Jackson v. Ferguson-Florissant School District

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss (#10) is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 2/21/2017. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KERI JACKSON,

Plaintiff,
vs.
FERGUSON-FLORISSANT
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:16cv1412 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Keri Jackson filed her complaint against her former employer, the
Ferguson-Florissant School District, for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). The defendant has moved to
dismiss (#11). Plaintiff has not responded, and the time for doing so has passed.
Plaintiff alleges that she was employed as a teacher or teacher’s assistant with the
defendant. She believes she was discharged due to her “disability and in retaliation for
reporting the discrimination, bullying, and harassment [she] endured.” (#1 at 6.) She
filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights on
April 17, 2015. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sent to plaintiff her
Right to Sue letter on May 25, 2016. The Right to Sue letter states that she may file a
lawsuit against the defendant and that it “must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your
receipt of this notice.” (#1-1 at 1 (emphasis in original).)

Defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint so as to eliminate those actions
“which are fatally flawed in their legal premises and deigned to fail, thereby sparing
litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity.” Young v. City of St.
Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
326-27 (1989)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must be facially plausible,
meaning that the ‘factual content. . . allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’“ Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., Inc.,
599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
The Court must “accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Coons v. Mineta,
410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
Defendant moves for dismissal because plaintiff failed to file her lawsuit within 90
days of receiving her Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. The ADA requires that a claim
be fired in federal court within ninety (90) days of the plaintiff s receipt of a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(f)(l) (Title VII action must be brought
within 90 days of notification of right to sue); 42 U.S.C. § 121l7(a) (adopting Title VII
limitations period for the ADA). Here, it is presumed that plaintiff received her right to
sue letter three days after its mailing. Rich v. Bob Downes Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 831

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F. Supp. 733, 735 (E.D. Mo. 1993); see also Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d
522, 525 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). However, plaintiff did not file this
lawsuit until September 1, which was 96 days after plaintiff is presumed to have received
the letter. Although the 90-day limitation is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable
tolling, courts “have generally reserved the remedy of equitable tolling for circumstances
which were truly beyond the control of the plaintiff.” Hill v. John Chezik Imports, 869
F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989). Here, plaintiff has not responded at all to the motion to
dismiss.
Because this Court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss due to plaintiff s
failure to timely file her lawsuit, the Court need not address defendant’ s other arguments
in favor of dismissal.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (#10) is
GRANTED.

Dated this 21st day of February, 2017.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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