Reynolds v. Russell et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Byington, Helms, and Rodgerss motion to dismiss [ECF No. 20] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Byington is DISMISSED from this action. Plaintiffs medical mistreatment and failure -to-protect-claims are DISMISSED. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Roesslers motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 27] is GRANTED, and Roessler is DISMISSED from this action. An Order of Partial Dismissal will be filed separately. 20 27 Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 8/10/16. (CLA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KENNETH DA’VON REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARRY RUSSELL, et al.,
Defendants,

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No. 4:16-CV-149 JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants Earl Byington, Ronald Helms, and James Rodgers move to dismiss this
action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Rachael Roessler
separately moves for summary judgment under Rule 56. After reviewing the motions and all
other relevant matters, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims against defendants Byington and
Roessler should be dismissed.
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Byington, Helms, and
Rodgers are correctional officers at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center.
Roessler is a nurse there, and she works for Corizon, Inc.
Plaintiff alleges that while defendants Rodgers and Helms were applying wrist restraints
to him, he asked them why he was “being cuffed up.” He says that Helms then slammed his
head into the concrete wall and that Rodgers punched him several times. He also says he was
kneed in the back of the neck several times. Plaintiff claims that Byington “responded.” He
asserts that Helms resumed punching him while Rodgers held him down. He says that after the
wrist restraints were applied, he was taken to the medical unit.

Plaintiff claims that Roessler assessed his injuries. He says she wrote in the medical
records that he had no injuries and that he refused to cooperate, which he claims is not true. He
maintains that he had “multiple injuries, including deep cuts in [his] mouth, upon [his] face,
bruises and head injuries . . .”
1.

Motion to Dismiss

Byington, Helms, and Rodgers argue that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

They claim that plaintiff has failed to allege Byington’s personal

involvement, that there are not sufficient factual allegations to support a claim that defendants
failed to protect him, that plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing their deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs, that plaintiff failed to assert § 1983 constitutional violations
because plaintiff’s injuries were de minimis, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
“Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged
deprivation of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and
§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Plaintiff’s only assertion with
regard to Byington is that he “responded.” This is insufficient to show that Byington was
directly involved in the alleged violations of plaintiff’s rights.

So, defendant Byington is

dismissed.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Helms and Rogers do not state a failure-to-protect claim.
Instead, his allegations against them tend to show that they used excessive force. Therefore,
plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claims are dismissed.

2

To state a claim for medical mistreatment, plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to indicate
a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 175 (8th Cir. 1995). Allegations of mere negligence in
giving or failing to supply medical treatment will not suffice. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. In order
to show deliberate indifference, plaintiff must allege that he suffered objectively serious medical
needs and that defendants actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs. Dulany v.
Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff does not allege that defendants
disregarded his medical needs. Rather, he says he was taken to the medical unit immediately
after the alleged assault. As a result, plaintiff’s medical mistreatment claims are dismissed.
“‘[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). In the context of a prisoner’s
Eighth Amendment claim against a prison guard for the use of excessive force, “the core judicial
inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. There is no “significant
injury” requirement, because “[o]therwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of
injury.” Id. at 9; see Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010) (assault allegedly leaving plaintiff
“with a bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatment” sufficient to state
Eighth Amendment claim.). Defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s injuries were no more than de
minimis is incorrect. Plaintiff’s allegations are comparable to the alleged injuries in Wilkins.
Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for excessive use of force
against Helms and Rodgers.

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Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate a constitutional violation. Defendants state, “The facts alleged show no more
than that Defendants were acting to suppress a non-compliant prisoner.”
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “The protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of
law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)). The Court has found that plaintiff has stated a
plausible claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Therefore,

defendants’ argument fails. Additionally, plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive force is
clearly established. Consequently, the Court finds that defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity at this stage of the proceedings.
2.

Summary Judgment

Roessler moves for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff did not exhaust his
administrative remedies with regard to his claim against her. She has attached the affidavit of
Shanta Morgan, who is responsible for the offender medical grievance process at the Eastern
Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center. Morgan avers that there are no records of a
grievance filed by plaintiff against Roessler regarding the allegations in the complaint. Movant
did not file a response to the motion.
Summary judgment is required “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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56(a). In opposing summary judgment, a plaintiff may not “simply point to allegations” in the
complaint, Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2004), or “rest on
the hope of discrediting the movant’s evidence at trial,” In re Citizens Loan & Sav. Co., 621
F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1980), “but must identify and provide evidence of ‘specific facts creating
a triable controversy.’” Howard, 363 F.3d at 800 (quoting Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d
1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner may not bring an action under § 1983 “until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “An inmate exhausts a claim by taking
advantage of each step the prison holds out for resolving the claim internally and by following
the ‘critical procedural rules’ of the prison’s grievance process to permit prison officials to
review and, if necessary, correct the grievance >on the merits= in the first instance.’” Reed-Bey v.
Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95
(2006)).
Because plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that he exhausted his
administrative remedies with regard to Roessler, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Byington, Helms, and Rodgers’s motion to
dismiss [ECF No. 20] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Byington is
DISMISSED from this action. Plaintiff’s medical mistreatment and failure-to-protect-claims are
DISMISSED. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Roessler’s motion for summary judgment
[ECF No. 27] is GRANTED, and Roessler is DISMISSED from this action.

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An Order of Partial Dismissal will be filed separately.
Dated this

10th

day of August, 2016.

\s\ Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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