Hudson v. Steele
Filing
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OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Doc.No. 1], is denied.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 9/19/18. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
FRED D. HUDSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
TROY STEELE,
Respondent.
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) Case No: 4:16CV608 HEA
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OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 [Doc. No.1] on April 29, 2016. Respondent filed a Response to the Court’s
Order to Show Cause Why Relief Should Not be Granted [Doc. No. 6] on
September 20, 2016. On October 13, 2016, Petitioner filed his Reply to Response
to Order to Show Cause [Doc. No.8]. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, this Court has determined
that there are no issues asserted that give rise to an evidentiary hearing and
therefore one is not warranted. For the reasons explained below, the Response to
the Order to Show Cause Why Relief Should not be Granted is well taken and the
petition will be denied.
Procedural Background
Petitioner was found guilty by a jury in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, St.
Louis County on May 15, 2013 of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, firstdegree assault and armed criminal action. On June 13, 2013, Petitioner was
sentenced to life without probation or parole as to the first-degree murder offense
in count 1, thirty years as to the armed criminal action offense in count 2,
concurrent to the first-degree murder offense in count 1, life as to the first-degree
assault offense in count 3, consecutive to counts 1 and 2, and finally thirty years as
to armed criminal action offense in count 4 concurrently served to count 3. On
June 24, 2013 Petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal.
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District of Missouri, by
Per Curiam opinion, concluded the merits of his appeal were lacking and affirmed
the trial court and upheld the convictions.
On July 16, 2014 Petitioner timely filed his motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to Rule 29.15, Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, on
November 26, 2014 he filed his amended Rule 29.15 motion. In his amended
motion Petitioner asserted his counsel to be ineffective by: (1) failing to elicit
evidence of a similar shooting at a nearby house and evidence that another person
had been implicated in the shooting in the case; and (2) appellate counsel was
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ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal, preserved error in the trial court’s
refusal to quash venire panel following venire persons emotional outburst.
The Motion court denied an evidentiary hearing on the motion. In its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Motion court denied relief to
petitioner on both his ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims.
Petitioner then took timely appeal of the unfavorable ruling on his Rule
29.15 motion. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District of Missouri
affirmed the ruling of the Motion court. Petitioner is now before this court on his
28 U.S.C §2254 Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (“AEDPA”) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners
after the statute’s effective date of April 24, 1996. When reviewing a claim that
has been decided on the merits by a state court, AEDPA limits the scope of judicial
review in a habeas proceeding as follows:
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
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law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In construing AEDPA, the United States Supreme Court, in Williams v.
Taylor, held that:
Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the ‘unreasonable
application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
U.S. Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). Furthermore, the Williams Court held that “a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” 529 U.S. at 409.
A state court decision must be left undisturbed unless the decision was
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or the decision was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in state court. Colvin v. Taylor, 324 F.3d 583, 586-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
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A decision is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent if it
decides a case based on a different rule of law than the rule dictated by United
States Supreme Court precedent, or it decides a case differently than the United
States Supreme Court did on materially indistinguishable facts. Id. A decision may
only be overturned, as an unreasonable application of clearly established United
States Supreme Court precedent, if the decision is both wrong and an objectively
unreasonable interpretation or application of United States Supreme Court
precedent. Id. A federal habeas court may not disturb an objectively reasonable
state court decision on a question of federal law even if the decision is, in the
federal court’s view, wrong under Eighth Circuit precedent, and even if the habeas
court would have decided the case differently on a clean slate. Id. State court
factual determinations are presumed to be correct and this presumption can only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).
Statute of Limitations
Congress provides a one-year window in which a habeas applicant can file a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. That window opens at the conclusion of direct
review. The window closes a year later. Failure to file within that one year
window requires the court to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28
U.S.C. §2244(d) (1) (A); See Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971 (2003). If an inmate does not seek a writ of certiorari on
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direct review, direct review concludes when the time limit for seeking further
review expires. Gonzales v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). Under Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 30.01, Rule 30.03, Rule 81.04, and Rule 81.08, the time limit
for filing a notice of appeal is ten days after sentencing.
Discussion
Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is a review to determine whether a person
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Here, Petitioner’s allegations are set forth in Ground
One: he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in that trial counsel
did not investigate whether there was a similar shooting into the home of his
victims; and in Ground Two: he received ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel in that his appellate counsel did not brief a claim of trial court error
when it did not quash the venire panel following a venireperson’s
outburst.
A. Was Trial Counsel Ineffective in Not Investigating a Similar Shooting Into
the Home of the Victims?
As to Petitioner’s first ground for relief from ineffective assistance of trial
counsel the trial court, in ruling on his Rule 29.15 motion, found he had pleaded
mere conclusions and not facts which would warrant relief. The motion court went
on to render that even if underlying facts of the allegation relating to ineffective
assistance of counsel were true, the evidence would be inadmissible without proof
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that the other person committed some act directly connecting him to the crime.
State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2nd 494, 511 (Mo banc 1994); State v. Schaal, 806 S.W. 2d
659 (Mo banc 1991). The failure to plead facts sufficiently is a procedural bar that
precludes state and federal court review of the claim. Barnett v. Roper, 541
F.3d 804, 808-811 (8thCir. 2008).
The ruling of the trial court on the Rule 29.15 motion relating to the
evidence as being inadmissible is a consideration of the merits. That opinion is
reasonable, and well-supported in the law as recited by the trial court. In his appeal
to the Missouri Appeals Court, that court also concluded, in its Per Curiam
opinion, that the information was inadmissible and insubstantial. There is nothing
in the record by way of allegation or assertion to the state court decision as
unreasonable. The decision is a reasonable one and is entitled to deference under
28 U.S.C. §2254(d).
There is also an allegation the victim owed a lot of money to Michael
Klopstein. As referenced earlier, the state trial court concluded that evidence
which has no other effect than to cast bare suspicion on another person or to raise
conjectural inference that another person committed the charged crime is
inadmissible in the absence of direct evidence tying that other person to the crime.
State v. Brown, 916 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Clark, 859 S.W.2d 782
(Mo. App. 1993). The Missouri appeals Court likewise concluded the evidence
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was inadmissible. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the state
court’s resolution of these issues was reasonable.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a duty on the part of counsel and has
also failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice. The Trial court and the Missouri
appellate court arrived at the same conclusion in this regard. Both concluded that
Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice as the evidence was overwhelming and
the record fully supports it. The state court’s resolution of this issue is reasonable
and entitled to deference under section 2254(d).
B. Was Appellate Counsel Ineffective in Not Briefing a Claim of Trial Court
Error When It Did Not Quash the Venire Panel Following Venireperson
Outburst?
Here, the Rule 29.15 trial court examined the factual basis for the claim and
found the only time that the venireperson said anything about why she was crying
was at the bench out of the hearing of the jury. The trial court further noted that
Petitioner failed to plead any facts that might warrant relief and that as a
consequence, appellate counsel was not required to raise a non-meritorious
appellate claim. The appellate court agreed that there was no error and no prejudice
to Petitioner that would have justified reversal and a new trial, had the claim been
briefed on direct appeal.
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There is support in the record for the determination and conclusions of the
state courts. The state court rulings are entitled to deference under sections 2254
(d)and (e).
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing discussion and analysis the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus must be denied.
Certificate of Appealability
When a district court issues an order under § 2254 adverse to the applicant it
“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability.” R. Governing Section 2254
Cases in the U.S. Dist. Cts., R. 11. If a federal court denies a habeas application on
procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, the court
should issue a certificate of appealability if the prisoner has shown “that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district
court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not
conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the
petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id.; see also Khaimov v. Crist,
297 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (interpreting Slack in the following manner: “1)
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if the claim is clearly procedurally defaulted, the certificate should not be issued;
2) even if the procedural default is not clear, if there is no merit to the substantive
constitutional claims, the certificate should not be issued; but, 3) if the procedural
default is not clear and the substantive constitutional claims are debatable among
jurists of reason, the certificate should be granted”). Petitioner’s federal habeas
petition is clearly time-barred under AEDPA, and no reasonable jurist could that
find this case is timely filed. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; Khaimov, 297 F.3d at 786
Hence, no certificate of appealability will be issued.
Accordingly
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
[Doc.No. 1], is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Opinion, Memorandum and Order
is entered this same date.
Dated this 19th day of September, 2018.
______________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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