Evans v. Texas Roadhouse Holdings, LLC et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Texas Roadhouse L.L.C., to dismiss [Doc. # 3 ] is denied.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 10/24/16. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DORIS EVANS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TEXAS ROADHOUSE HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:16-CV-1318 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Texas Roadhouse
Holdings, L.L.C., to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff has not responded, and the
time allowed for doing so has expired.
I.

Background
In the complaint, plaintiff Doris Evans alleges that on July 12, 2011, she was

a patron at a Texas Roadhouse restaurant owned by defendant in St. Charles
County, Missouri. [Doc #1-1 at 2]. As she exited the restaurant, plaintiff’s foot got
caught on a floor mat or rug located near the entrance, causing her to fall. [Doc
#1-1 at 2].

According to the complaint, the mat or rug was “dangerous” either

because of its height, its style, its lack of flat/beveled edges, it did not lie flat on the
floor, or it was not properly illuminated. Plaintiff alleges that she sustained a spinal
fracture and a leg fracture which required surgery.

Plaintiff alleges that her

injuries are disabling and that she continues to experience pain. She asserts claims
against the defendant based on theories of premises liability (Count I), res ipsa
loquitor (Count II), negligent supervision (Count III), and respondeat superior
(Count IV). Plaintiff seeks an award of actual damages and attorneys’ fees.

II. Discussion
The defendant does not cite any legal basis for its motion to dismiss. Thus, it
is unclear whether the defendant seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), or
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons set forth below, the
defendant’s motion fails under either standard.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The factual allegations of a
complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, “even if it strikes
a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 508 n.1 (2002)); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule
12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a
complaint’s factual allegations.”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)
(stating that a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears “that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely”). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in
support of his claim. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. A viable complaint must include
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570; see id. at 563 (stating that the “no set of facts” language in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), “has earned its retirement”); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–84 (2009) (holding that the pleading standard set forth
in Twombly applies to all civil actions).

“Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

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When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c),
Fed.R.Civ.P., the Court must accept as true all factual allegations set out in the
complaint and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
drawing all inferences in her favor. Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th
Cir. 2006).

AJudgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when there is no

dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law,@ the same standard used to address a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Ashley County, Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d

659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488
(8th Cir. 1990)).
Under Rule 56, summary judgment may be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the underlying facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734
(8th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing both the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
The sole argument presented in the defendant’s motion is that, “[b]ased on
information and belief,” plaintiff was not a patron at its restaurant as she claims.
According to the allegations of the complaint, which the Court must accept as true
for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c), plaintiff was a patron at the

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restaurant when she fell and sustained injuries and the rug on which she tripped
presented a dangerous condition. The defendant has not submitted any affidavits,
deposition testimony, or other materials contradicting the plaintiff’s allegations. As
such, there remains a material factual dispute that cannot be resolved on the basis
of the present record.

Defendant has not shown that it is entitled to summary

judgment.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Texas Roadhouse
L.L.C., to dismiss [Doc. #3] is denied.

CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of October, 2016.

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