Waldron v. USA

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Judgment is entered for Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Matthew McReynolds, and that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice. Doc. 1 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 01/22/2016. (KCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STEPHEN WALDRON,
Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 4:16-CV-75-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Stephen Waldron to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2255. For the following
reasons, the Court will instruct movant to show cause why this action should not be
dismissed as time-barred.
After pleading guilty to distribution of heroin, distribution of heroin to a
person under the age of twenty-one, maintaining a drug-involved premises, and
possession with intent to distribute heroin, movant was sentenced on December 11,
2012, to 168 months= imprisonment and six years of supervised release. Movant
did not appeal. In the instant action, movant alleges that he is actually innocent,
because his conviction and sentence are invalid under the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881 (2014) (defendant
cannot be held liable under penalty enhancement provision of Controlled Substance

Act where use of drug distributed by defendant was not independently sufficient
cause of victim’s death). In addition, movant asserts claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and he argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and
intelligently made. The instant motion to vacate was signed on December 21, 2015,
and was filed in this Court on January 20, 2016.
Discussion
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing ' 2255 Cases in the United States District
Courts provides that a District Court may summarily dismiss a ' 2255 motion if it
plainly appears that the movant is not entitled to relief.
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 now provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of-(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction
becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a
motion created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
A review of the instant motion indicates that it is time-barred under 28 U.S.C.
' 2255(1) and subject to summary dismissal. Movant=s conviction became final on
about December 26, 2012, fourteen days after his December 11, 2012 sentencing;
however, he did not sign the instant motion to vacate until December 20, 2015.
Thus, it appears that this action is untimely. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A); 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1,4); Anjulo-Lopez v. U.S., 541 F.3d 814, 816 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008)
(citing Moshier v. U.S., 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005).
Movant asserts that his motion to vacate should be considered timely,
because the Supreme Court=s decision in Burrage announced a new rule that was
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, pursuant to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ragland v. United
States, 784 F.3d 1213 (2015). See 28 U.S.C. ' 2255(3). As such, according to
movant, the period for filing his ' 2255 motion was extended.

Movant contends

that it is the 2015 date of the Eighth Circuit’s Ragland opinion that started the
running of his one-year limitations period, and therefore, the instant action is
actually timely.

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Movant=s argument is without merit.

In Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S.

353, 357, 360 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the one-year limitation period
for filing a motion to vacate based on a newly-recognized right ran from the date
on which the Supreme Court initially recognized the right asserted, not from the
date on which the right was made retroactively applicable. Burrage was decided
on January 27, 2014; however, the instant motion was not even signed until
December 2015, well after the one-year limitations period had expired.

As such,

the instant action appears to be untimely.
Before taking any further action, the Court will order movant to show cause
why this action should not be dismissed as time-barred.
Respondent will not be ordered to respond to the motion to vacate at this time.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that movant shall show cause in writing within
thirty (30) days of the date of this Order why his 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 motion to vacate
should not be dismissed as time-barred. If movant fails to comply, the Court will
dismiss this action as untimely.
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2016.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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