Reed v. State of Missouri

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner Vincent E. Reed's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. A separate Order of Dismissal will be entered herewith. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 10/18/16. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
VINCENT E. REED,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI,
Respondent.

No. 4:16-cv-1444 SNLJ-PLC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner=s response to the Court’s September 16,
2016 Order to Show Cause. In the Order to Show Cause, the Court observed that the petition
appeared to be barred by the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d), and ordered petitioner to
show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as time-barred. Because petitioner has
failed to demonstrate to the Court any circumstances warranting the application of equitable
tolling in this case, the petition will be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing ' 2254 Proceedings.
On May 25, 2012, petitioner pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County to
one count of criminal non-support, a class D felony, and was sentenced to a five-year term of
probation. He sought no review. Petitioner filed the instant petition more than four years later,
on September 12, 2016.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d):
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-1

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that equitable tolling
is proper only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner=s control make it impossible
to file a petition on time or when the conduct of the respondent has lulled the plaintiff into
inaction. Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2001). Equitable tolling, however, is
Aan exceedingly narrow window of relief.@ Id. at 805. APro se status, lack of legal knowledge or
legal resources, confusion about or miscalculations of the limitations period, or the failure to
recognize the legal ramifications of actions taken in prior post-conviction proceedings are
inadequate to warrant equitable tolling.@ Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004);
Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that Aeven in the case of an
unrepresented prisoner alleging a lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, equitable tolling
has not been warranted@); Jihad, 267 F.3d at 805-07 (unsuccessful search for counsel could not
2

warrant equitable tolling); Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 976-77 (8th Cir. 2002) (claim of
actual innocence could not justify equitable tolling).
In his response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, petitioner stated that he was “entitled
to relief” due to excusable neglect, fraud, irregular, void or satisfied judgment, that the Circuit
Court of St. Louis County lacked personal jurisdiction over him, that he was not responsible for
the crime of which he was convicted, and other conclusory statements.

(Docket No. 6).

Petitioner neither addressed the issue of the timeliness of his petition, nor made any arguments
which could reasonably be construed as alleging circumstances meriting the application of
equitable tolling. The Court therefore concludes that the petition is time-barred, and will dismiss
it as such.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner Vincent E. Reed’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
A separate Order of Dismissal will be entered herewith.
Dated this 18th day of October, 2016.
____________________________________
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3