Shields v. Lambert et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2) is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $28.72 within twenty-one (21 ) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the amended complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An order of dismissal will be filed separately. 3 . Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 10/21/16. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES LEE SHIELDS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAMBERT, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:16CV1295 CEJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff James Lee Shields for leave
to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed
the certified inmate account statement submitted with the instant motion, the Court determines
that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and assesses a partial initial filing
fee of $28.72. In addition, the Court has reviewed the amended complaint, and will dismiss it
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or
her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the
prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior sixmonth period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these

monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds
$10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
According to the certified inmate account statement submitted with the instant motion,
plaintiff’s average monthly deposit amount is $143.62, and his average monthly balance is
$30.76. The Court therefore assesses an initial partial filing fee of $28.72, which is twenty
percent of plaintiff’s average monthly deposit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is
frivolous if it Alacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.@ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A complaint fails to state a claim if it
does not plead Aenough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.@ Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). An action is malicious if it is undertaken for the
purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable
right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D. N.C. 1987), aff=d 826 F.2d 1059 (4th
Cir. 1987).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the
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Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51.
This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show
more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The Court must
review the factual allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951.
Procedural History
On August 8, 2016, plaintiff filed a 34-page complaint accompanied by various exhibits
and letters. On that same date, he filed a “Motion for Liberal Construction,” and on August 25,
2016 he filed a motion to supplement the complaint with new allegations. On September 8,
2016, the Court denied the motions as moot and gave plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint that contained all of the allegations he wished to bring against the defendants. The
Court explained to plaintiff that the amended complaint must contain short and plain statements
showing that he was entitled to relief, that the allegations must be simple, concise and direct, and
that the amended complaint must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Plaintiff was cautioned that failure to make specific and actionable allegations or
failure to follow the Court’s instructions would result in the dismissal of his case. (Docket No.
8).
The Amended Complaint
On October 17, 2016, plaintiff filed a 55-page amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Named as
defendants are Christopher Lambert (Storekeeper), Karen Teal (Storekeeper), Steven Gifford
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(Correctional Officer), Bruce Dunn (Case Manager), Troy Steele (Warden), Jeffery Jones (Case
Manager), Michael Miller (Case Manager) John Bain (Acting Assistant Warden), Jamie Crump
(Deputy Warden of Offender Management), Jason Davis (Correctional Officer), and Dave
Dormire (Assistant Director of Adult Institutions).
The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff’s allegations
stem from an incident that occurred on August 8, 2014 involving an exchange of obscene hand
gestures between plaintiff and a fellow inmate who was working in the canteen. Plaintiff alleges
that defendant Karen Teal, who was the canteen shopkeeper, noticed plaintiff displaying an
obscene hand gesture, and asked him why he did it. Plaintiff initially refused to respond but
when pressed, said that he did so because a canteen worker had made an obscene gesture at him
from inside the canteen. Teal directed plaintiff to identify the canteen worker and plaintiff
refused, telling her to review the surveillance camera footage to obtain the information. As other
inmates looked on, Teal continued to demand that plaintiff identify the canteen worker.
Defendant Christopher Lambert took plaintiff’s canteen items in an effort to help Teal secure
plaintiff’s compliance, but plaintiff stated that he could keep it. Plaintiff received a conduct
violation for arguing and cursing while refusing Teal’s directive and telling Lambert to keep his
canteen items. He was moved from the honor dorm to disciplinary segregation, and his recreation
was restricted. Plaintiff filed a grievance, and an appeal from the denial of it.
Plaintiff alleges that following Teal’s and Lambert’s directive to identify the canteen
worker could have resulted in him being labeled a “Snitch, Rat and or a Police [expletive]” and
that if that happened, he would be in danger of serious bodily injury or death. (Docket No. 12 at
p. 21, et seq.) He alleges that those actions on the part of Teal and Lambert, and their conspiracy
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in conjunction with his conduct violation charge and grievance procedure, violated his
constitutional rights. As to defendants Gifford, Dunn, Steele, Dormire, Miller, Jones, Bain,
Crump, and Davis, plaintiff alleges that they falsified claims against him, conspired against him,
were deliberately indifferent to the danger that identifying the canteen worker could expose him
to, and committed various wrongs in conjunction with the grievance he filed regarding his
conduct violation. Plaintiff does not allege that his reputation was actually damaged or that he
ever suffered any other form of actual injury as a result of the actions of any defendant.
Discussion
Plaintiff is before the Court in forma pauperis, meaning the Court has a duty to dismiss
the case at any time if it determines that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon consideration, the Court determines that
plaintiff’s amended complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
Plaintiff fails to allege that he ever suffered any actual injury as a result of the actions of
any of the defendants. Plaintiff alleges that identifying the canteen worker could have caused
ramifications for him in terms of his reputation among the other inmates, but he alleges no facts
tending to show that his reputation actually was damaged. Plaintiff also fails to allege that he
suffered any other form of harm as a result of the actions of any of the defendants. To state a
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that an actual injury resulted from the alleged
constitutional violation. Klinger v. Dept. of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (actual injury requirement derives from the
doctrine of standing); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (serious injury required in
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order to state a failure to protect claim). For the remainder of his claims on this point, plaintiff
alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when the defendants, collectively and in
conspiracy with each other, instructed him to identify the canteen worker while in the presence
of other inmates. Plaintiff’s allegations suggesting a conspiracy on the part of the defendants are
conclusory and nonsensical, and fail to plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1951.
Plaintiff also fails to identify any constitutional or federal right, privilege or immunity
that has been violated by any of the defendants. Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants
falsified claims, conspired to deceive hearing officers, and failed to grant him relief during his
prison grievance procedure.

In the context of a state prison system, an inmate grievance

procedure is not constitutionally required. Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1986)
(internal citations omitted). If the state elects to provide a grievance procedure, violations
thereof do not deprive prisoners of any federal constitutional rights. Id. Therefore, any and all
of plaintiff’s claims that are related to his prison grievance procedure fail to give rise to a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because plaintiff has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure,
he fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the conduct violation charge, he was transferred from
the “honor dorm” into a disciplinary segregation unit, and his recreation was restricted. To the
extent plaintiff can be understood to allege that this change in his custodial classification violated
a constitutional right, such claims would fail. The protections afforded by the Due Process
Clause do not extend to “every change in the conditions of confinement” that are adverse to a
prisoner.

Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). Only when a prisoner
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demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances” showing that a punishment imposes an atypical and
significant hardship may he maintain a constitutional challenge to a change in his custodial
classification. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995) (due process protections attach
only to those punishments that impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary
prison life, or to those that extend the length or duration of confinement). Plaintiff herein makes
no such allegations with regard to his transfer from the honor dorm into disciplinary segregation,
or his recreational restriction. Cases in which segregated confinement is sufficiently atypical to
raise such concerns involve circumstances much harsher than plaintiff describes. Compare
Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that a prisoner’s due process rights
may have been violated where he was kept on lock-down status for thirty years.). The Court
therefore concludes that plaintiff fails to state a claim that the change in his custodial
classification implicated any constitutional right. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1198
(10th Cir. 2007) (upholding district court's ruling that a reduction in classification level does not
implicate a liberty interest).

Finally, the amended complaint fails to state, with regard to each

one of the defendants, the capacity in which they are sued. The Court need not reach this point,
however, because plaintiff’s claims would fail even if they had been properly alleged against
proper party-defendants.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Docket No. 2) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $28.72
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his
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remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name;
(2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an
original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall not issue process or cause
process to issue upon the amended complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
An order of dismissal will be filed separately.
Dated this 21st day of October, 2016.

CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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