Shuck v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District 837 et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, State of Missouri. An Order of Remand will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 03/07/2017. (KCB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ANN SHUCK,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE
WORKERS, DISTRICT 837, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 4:16-CV-309 RLW
)
)
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Second Motion to Remand (ECF No. 14).
This matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the correctness of removal
are resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); In re Bus. Men 's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183
(8th Cir. 1993); Manning v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625
(8th Cir. 1997)). A civil action brought in state court may be removed to the proper district court
if the district court has original jurisdiction of the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The party
seeking removal has the burden to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Cent. Iowa Power
Co-op. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 561 F.3d 904, 912 (8th Cir. 2009);
Bell v. Hershey Co. , 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009).
BACKGROUND
Shuck was employed as an administrative assistant by Defendant District 83 7
("Defendant") from March 2005 through March 2013. On December 9, 2009, Shuck fell down
the steps while working at Defendant, and she suffered permanent partial disability to her neck
and back. She filed a claim under the Worker's Compensation Act. Shuck alleges that, after she
filed Worker's Compensation claim, Shuck's supervisors created a hostile work environment.
Shuck settled her workers' compensation claim on February 8, 2013. Shuck claims that she was
wrongfully discharged on February 28, 2013, effective February 25, 2013, in retaliation for
exercising her right to worker's compensation.
Shuck filed claims for Wrongful Discharge
(Count I), Wrongful Termination-Breach of Public Policy (Count II), Civil Conspiracy (Count
III).
This case was previously removed to this Court and then remanded to the Circuit Court
of St. Louis County. On February 5, 2016, Shuck filed her Amended Petition in state court. On
February 7, 2016, Defendant removed this action to federal court.
DISCUSSION
This case was removed based upon federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§1331,
1446. In the Notice of Removal, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs Amended Petition is preempted by the strong federal policy favoring union democracy, which is embodied in the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. §401, et. seq. (ECF No. 1 at
3). Defendant argues that this Court should follow the reasoning of the California Supreme Court
to determine whether "claims for wrongful discharge and related torts against the union and its
officials are preempted by the LMRDA." Screen Extras Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.
3d 1017, 1021 (1990); see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, at 2-4; ECF No. 20 at 9. The
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California Supreme Court held that "allowing even 'garden-variety' wrongful termination
actions to proceed from the discharge of appointed union business agents by elected union
officials would implicate the union democracy concerns of the LMRDA." Screen Extras Guild,
Inc., 51 Cal. 3d at 1027 (emphasis in original). 1
The Court finds this California state court case and its protection of "union democracy
concerns of the LMRDA" to be unpersuasive for finding complete preemption. Defendant cites
to no Eighth Circuit precedent adopting the California state court's solitary interpretation
regarding "the union democracy concerns of LMRDA."
Moreover, Shuck's wrongful
termination claim does not implicate the union's self-governance. Defendant asserts that Shuck
was a "Secretary-Business Representative" who worked for the President-Directing Business
Representative and, therefore, Shuck had access to confidential union information. Defendant
maintains Shuck was fired because of alleged dishonesty, but Shuck claims she was wrongfully
termination in retaliation for filing her worker's compensation claim.
implicate union democracy concerns.
None of these facts
The mere fact that confidential documents crossed
Shuck' s desk in her capacity as secretary for the union President-Directing Business
Representative does not connect her claim with the autonomy of the union's administration.
Likewise, the Court finds that the other cases law cited by Defendant do not support
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Unlike the cases cited by Defendant, this case does not
involve a union election, and such cases finding preemption for union elections are also not
persuasive. (ECF No. 20 at 9); cf Porch-Clark v. Engelhart, 930 F. Supp. 2d 928, 935 (N.D. Ill.
2013) ("Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has directly addressed
whether Title IV of the LMRDA completely preempts state law challenges to union elections, it
1
When Defendant cites this passage, however, it fails to include the language about "appointed
union business agents" and "elected union officials." (ECF No. 1 at 4).
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is clear that the requisites of complete preemption are present here."); Pettaway v. Houston Fed'n
of Teachers, Local 2415, No. CIV.A. H-07-0922, 2007 WL 951564, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27,
2007) ("Because plaintiff challenges the validity of the election itself, the court is also persuaded
that his complaint is completely preempted. Section 482 creates a comprehensive federal
enforcement procedure that includes a civil action in federal court brought by the Secretary of
Labor, and section 483 indicates Congress's intent to make this remedy exclusive with respect to
"already conducted" elections."). In fact, Defendants conceded "courts have not expressly held
that non-election portions of the LMRDA provide for complete preemption[.]" (ECF No. 20 at
9).
The Court is unwilling to extend the preemption doctrine to the limits requested by
Defendants.
Instead, the Court holds that the LMRDA provides neither a defense to Shuck's claims
nor a basis for removal of this action. "[A] state-law retaliation claim is not preempted when it
does not conflict with the purposes of the LMRDA." Henry v. Laborers' Local 1191 , 495 Mich.
260, 284, 848 N.W.2d 130, 143 (2014). Shuck' s claims arise from allegedly illegal misconduct
under state law. Shuck' s claims do not related to a union election or that she was fired for
political reasons. Shuck does not allege any federal interest protected by the LMRDA. As stated,
Shuck alleges a rather garden variety wrongful termination claim. Courts have likewise held that
such a claim does not rise to the level of federal preemption under the LMRDA. See Bloom v.
Gen. Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local 952, 783 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir.
1986) ("In the present case, Bloom alleges that he was fired, not for political reasons, or for no
reason at all, but rather because he refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. Not
only is the state's interest in allowing the wrongful discharge action here strong, as discussed
above, but the federal interest is much lessened under these circumstances."); Montoya v. Local
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Union III of the Int'! Bhd. of Elec. Workers , 755 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Colo. App. 1988) ("although
Mason's claim for wrongful discharge based on internal political views is preempted, his claim
based on Mason's alleged illegal activities is not"); Henry, 848 N.W.2d at 144 ("we hold that the
LMRDA does not preempt state wrongful-termination claims in cases in which elected union
officials attempt to use their discretion as a shield to hide alleged criminal misconduct").
Defendant also argues that Shuck' s claim is preempted under §301 of the LMRDA
because her claim relies on an interpretation of the union' s constitution. (ECF No. 20 at 10-11).
Defendant contends that Shuck' s petition rests on a finding that Defendant' s officers failed to
carry out their duties. Defendant asserts that its officer' s duties are set forth in enumerated
sections of the union's Internal Constitution.
Specifically, the union constitution provides,
"Monies collected by [Secretary Treasurers] on behalf of the [Grand Lodge] , as indicated on
monthly reports, shall be sued for no other purpose and must accompany the report. " Article
XXII, Section 8 of the union International Constitution.
The Court holds that interpretation of the union' s International Constitution is not
implicated by Shuck's wrongful termination claim. Although Shuck has alleged some acts
which also may violate sections of the International Constitution that is not the crux of her claim.
Shuck' s claim relates to her allegedly wrongful termination after she reported the illegal
handling of funds, not the improper handling of the funds themselves. The Court does not find
that it will be required to interpret the union's International Constitution in order to resolve
Shuck' s claim that she was terminated as a result of reporting the illegal handling of funds. In
fact, Shuck argues that "she can prove the underlying criminal violations without any reference
whatsoever to the Union International Constitution." (ECF No. 23 at 7); Luecke v. Schnucks
Markets, Inc., 85 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906
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F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.1990) ("The proposition follows that ' a state law claim may involve
analysis of the same set of facts as a claim arising under the collective bargaining agreement
without compelling preemption." ').
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of St.
Louis County, State of Missouri. An Order of Remand will accompany this Memorandum and
Order.
Dated this 7th day of March, 201 7.
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~rm'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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