (Tr. 81)
D. ALJ’s Decision
In evaluating Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments, and whether Plaintiff was
entitled to disability benefits, the ALJ followed the familiar five-step analysis found in the
Commissioner’s regulations. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity from the time of his alleged disability onset. (Tr. 23)
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
status post left subdural hematoma, history of broken ribs secondary to a motor vehicle accident,
history of disc replacement, alcohol abuse in remission, depressive disorder, and cognitive
disorder. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr.
24, 27)
As part of his decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility and also evaluated
several pieces of medical opinion evidence. As to Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ found Plaintiff

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to be “not entirely credible,” in his hearing testimony and assertions of disabling symptoms and
functional limitations. (Tr. 30) This finding was largely based on the ALJ’s view that the
objective evidence did not support the level of disability that Plaintiff was claiming; Plaintiff’s
daily activities were limited as a lifestyle choice, not a medical condition; Plaintiff’s routine and
conservative medical treatment; and Plaintiff’s failure to follow recommended treatment. (Tr.
30) Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff does not take medications for his headaches, and he
has not returned to the neurologist for follow-up treatment as instructed.
As to the opinion evidence, the ALJ reviewed the opinions of the consultative examiner,
Dr. Michael Armour, and the state agency medical consultant, Dr. Robert Cottone. (Tr. 28) Dr.
Armour opined that his examination showed Plaintiff’s long-term memory was grossly intact,
with his immediate memory mildly better than his delayed memory. Dr. Armour noted that
Plaintiff’s mood was subdued, his speech was of normal rate, and his responses were relevant
and coherent. Dr. Armour found that Plaintiff’s intellect fell within at least the average range.
Dr. Armour diagnosed Plaintiff with cognitive disorder, alcohol abuse in remission, and
depressive disorder, and assessed a GAF score of 45. The ALJ gave Dr. Armour’s opinion
“some weight.”
Dr. Cottone, who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records, opined that Plaintiff could
understand, remember, carry out and persist at simple tasks, make simple work-related
judgments, relate adequately to coworkers and supervisors, and adjust adequately to ordinary
changes in work routine or settings. Dr. Cottone found that Plaintiff must avoid work involving
intense or extensive interpersonal interaction, handling complaints or dissatisfied customers,
close proximity to coworkers, and close proximity to available controlled substances. The ALJ
gave this opinion “great weight.” (Tr. 30)

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After weighing the medical evidence, and evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility and the
opinion evidence of record, the ALJ formulated the follow residual functional capacity—
[Plaintiff is capable of performing] sedentary work … except [he] can lift ten
pounds frequently, sit 6 hours out of 8-hour day, and can stand and walk 2 hours
out of 8-hour workday. Use of hand and arm controls is unlimited and use of foot
and leg controls is reduced to occasional. Reaching overhead, feeling, fingering,
handling, and reaching are all unlimited. [He] can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. [He] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, as well as balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch, crawl, and bend. [He] should avoid all pulmonary irritants,
extreme temperatures, and hazards of unprotected heights, moving machinery,
and industrial vibrations. [He] is able to operate a motor vehicle but it does not
include operating a motor vehicle or being a passenger of public conveyance.
[He] is able to do simple, routine, repetitive, unskilled task[s]. He can frequently
interact with general public, supervisors and coworkers. [He] works better with
things rather than people. He is able to make simple judgments. Time off task is
5% of a workday, with loss of productivity of 5%, with ability to respond to
routine changes in the work setting on occasional basis.
(Tr. 25-26)
At step four, the ALJ found—based upon the testimony of the VE recounted earlier—that
Plaintiff was not capable of returning to his past work because it exceeded the restrictions in his
RFC. (Tr. 30) At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, Plaintiff is capable of making a transition to other
work in the national economy. (Tr. 31) Specifically, the ALJ thought Plaintiff capable of
working in jobs such as a sorter, an assembler, and a packager. (Id.) Because Plaintiff could
make a transition to other work, the ALJ found him not disabled. (Tr. 32)
II.

Standard of Review
“To be eligible for [disability] benefits, [Plaintiff] must prove that [he] is disabled …”

Baker v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Pearsall
v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001). A disability is defined as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
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expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A)
and 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant will be found to have a disability “only if [his] physical or
mental impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do [his] previous work but
cannot, considering [his] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(2)(A) and
1382c(a)(3)(B); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).
Per regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, the ALJ follows a five-step process in
determining whether a claimant is disabled. “During the process the ALJ must determine: ‘1)
whether the claimant is currently employed; 2) whether the claimant is severely impaired; 3)
whether the impairment is, or is comparable to, a listed impairment; 4) whether the claimant can
perform past relevant work; and if not 5) whether the claimant can perform any other kind of
work.’” Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hacker v. Barnhart, 459
F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2006)). “If, at any point in the five-step process the claimant fails to
meet the criteria, the claimant is determined not to be disabled and the process ends.” Id. (citing
Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005)); see also Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909,
921 (8th Cir. 2011).
The Eight Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that a district court’s review of an ALJ’s
disability determination is intended to be narrow and that courts should “defer heavily to the
findings and conclusions of the Social Security Administration.” Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734,
738 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001)). The
ALJ’s findings should be affirmed if they are supported by “substantial evidence” on the record
as a whole. See Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is “less

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than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a
decision.” Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2008).
Despite this deferential stance, a district court’s review must be “more than an
examination of the record for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the
Commissioner’s decision.” Beckley v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1998). The district
court must “also take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from that decision.” Id.
Specifically, in reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, a district court is required to examine
the entire administrative record and consider:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The credibility findings made by the ALJ;
Plaintiff’s vocational factors;
The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians;
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints relating to exertional and non-exertional activities and
impairments;
5. Any corroboration by third parties of Plaintiff’s impairments;
6. The testimony of vocational experts when required, including any hypothetical questions
setting forth Plaintiff’s impairments.
Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992).
Finally, a reviewing court should not disturb the ALJ’s decision unless it falls outside the
available “zone of choice” defined by the evidence of record. Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549,
556 (8th Cir. 2011). A decision does not fall outsize that zone simply because this Court might
have reached a different conclusion had it been the original finder of fact. See also McNamara v.
Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that if substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, the court “may not reverse, even if inconsistent conclusion may be
drawn from the evidence, and [the court] may have reached a different outcome.”).

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III.

Analysis of Issues Presented3
As noted above, Plaintiff in this case makes two arguments for reversal of the ALJ’s

decision. The Court will address each of these points in turn. As discussed below, none of
Plaintiff’s arguments are meritorious. The ALJ’s thorough opinion is supported by substantial
evidence, and therefore, this Court must affirm.
A. GAF Scores
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ committed reversible error when he failed to accord any
weight to his low GAF scores inasmuch these scores show that he suffers from “Serious
symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. no friends, unable to keep a job).”
(ECF No. 16-1)
Plaintiff overstates the importance of GAF scores. “GAF scores may be relevant to a
determination of disability based on mental impairments … [b]ut an ALJ may afford greater
weight to medical evidence and testimony than to GAF scores when the evidence requires it.”
Mabry v. Colvin, 815 F.3d 386, 391 (8th Cir, 2016) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that GAF scores have “little value” and the
3

Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding in his Brief.
Moreover, the undersigned finds the ALJ complied with the strictures of Polaski v. Heckler, 739
F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), and there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
analysis of Plaintiff’s credibility. A review of the ALJ’s decision shows he partially discredited
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints for good reason and thoroughly discussed the conservative
medical evidence and inconsistencies in the record, and Plaintiff’s failure to follow
recommended treatment and his limited activities of daily living as a lifestyle choice and not due
to an established impairment, in support of his adverse credibility determination. See Julin v.
Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[c]redibility determinations are the
province of the ALJ” and the deference owed to such determinations); Gregg v. Barnhart, 354
F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “[i]f an ALJ explicitly discredits the [plaintiff’s]
testimony and gives good reasons for doing so, [the reviewing court] will normally defer to the
ALJ’s credibility determination”).
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level of severity denoted by a GAF score does not correlate to the severity requirements under
the Act. See Nowling v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1110, 1115 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Jones v. Astrue,
619 F.3d 963, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2010)) (“Moreover, the Commissioner has declined to endorse
the [GAF] score for use in the Social Security and [Supplemental Security Income] disability
programs and has indicated that [GAF] scores have no direct correlation to the severity
requirements of the mental disorders listings.”). Accordingly, “[a] litany of scores in the 41-50
range, although indicating a serious problem with occupational functioning in the DSM-IV
sense, does not necessitate a finding of disabling limitations under the Act.” Doolittle v. Colvin,
2014 WL 7369635, at *2 (W.D. Mo. 2014).
Further, the current edition of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
abandoned the use of GAF scores “because of, among other reasons, ‘it conceptual lack of
clarity’ and ‘questionable psychometrics in routine practice.’” American Psychiatric Ass’n
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 16 (5th ed. 2013)
Plaintiff’s low GAF scores are thus not presumptively accorded dispositive, or even
great, weight in the disability determination. As required to do so, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s
GAF scores, much like any other type of evidence in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. See
Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir. 2010). The ALJ explicitly considered and
rejected Plaintiff’s low GAF scores as mere “snapshots” of functioning as follows:
The record also contains various GAF scores ranging from 45 to 50. The
undersigned notes that the GAF score is of limited value. It is a subjective
assessment of [Plaintiff’s] current level of functioning utilizing a generic scale.
Because it is an assessment of [Plaintiff’s] functioning at a specific point in time
and is highly dependent on [Plaintiff’s] current situation, it provides no indication
of [Plaintiff’s overall level of functioning over an extended period. Also, because
a GAF score is part of a mental health assessment, it is often determined during
periods when the individual is having significant problems mentally, financially,
socially, etc. Furthermore, because it is a subjective assessment and there are
limited guidelines on how to assign a GAF score, if two people were to assess
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[Plaintiff] at the same time, it is highly likely that two different GAF scores would
be assigned. The Social Security Act requires [Plaintiff] to demonstrate a
medically determinable “severe” impairment or impairments that precludes
engaging in substantial gainful activity for a period of at least twelve months (or
leads to death). Therefore, when determining functioning, the undersigned must
take a long-term approach. Everyone will experience difficult times in their lives
and go through periods where their overall level of functioning is diminished.
Individuals with severe physical and/or mental impairments are likely to have
increased periods of diminished functioning and may be more likely to experience
greater decreases in functional ability. However, it is still necessary to assess
their level of functioning over a period of a year or more. Because the GAF score
only reflects a specific moment in time and can change rather dramatically in a
short period of time as [Plaintiff’s] circumstances change, it is of very little value
in determining disability.
(Tr. 29) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds the ALJ did not err in failing to give great weight to
Plaintiff’s GAF scores, or that the GAF scores, in and of themselves, demonstrate that the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
B. ALJ’s RFC Determination
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to account for his serious psychological
impairments in his RFC determination.
A disability claimant’s RFC is the most he can still do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ’s determination of an individual’s RFC should be “based on all the
evidence in the record, including ‘the medical records, observations of treating physicians and
others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.’” Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 249
F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted).
“Some medical evidence is necessary to support the ALJ’s determination of the
claimant’s RFC, and the ALJ should obtain medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s
ability to function in the workplace.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations omitted). While more weight is generally given to the opinion of an examining
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source than to the opinion of a non-examining source, the ALJ must consider state agency
medical consultants’ findings as opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1);
404.1527(f)(2)(I). In a case where no examining source has opined as to Plaintiff’s abilities to
perform work-related activities, it is within the ALJ’s authority to rely on the RFC provided by a
non-examining source. See Meares v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 22283913, at * 11 (E.D. Mo. Aug, 29,
2003) and Melton v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 21976088, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 4, 2003) (indicating
that findings of fact and opinions made by non-examining agency physicians must be treated as
“expert opinion evidence of non-examining sources,” and evaluated in conjunction with other
medical evidence of record).
The record shows that, at the time the ALJ issued his decision, none of Plaintiff’s treating
physicians had opined as to Plaintiff’s mental ability to do work-related activities. Therefore, it
was within the ALJ’s authority to rely on the RFC provided by Dr. Robert Cottone, the state
agency medical consultant, and the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform
sedentary, unskilled work consisting of simple, routine, repetitive, unskilled tasks and making
simple judgments. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff can frequently interact with the general
public, supervisors, and coworkers but he works better with things rather than people. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff would be off task 5% of the work day resulting in a 5% loss of productivity,
with the ability to respond to routine changes in the work setting on an occasional basis.
Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC should have included additional limitations related to
his serious psychological impairments is not supported by the medical records. Although
Plaintiff testified that he had serious psychological impairments, the ALJ found his testimony not
entirely credible in light of the subjective medical evidence. The only additional limitation
Plaintiff identified that should have been included to address his serious psychological

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impairments was the need to be off-task 25-30% of the work day. The medical records are
devoid of any findings that Plaintiff would be off-task 25-30% of the work day. The
undersigned concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that no further
limitations were required.
As discussed above, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s mental RFC finding is
supported by substantial evidence in the record; thus, the ALJ properly relied on the vocational
expert’s response to a hypothetical question that included the RFC finding. See Goff v.
Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding the ALJ “properly included only those
limitations supported by the record as a whole in the hypothetical” and stating “[a] vocational
expert’s testimony based on a properly phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial
evidence”) (quotations omitted).
As previously discussed, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling
limitations were not credible based on Plaintiff’s failure to follow recommended treatment and
his limited activities of daily living as a lifestyle choice and not due to an established
impairment. After discussing the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ concluded that his RFC
assessment was supported by the medical evidence of record considered as a whole, and the
opinion of the state agency doctor. The undersigned finds that the RFC formulated by the ALJ is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole. The ALJ thoroughly evaluated the evidence in this case, and gave Plaintiff a
full and fair hearing. An ALJ’s decision is not to be disturbed “‘so long as the ... decision falls
within the available zone of choice. An ALJ’s decision is not outside the zone of choice simply

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because [the Court] might have reached a different conclusions had [the Court] been the initial
finder of fact.’” Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bradley v.
Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008)). Although Plaintiff articulates why a different
conclusion might have been reached, the ALJ’s decision, and, therefore, the Commissioner’s,
was within the zone of choice and should not be reversed for the reasons set forth above.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ denying Plaintiff’s claims for
benefits should be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this
matter is affirmed, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
A separate judgment is entered this day.
/s/ John M. Bodenhausen
JOHN M. BODENHAUSEN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 14th day of June, 2017

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