Waldron v. USA

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no order to show cause shall issue as to respondent, because the instant 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion is time-barred. A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 28, 2016. (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STEPHEN WALDRON,
Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 4:16-CV-75-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on review of movant=s response to this
Court=s January 22, 2016 Memorandum and Order, instructing him to show cause
why the Court should not dismiss the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence as time-barred [Doc. #5].

Having carefully reviewed the response, the

Court concludes that movant=s arguments are without merit, and the instant action
is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255(f).
In his response to show cause, movant states that he “was held in St. Louis
City Justice Center for an extended period of time to answer state charges for other
offenses.”

He further states that he “did not arrive at FCI Forest City until March

11, 2014.”

Movant complains that during this entire time, he “was not afforded

any access to a law library and his request to his attorney about filing an appeal

was met with stiff opposition by the attorney.”
Forest City, he “diligently pursued an appeal.”

Movant states that after arriving at
He asks the Court to grant him

equitable tolling due to the “unavoidable delay, due to circumstances beyond his
control, as it took a considerable amount of time in order . . . to obtain not only the
Sentencing Transcript but a copy of the plea agreement as well.”

In addition,

movant “avers that [the] Plea Agreement contains a conflict of interest.”
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act=s (AAEDPA@) one-year
statute of limitations is mandatory. Equitable tolling of this time period in order
to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court requires Aextraordinary
circumstances.@

Movant=s claims relative to the untimeliness of this case simply

do not establish extraordinary circumstances required for tolling, even assuming
his contentions to be true.

See Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir.

2000) (equitable tolling proper only when extraordinary circumstances beyond
prisoner=s control make it impossible to file timely petition); Shoemate v. Norris,
390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (pro se status, lack of legal knowledge or legal
resources, confusion about or miscalculations of the limitations period, or the
failure to recognize the legal ramifications of actions taken in prior post-conviction
proceedings are inadequate to warrant equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox,
231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that Aeven in the case of an

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unrepresented prisoner alleging a lack of legal knowledge or legal resources,
equitable tolling has not been warranted@).

Moreover, attorney negligence does

not warrant equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007).
Finding no grounds for equitable tolling, the Court will dismiss this action as
time-barred.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no order to show cause shall issue as to
respondent, because the instant 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 motion is time-barred.
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and
Order.
Dated this 28th day of March, 2016.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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