Mygatt v. Medicredit, Inc.

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26 ) and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29 ) are DENIED. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 5/18/2017. (NEB)

UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
)
)
)

TIMBERL Y MYGATT,
Plaintiff,

)

No. 4:15-CV-1947 RLW

)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

MEDICREDIT, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 26) and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29).

These

matters are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Timberly Mygatt ("Mygatt") incurred debt as a result of medical treatment she
received at Missouri Delta Medical Center ("MDMC"). (Plaintiffs Statement of Uncontroverted
Facts in Conjunction with her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("PSUMF"), ECF No. 31 ,
~2) ;

Defendant's Statement ofUncontroverted Material Facts ("DSUMF"), ECF No. 28, ~1).
Mygatt alleges Medicredit, Inc. ("Medicredit") served as the debt collector with respect

to her debt owed to MDMC. (DSUMF,

~8).

Medicredit sent at least two collection letters to

Mygatt in an attempt to collect the debt owed to MDMC. (PSUMF,

~4) .

Medicredit mailed

Mygatt a letter, dated December 24, 2014, listing a balance due of $300.23. (DSUMF,

~9).

Medicredit' s December 24, 2014 letter did not disclose that the "Balance Due" of $300.23 would
increase after the date of the letter. (PSUMF,

~10).

Medicredit mailed Mygatt a letter, dated

April 25, 2015, listing a balance due of $308.20. (DSUMF, ~10). Medicredit's April 25, 2015

letter did not disclose that the "Balance Due" would increase after the date of the letter.
(PSUMF,

~18) .

As of April 25, 2015, Medicredit was assessing 9% interest per annum on

Mygatt's debt. (PSUMF,

~

21). Mygatt alleges that on October 23 , 2015, she called Medicredit

and was informed that the balance due was $319.44. (DSUMF,

~11).

Mygatt was told that the

amount from Medicredit's April 25, 2015 letter had increased because Medicredit was assessing
interest on Plaintiffs MDMC debt. (PSUMF, ~26) . Every dollar of interest that accrued on the
MDMC debt occurred after the accounts were placed with Medicredit for collections. (PSUMF,
~51).

On November 6, 2015, Mygatt filed her "Schedule F" as part of her voluntary Chapter 7
petition in bankruptcy, and listed her debts owed to Medicredit as $300.23 and $308.20.
(DSUMF, ~~3-5). Mygatt was discharged in bankruptcy on June 1, 2016. (DSUMF,

~

7).

DISCUSSION
I.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard

The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Citrate, 477 U.S . 317, 322 (1986);
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 , 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The substantive law
determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly
preclude summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

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A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving
party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of
material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials
of his pleading. Id.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331.

The Court' s function is not to weigh the evidence but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. '" Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge."' Torgerson , 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , Inc., 530 U.S . 133, 150 (2000)).
B. Discussion
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Mygatt argues that she is entitled to partial summary judgment with respect to
Medicredit's liability under 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A). See 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) ("A debt
collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection
with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the
following conduct is a violation of this section: The false representation of the character, amount,
or legal status of any debt."). Mygatt argues that the contents of Medicredit' s December 24,
2014 and April 25, 2015 letters, along with the October 2015 collection call, violate the FDCPA
because they informed Mygatt that she had a single "Balance Due" on a medical debt, but

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Medicredit subsequently assessed and attempted to collect interest beyond the static balance
amount listed in the letter. (ECF No. 30 at 1). See Wideman v. Kramer & Frank, P.C. , No.
4:14CV1495 SNLJ, 2015 WL 1623814, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 10, 2015) (denying motion to
dismiss section 1692e(2)(A) claim where it was "undisputed that the collection letter did not
state that the balance listed in the letter was subject to increase due to the accrual of interest");

Ray v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P., No. 4:15CV272 JCH, 2015 WL 3453467, at *6 (E.D. Mo.
May 29, 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss and citing approvingly to Wideman, " [a]n omission
of the fact that a balance listed in a collection letter was subject to increase due to the accrual of
interest has been held to violate" the FDCPA); May v. Consumer Adjustment Co., No.
4:14CV166 HEA, 2015 WL 4506688, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2015) (an allegation that the debt
collector defendant, and not the original creditor, is actively assessing interest and/or additional
charges sufficiently states a claim, but the court refused to "establish a bright line rule that a debt
collector assessing interest without specifying so in its collection letters is, as a matter of law,
liable for violating Sections 1692g(a)(l) and 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA"). As in those district
court cases, Mygatt maintains that the FDCP A requires debt collectors, when they notify
consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and
fees . See Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Because the
statement of an amount due, without notice that the amount is already increasing due to accruing
interest or other charges, can mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that
payment of the amount stated will clear her account, we hold that the FDCP A requires debt
collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may
increase due to interest and fees .") (vacating dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims on this ground).
Here, Mygatt argues that a strong case exists for imposing summary judgment: (1) the original

-4-

creditor did not charge interest on the account before sending it to collections; (2) the debt
collector listed the amount due as a "balance due," not a "current balance"; (3) the debt collector
did not provide an amount of the debt "as of' a date certain; and (4) the underlying debt was a
medical debt, not a credit card debt. (ECF No. 30 at 10-14).
Medicredit contends that it was not required to make a pnor demand because the
underlying agreement with MDMC permitted accrual of interest. (ECF No. 36 at 2). Mygatt
agreed that she would render "full payment to the [MDMC] for all services rendered to" her.
(ECF No. 36 at 2). Medicredit takes the position that a debt collector is not required by the
FDCPA to state that interest is accruing on debt. (ECF No. 36 at 3). Medicredit argues that
whether a debt collector is required by the FDCP A to state that interest is accruing is a matter
that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. (ECF No. 36 at 3). Medicredit contends that, as
a bare minimum, a fact question exists on the issue that precludes summary judgment in favor of
Mygatt.

(ECF No. 36 at 3).

Medicredit further contends that it adequately disclosed its

assessment of interest. (ECF No. 36 at 3-6). Medicredit notes several cases which have held that
a debt collector must disclose assessment of interest to avoid violating the FDCP A. (ECF No. 36
at 4 (citing Wideman, 2015 WL 1623814; May, 2015 WL 4506688, at *8). Medicredit, however,
explains that none of the cases cited definitively held that omitting the disclosure of the
assessment of interest is an automatic FDCPA violation. Rather, all of the cases held that the
propriety of a FDCP A violation depended on the facts of the cases. Likewise, Medicredit states
there is no Eighth Circuit authority regarding this issue. (ECF No. 36 at 6).
Medicredit claims that, contrary to her claim, Mygatt had prior notice that the amount of
the debt was subject to increase. Unlike in May and Gill, Medicredit claims that Mygatt had prior
to notice that the amount of her debt was subject to change because she signed an agreement that

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allowed Medicredit to charge interest. Further, Medicredit argues that, contrary to the reasoning
of Gill and May, credit card debt is not the only debt where consumers expect to be charged
interest. (ECF No. 36 at 6-7). Medicredit argues that "[c]redit card debt is unique only for its
extraordinary interest rates and fees, not for the mere existence of those rates and fees ." (ECF
No. 36 at 7).
Medicredit also argues that Mygatt cannot assert a claim under Section 1692g(a)(l)
because Mygatt conceded during her bankruptcy proceedings that the amount of the debt owed
was undisputed and correct. (ECF No. 36 at 7). Medicredit contends that it did not violate
Section 1692e(2)(A) because Medicredit' s communications "indisputably listed an amount in
excess of the original balances." (ECF No. 36 at 8). Thus, Medicredit contends that it did not
misrepresent the amount or character of the debt as necessary for Mygatt to prevail on her
Section l 692e(2)(A) claim. Likewise, Medicredit argues that it was willing to accept the
amounts listed on the statement "in full satisfaction of the debts, notwithstanding the assessment
of interest" for 30 days following the dates on the letters. (ECF No. 36 at 8). Thus, Medicredit
claims that its letters were not misleading as a matter of law.
The FDCP A specifically prohibits false representations about the "character, amount, or
legal status of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). "A closer question is whether claims arising
under section 1692e may be resolved as a matter of law where the underlying facts are not in
dispute." Gill v. Credit Bureau of Carbon Cty., No. 14-CV-01888-KMT, 2015 WL 2128465 , at
*3 (D. Colo. May 5, 2015) (noting that the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have determined
that the question of whether a communication is false and deceptive in violation of section l 692e
is a question of law for the Court, but the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have come
to the opposite conclusion, finding that this determination is a question of fact for the jury).
-6-

"Nevertheless, even the courts adopting [the latter] view have explained that not all cases require
a jury trial if material facts are not disputed and the court is able to decide the case as a matter of
law based on the language of the collection letter."' Gill, 2015 WL 2128465, at *3 (citing

Kalebaugh v. Berman & Rabin, P.A. , 43 F.Supp.3d 1215, 1222 (D. Kan. 2014); Kuehn v. Cadle
Co. , Inc., 335 Fed. Appx. 827, 830 (11th Cir. 2009); Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C.,
505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)).

The Court holds that Mygatt has failed to establish that she is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law for her claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). As an initial matter,
the Court notes that the case law from this district cited by Mygatt were all denials of motions to
dismiss and have little value in determining a violation as a matter of law. Likewise, district
courts have refused to identify a bright line rule of liability. See Wideman, 2015 WL 1623814;

May, 2015 WL 4506688, at *8; Gill, 2015 WL 2128465, at *3. Rather, the district courts
evaluated the facts of the cases and refused to dismiss the FDCP A claims on those facts.
Further, various factual disputes exist in this case which preclude entry of summary
judgment. For example, it is unclear whether Mygatt was aware of the true amount of the debt,
or whether Medicredit would have accepted the payment listed on the letter as full compensation,
and whether Mygatt was aware of that option. Wideman, 2015 WL 1623814, at *3 ("These are
factual disputes that are not properly determined on a motion to dismiss."); May, 2015 WL
4506688, at *8 ("Given that purpose of the FDCP A is to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, ... , every case brought
under the FDCPA necessarily requires a fact specific inquiry and analysis. For this reason, bright
line rules are difficult to establish in the context of the FDCP A.")(intemal citations omitted).

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The Court also cannot decide as a matter of law that it is unreasonable for a consumer to assume
that interest will not accrue on a medical debt. Moreover, the fact that the Eighth Circuit has yet
to address whether a debt collector must disclose that interest is accruing on a debt bolsters this
Court' s decision to refrain from deciding this issue as a matter of law. Finding that the evidence
before the Court is disputed and not amenable to disposition as a matter of law, the Court denies
Mygatt' s Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

As an initial point, Medicredit contends that it was authorized to charge interest on
Mygatt' s debt with MDMC. (ECF No. 27 at 2-3). When Mygatt agreed to treatment at MDMC,
she also agreed in writing that all otherwise unpaid amounts would become "due and payable at
the time of discharge or discontinuation of treatment." (DSUMF, if2). Mygatt further agreed
that "if the account becomes delinquent, interest on the amount due will accrue interest at the
maximum amount allowed by law[.]"

(SUMF, if2).

Medicredit argues that this written

agreement puts it outside the purview of Missouri 's prejudgment interest statute, Mo. Rev. Stat.
§408.020. (ECF No. 27 at 2). Because the accrual of interest is provided for under the written
agreement, Medicredit argues it could assess interest without any demand required. (ECF No. 27
at 2).
Medicredit further argues that it did not violate the FDCP A by failing to disclose the
accrual of interest in its letters. (ECF No. 27 at 3-6). Medicredit states that omitting to disclose
the accrual of interest in a collection letter is not a violation of the FDCP A. (ECF No. 27 at 3).
Medicredit acknowledges that several, recent district court cases have held that a debt collector
may violate the FDCP A by sending a written demand for payment without specifying interest
accruing on the debt. (ECF No. 27 at 3 (citing May, 2015 WL 4506688, at *8). Medicredit,

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however, notes that the May Court stated that "it would be highly improvident for this Court to
establish a bright line rule that a debt collector assessing interest without specifying so in its
collection letters is, as a matter of law, liable for violating Sections 1692g(a)(l) and 1692e(2)(A)
of the FDCPA. That inquiry, both in these proceedings, and in future cases, will necessarily turn
on the particular facts of the case." May, 2015 WL 4506688, at *8. Medicredit argues that it is
not liable under the FDCPA for failing to specify in its letters that interest was accruing because
Mygatt has conceded and admitted that interest was accruing on her debt with Medicredit. (ECF
No. 27 at 4). Medicredit notes that Mygatt received debt collection letters from Medicredit on
December 24, 2014 and April 25, 2015 . Mygatt called Medicredit regarding the change in the
balance between the two letters and learned that her debt was accruing interest. Fourteen days
later, Mygatt filed her bankruptcy case. When Mygatt filed her bankruptcy case, she filed
schedules listing her assets and debts, which included the non-contingent, liquidated, and
undisputed debts owed to Medicredit of $300.23 and $308.20. Mygatt attested that the schedules
were true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information and belief and that the schedules
were not subject to dispute. (ECF No. 27 at 4-5). Medicredit emphasizes that Mygatt made
these representations even after she learned that her debt included interest. Medicredit argues
that Mygatt' s reliance on May is misplaced because here "everyone agrees to the nature and
character of the debt," including the accrual of interest. (ECF No. 27 at 5). Medicredit argues
that Mygatt cannot now argue that Medicredit misstated the amount or nature of the debt when
she previously agreed under oath that Medicredit's statement of the debt was true and correct.
(ECF No. 27 at 5). Given that Medicredit and Mygatt agreed on the amount and character of the
debt, Medicredit claims that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Mygatt' s FDCPA
claims. (ECF No. 27 at 6).

-9-

In response, Mygatt admits that she included her two debts with Medicredit on her
schedules for bankruptcy. However, Mygatt claims that Medicredit has failed to demonstrate
that it was entitled to assess interest on all four of her medical accounts prior to sending a written
demand for payment, which is a violation of Section 1692f(l ). Mygatt notes that Medicredit
only provided an authorization form that corresponds to one of Mygatt' s November 1, 2012
medical services. (ECF No. 32 at 5 (citing ECF No. 28-1)). Mygatt claims that Medicredit has
not produced any forms or other documents referencing the accrual of interest for the medical
services Mygatt received on October 12, 2012 and/or March 28, 2013. (ECF No. 32 at 5 (citing
ECF Nos. 28-1 - 28-6)). Mygatt claims that there are no documents authorizing the accrual of
interest on her second November 2, 2012 account and the March 28, 2013 account, yet
Medicredit added interest for that account. (ECF No. 32 at 6). Thus, Mygatt claims that an issue
of fact exists as to whether Medicredit was allowed to assess interest before sending its initial
collection letter under Mo. Rev. Stat. §408.020. (ECF No. 32 at 6).
Further, Mygatt claims that the language of the November 1, 2012 authorization form
does not support Medicredit' s theory that it was allowed to immediately assess interest without
proof of a prior written demand from Missouri Delta Medical Center. (ECF No. 32 at 6-7).
Mygatt argues that Medicredit misreads the medical form to allow for automatic accrual of
interest absent a demand for payment. The form provides:
I/we hereby agree that all charges connected with this treatment not covered by
insurance or other third party coverage are due and payable at the time of
discharge or disconnection of treatment.. .. I/we further agree that if the account
becomes delinquent, interest on the amount due will accrue at the maximum
amount allowed by law.

Mygatt argues that "[t]he language referencing 'this treatment' reaffirms .. . that the guarantee of
payment and interest provisions are tailored to the treatment and service date that is listed on the
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authorization form." (ECF No. 32 at 7). Mygatt argues that this provision does not provide for
the automatic accrual of interest absent a demand of payment. (ECF No. 32 at 7). Mygatt notes
that the provision states that the interest will not accrue on the "amount due" until the account
becomes delinquent. (ECF No. 32 at 7). Mygatt claims that "[i]n order for an amount to become
due, and then subsequently delinquent (thereby triggering the accrual of interest on the account),
it must first necessarily be reduced to a definite balance." (ECF No. 32 at 7). Mygatt argues that
there is "inherently a requirement to send a bill and/or demand for payment before interest can
accrue on the account." (ECF No. 32 at 8). That is, "an amount due cannot be delinquent before
the consumer is even aware that he or she owes it." (ECF No. 32 at 8). Mygatt claims that
Medicredit had to show that written notice was provided of the amount due and/or evidence that
the amount due was delinquent before it could assess interest on the debt. Thus, Mygatt claims
an issue of fact exists regarding whether Medicredit was allowed to assess interest when it
received the accounts from Missouri Delta Medical Center. (ECF No. 32 at 8).
As another basis, Mygatt argues that Medicredit is not entitled to summary judgment
simply because Mygatt included her debt with Medicredit on her bankruptcy schedules. (ECF
No. 32 at 8-12). Mygatt claims that listing an amount as undisputed under Schedule F is not the
same as conceding that the total amount due was accurately represented within a collection letter
for purposes of § 1692e and § 1692g. Mygatt contends that "whether Medicredit was authorized
to assess interest in the first place has no bearing on the separate inquiry of whether Medicredit
sufficiently apprised Plaintiff of that fact within its collection letter under Section 1692e(2)(A)
and/or §1692g(a)(l)."

(ECF No. 32 at 10).

Mygatt claims that the only relevance to her

including her debt to Medicredit on her bankruptcy schedule that it provide a concrete illustration
of the "misunderstanding that can occur when collecting multiple debts without disclosing that

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daily interest is accruing on the amount listed." (ECF No. 32 at 10). Mygatt claims that, when
she listed her debts on her bankruptcy schedule, she believed that the two letters corresponded to
different dates of service with MDMC, not that her account was actively accruing interest. (ECF
No. 32 at 10-11). Thus, Mygatt claims that her inclusion of Medicredit debt serves to further
underscore her confusion and why debt collectors should disclose that interest is accruing on a
debt, "especially in the context of medical accounts." (ECF No. 32 at 11). In addition, Mygatt
notes that Medicredit sent an April 25 , 2015 letter, indicating a balance of $308.20. However,
during a call in October 2015, Medicredit attempted to collect a balance higher than listed in the
letters, $319.44. Mygatt disputed that she owed the higher balance and she refused to put the
higher amount on her bankruptcy schedule. Thus, Mygatt claims that she purposefully did not
include the $319 .44 on her schedules because she disputed Medi credit's ability to accrue interest.
Finally, Mygatt contends that Medicredit is not entitled to summary judgment in its favor
because Medicredit has not addressed the line of cases from this district holding that a debt
collector must disclose that it is collecting interest. (ECF No. 32 at 12-13). Likewise, Mygatt
claims that Medicredit has not addressed the Second Circuit's decision in Avila v. Riexinger &
Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016), vacating the judgment of the district court insofar as it
dismissed plaintiffs' claim that defendants violated the FDCP A by sending plaintiffs a collection
notice stating their "current balance" without disclosing that the balance might increase over
time due to interest and fees . Id. at 77. Mygatt argues that, unlike the cases which found that
FDCPA does not impose a duty to inform the consumer that the debt is accruing interest, the
underlying debt was a medical, not a credit card account. (ECF No. 32 at 14). Also, Mygatt
argues that Medicredit informed Mygatt that she owed $300.23, but Mygatt was never informed
that Medicredit was accruing interest.

Likewise, Medicredit did not provide a payoff date

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specifying when Medicredit would honor payment in full of the static amount it listed within its
letter. Mygatt claims that she did not learn until October 2015 that Medicredit was assessing
interest on her medical account. (ECF No. 32 at 14-15). As a result, Mygatt maintains that this
Court must deny summary judgment.
The Court denies Medicredit's Motion for Summary Judgment. As previously discussed,
whether there was a violation of the FDCP A is largely an issue of fact that is not generally
amenable to summary judgment. The Court holds that various factual disputes preclude entry of
summary judgment. Medicredit has not shown as a matter of law that a reasonable consumer
would have known that Medicredit was assessing interest on Mygatt' s medical debt.
Specifically, Medicredit has not shown that Mygatt was aware that interest could be or was
accruing on her debt. Nor has Medicredit shown that any demand for payment was ever made to
Mygatt. Medicredit also has not proven that it had the legal authority to assess interest on all of
the accounts for which it charged interest. Further, the Court holds that Mygatt has provided a
plausible explanation for her inclusion of the debt with Medicredit on her Schedule F bankruptcy
form, even though she was unaware of the accruing interest. The Court holds that this issue of
fact precludes a finding that the debt was undisputed. Likewise, Medicredit has not shown that
Mygatt knew that Medicredit would have accepted the amounts stated in its correspondence for
thirty (30) days after the letters were sent. In sum, the Court determines that Medicredit failed to
show that the letters sent to Mygatt did not misrepresent the amount due as a matter of law. The
Court finds, without holding, that a reasonable person could find that the balance provided to
Mygatt, which did not state that interest was accruing, was confusing. The Court defers to a
factfinder to determine whether Medicredit violated the FDCP A.

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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
26) and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) are DENIED.

Dated this;rlay of May, 2017.

~~
ONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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