Tribbitt v. Lawrence

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED AND DISMISSED as time-barred. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a Certificate of Appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 8/5/16. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN TRIBBITT,

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Petitioner,
v.
SCOTT LAWRENCE,
Respondent.

No. 4:16CV680 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s response to the Order to Show Cause why
the petition should not be dismissed as time-barred.1 Having carefully reviewed petitioner’s
response, the Court concludes that his arguments are without merit, and that the instant action is
time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
Background
After trial, petitioner, John Tribbitt, was found guilty of two counts of possession with
intent to distribute and one count of trafficking in the second degree. See State v. Tribbitt, Case No.
1122-CR00442-01(22nd Judicial Circuit, St. Louis City). On November 28, 2012, petitioner was
sentenced to three, ten-year terms’ of imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections, to
run concurrently. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence until August
25, 2014. See Missouri v. Tribbitt, Case No. ED101937 (Mo.Ct.App. 2014).
On September 9, 2014, the Missouri Court of Appeals directed petitioner to show cause
why his appeal shouldn’t be dismissed as untimely, pointing out that his notice of appeal was filed
1

On June 16, 2016, the Court ordered petitioner to show cause as to why the Court should not
dismiss the instant application for writ of habeas corpus as time-barred.
1

more than eighteen months late. On October 24, 2014, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner’s appeal as untimely. Although petitioner later moved to file a late notice of appeal, his
motion to do so was denied on November 24, 2014. Id. Petitioner failed to file any post-conviction
remedies in state court.
However, petitioner did file a state habeas corpus petition, pursuant to Mo.S.Ct.R.91, on
August 14, 2015, in Cole County Circuit Court, which was denied. See Tribbitt v. Lawrence, Case
No. 15AC-CC00409 (19th Judicial Circuit, Cole County).2
Discussion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one year from the date his judgment of
conviction becomes final within which to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Where, as here,
a Missouri petitioner does not file a timely direct appeal, his judgment becomes final upon
expiration of the time within which he may file a notice of appeal, or within ten (10) days of the
date of his sentence. Mo.S.Ct.R.81.04. Accordingly, petitioner’s judgment of conviction became
final on approximately December 8, 2012.3
It was more than a year later that petitioner first filed his notice of his direct appeal, or
approximately 18 months later, as the Court of Appeals noted. Thus, by the time petitioner
attempted to exhaust his state remedies, he was already too late to file his federal habeas corpus
action in this Court.4
2

Petitioner appears to have filed a second Rule 91 state habeas in the Missouri Western District
Court of Appeals on March 30, 2016. His motion was denied. See Tribbitt v. Lawrence, Case No.
WD79540 (Mo.Ct.App.).
3
A judgment becomes final in a criminal case when a sentence is entered. See State v. Williams,
871 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 1994).
4
Although petitioner did file two state habeas corpus actions, pursuant to State Supreme Court
Rule 91, purporting abandonment of counsel, he was not successful on the merits of his claims.
However, the time petitioner pursued such arguments can be subject to tolling under Eighth Circuit
2

In his response to the Order to Show Cause, petitioner asserts that he should be excused
from the one-year statute of limitations because
AGenerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way.@ Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Equitable
tolling is Aan exceedingly narrow window of relief.@ Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir.
2001). APro se status, lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, confusion about or
miscalculations of the limitations period, or the failure to recognize the legal ramifications of
actions taken in prior post-conviction proceedings are inadequate to warrant equitable tolling.@
Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted); Kreutzer v.
Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that Aeven in the case of an unrepresented
prisoner alleging a lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, equitable tolling has not been
warranted@).
Petitioner asserts that his filing in this Court is more than three years too late because he
was negligent in filing his notice of appeal from his conviction and sentence. Petitioner asserts that
he believed his trial counsel was going to file the notice of appeal after the conclusion of his trial,
and “once he realized the filing period had passed, [he] tried to file immediately. . . but there was
no transcript in order to complete the filing.”5
Petitioner has failed to show that he was diligently pursuing his rights and some
extraordinary circumstance prevented him from presenting his claims to this Court in a timely
caselaw if such an action is “properly filed.” It matters not in this case, as petitioner’s habeas was
time-barred prior to the filing of his Rule 91 motions.
5
Petitioner’s assertions relating to the abandonment of his post-trial counsel and his alleged failure
to file a notice of appeal on his behalf have been addressed by the Missouri state courts and found
to be lacking.
3

fashion. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). First, it took petitioner at least 18
months to file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. Moreover, petitioner failed to file a
motion for post-conviction relief from his sentence, pursing his alleged abandonment of trial
counsel claim. Petitioner’s failure to timely pursue his own direct appeal, as well as his failure to
pursue any post-conviction arguments related to his trial counsel’s abandonment, belies his
assertions that he diligently pursued his rights.6
As petitioner has failed to give an equitable reason why his untimeliness should be
excused, the Court must dismiss the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED AND DISMISSED as time-barred. Rule 4 of
the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a Certificate of Appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
Dated this 5th day of August, 2016.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6

Although petitioner did file two Rule 91 petitions relating to this matter, he did not do so until
more than three years had passed after his final sentence.
4