Pudlowski et al v. The St. Louis Rams, LLC et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum in Support of Remand (ECF No. 27 ) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 9/29/2016. (NEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES PUDLOWSKI, LOUIS C. CROSS, III,
GAIL HENRY, and STEVE HENRY, on
Behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated,

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)
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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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THE ST. LOUIS RAMS, LLC,
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THE ST. LOUIS RAMS PARTNERSHIP, and )
ITB FOOTBALL COMPANY, LLC,
)
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Defendants.
)

Case No. 4: 16-CV-189-RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum in Support of
Remand (ECF No . 27). This matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD
Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the correctness of removal
are resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.

Sheets, 313 U.S . 100, 108-09 (1941); In re Bus. Men 's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183
(8th Cir. 1993); Manning v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625
(8th Cir. 1997)). A civil action brought in state court may be removed to the proper district court
if the district court has original jurisdiction of the action. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(a).
Under CAF A, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over class actions where
there is 1) minimal diversity of citizenship among the parties; 2) there are at least 100 class
members; and 3) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5);

Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC , 674 F.3d 783 , 788-89 (8th Cir. 2012); Westerfeld v.
Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2010); Boegeman v. Bank Star, 2012 WL
4793739, *2 (E.D.Mo. Oct. 9, 2012). Minimal diversity means that "any class member and any
defendant are citizens of different states." Westerfeld v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819,
822 (8th Cir. 2010). A defendant seeking to remove on CAFA grounds must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence each of the three (3) jurisdictional elements. Ro/wing v. Nestle
Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir.2012); Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 957 (8th
Cir.2009); Hewitt II v. Gerber Products Co., 2012 WL 5410753, *7 (W.D. Ark. November 6,
2012). If the removing party meets this burden, then the party seeking remand must establish to a
legal certainty that the requirements for CAP A jurisdiction have not been met. Ro/wing, at 1069
citing Bell, at 959.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their original Petition (ECF No. 7) in state court on or around January 13,
2016. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants misled them regarding the future location of the Rams,
which caused Plaintiffs to purchase tickets, merchandise and concessions based upon Defendants'
false promises. In their original Petition, Plaintiffs purport to represent the following class:
All Missouri residents who purchased Rams tickets and/or merchandise and/or
concession from Defendants between April 21 , 2010 and January 4, 2016, in the
State of Missouri for personal, family or household purposes.
Excluded from the class are Named Plaintiffs' counsel and their agents. Also
excluded from the class are Defendants and any entity in which Defendants have a
controlling interest, and Defendant's [sic] legal representatives, heirs and
successors.
(Petition, ~26). Plaintiffs purport to allege a claim for Violation of the Merchandising Practices
Act (Count I).
On February 11 , 2016, this case was removed from state court to this Court. (ECF No. 1).

On April 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed their First Amended Complaint ("F AC"), ECF No. 26.
The putative class in the FAC is defined as:
All Missouri residents who were Missouri citizens and remained Missouri citizens
when this action was commenced who purchased Rams tickets and/or merchandise
and/or concessions between April 21, 2010 and January 4, 2016, in the State of
Missouri for personal, family or household purposes.
Excluded from the class are Named Plaintiffs' counsel and their agents. Also
excluded from the class are Defendants and any entity in which Defendants have a
controlling interest, and Defendant's [sic] legal representatives, heirs and
successors; the judicial officers assigned to this litigation and members of their
staffs and immediate families.
(FAC, if34).
On May 10, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. (ECF Nos. 49, 50).
Defendants appealed this decision. The Eighth Circuit remanded this action back to this Court,
with the instruction that it consider the impact of two declarations from people who were alleged
class members of the original Complaint. These declarants are former Missouri residents who are
now citizens of other states. These putative class members' declarations demonstrate that they
were residents of Missouri who purchased St. Louis Rams tickets, merchandise, or concessions,
and that they were citizens of other states at the time this case was removed. The parties have filed
post-remand briefs in support of their respective positions. (ECF Nos. 57, 59).

DISCUSSION

In support of their Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not
demonstrated that minimal diversity exists. (ECF No. 36 at 2).
Defendants argue that minimal diversity under CAFA exists in this case. (ECF No. 43 at
2-3). The St. Louis Rams, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of
business in Missouri at the time of removal.

The St. Louis Rams Partnership is a former

Delaware partnership that had its principal place of business in Missouri. ITB Football Company,
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LLC is a Missouri limited liability company with its principal place of business in Missouri.
Thus, Defendants claim that each Defendant is a citizen of Missouri, Delaware or both. (ECF No.
43 at 3).
Defendants further state that they have provided affirmative evidence of minimal diversity
through declarations from two putative class members. (ECF No. 43 at 4-5). These putative
class members declare that they were Missouri residents and made Rams-related purchases during
the relevant time period, but subsequently moved out of state to Connecticut and Florida.
Therefore, Defendants claim that they have demonstrated that "at least one plaintiff and one
defendant are citizens of different states." (ECF No. 43 at 5 (citing Downing v. Riceland Foods,

Inc., 298 F.R.D. 587, 590 (E.D. Mo. 2014)).
In their sur-response, Plaintiffs contend that these declarations do not create minimal
diversity or federal court subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 57 at 1). Plaintiffs rely on the
definition in the FAC, which "clarifies the class definition as all Missouri citizens and therefore the
two affiants are not class members and do not create minimal diversity. " (ECF No. 57 at 2).
Rather, Plaintiffs maintain that this Court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over this case under
the local controversy exception of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)( 4)(A). Plaintiffs rely upon Eighth Circuit opinions in Hood v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp.,

785 F.3d 263 , 266 (8th Cir. 2015) and Cartier v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA ., 547 F. App'x 800, 804
(8th Cir. 2013) to support their claim that the FAC mandates remand under the local controversy
.

exception.

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The Court further notes that although Plaintiffs also contend that the Court should apply the local
controversy exception, the local controversy exception is irrelevant to Plaintiffs' argument
because, if the putative class definition in the First Amended Complaint governs, there is no
minimal diversity of citizenship. (ECF No. 59 at 2, n.1).
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In their sur-reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' post-removal pleadings cannot divest
this Court of subject matter jurisdiction, particularly where the removal is based upon CAF A.
(ECF No. 59 at 3-6 (citing Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC, 674 F.3d 783, 790 (8th Cir.
2012) (affirming denial ofremand where Plaintiffs "First Amended Complaint redefined her class
as consisting of only Missouri plaintiffs, but her original complaint controls this determination, as
it was the operative complaint at the time ofremoval."); see also Louisiana v. Am. Nat. Prop. Cas.
Co., 746 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Every circuit that has addressed the question has held that
post-removal events do not oust CAF A jurisdiction.").
The Court holds that remand is not appropriate in this case. The original, pre-removal
Complaint is the relevant complaint to determine whether removal was appropriate. See Hargis ,
674 F.3d at 790; see also Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2011)
(CAF A "jurisdiction continued despite the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification").

Although

Plaintiffs

try

to

argue

that the

FAC-which was filed

post-removal- was a mere "clarification," the Court holds that Plaintiffs' revised class definition
was an attempt to manipulate the pleadings to divest this Court of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. The original Complaint clearly included former Missouri "residents," who are not
exclusively Missouri citizens, including the two declarants identified by Defendants. Plaintiffs
have provided no Eighth Circuit authority to support their position that post-removal amended
pleadings should be assessed in a jurisdictional analysis under CAF A. (ECF No. 59 at 8, n.4). In
fact, the cases cited by Plaintiffs, Hood and Cartier, do not support remand. In Hood, the Eighth
Circuit found that CAFA jurisdiction existed and reversed the district court's decision to remand
the case to state court. Hood, 785, F.3d at 265-66. The Hood court determined that the plaintiffs
failed to set forth evidence that two-third of the class members as of the date of filing the complaint
were citizens of the state where the action was pending. Id. The Hood court stated in dictum that
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the plaintiffs could have met this burden by "redefin[ing] the class as only local citizens." Id. at
266. However, the Hood court supported that proposition with a reference to In re Sprint Nextel

Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2010). In Sprint, the Seventh Circuit suggested that "the
plaintiffs could have guaranteed that the suit would remain in state court" if they had "defined their
class as all Kansas citizens who purchased text messaging from Sprint Nextel or an alleged
coconspirator." Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the Sprint court made clear that any redefinition
of the CAF A class had to occur in state court, not after removal.
Likewise, Cartier v. Wells does not support remand. In Cartier, the court concluded that
federal subject matter existed because the plaintiffs had voluntarily amended their complaint in a
manner that caused the parties to have diversity of citizenship. The case was removed to federal
court after the dismissal of the nondiverse parties. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, adding back the nondiverse parties as defendants .

The Cartier court relied on

Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc. , 58 F.3d 1238 (8th Cir. 1995) in support of its finding that the
plaintiffs' voluntary, diversity-creating amendment conferred federal jurisdiction. In Humphrey,
the Eighth Circuit noted, "where the removal of an action from state court to federal court may
have been improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), the subsequent amendment of the complaint so as
to create a basis for removal jurisdiction does not render the removal issue moot if the amendment
was ordered by the district court or was otherwise involuntary." Humphrey, 58 F.3d at 1241.
Thus, Cartier and Humphrey stand for the principle that a plaintiff may not rely on a pre-removal
complaint, which was drafted to avoid federal jurisdiction, and then voluntarily amend the
complaint in a manner that provides for federal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit consistently
holds that plaintiffs may not manipulate their pleadings post-removal in order to avoid federal
jurisdiction.

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Based upon this well-established and uncontroverted jurisprudence, the Court holds that
Plaintiffs cannot rely upon the FAC to deprive this Court of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court must rely on the class definition in the original Complaint, which includes
non-minimally diverse plaintiffs who are Missouri residents but not current Missouri citizens.
Therefore, the Court denies the motion to remand.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum in Support of
Remand (ECF No. 27) is DENIED.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2016.

~J#b

RONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE