Valentine v. Midland Funding LLC

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (See Full Order) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss 7 is denied. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 12/27/16. (EAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JORDAN VALENTINE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:16 CV 1520 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff alleges that defendant debt collector obtained a default judgment
against him in Missouri associate circuit court for $891.04. In a subsequent
garnishment action, defendant allegedly increased the total amount to include
additional costs that were not awarded in the default judgment, in violation of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Defendant moves to
dismiss the action, arguing that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and that plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Defendant’s motion will be
denied.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a
12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the factual allegations of a complaint are true

and construes them in favor of the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 32627 (1989). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The issue in considering such a motion is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present
evidence in support of the claim. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
When viewed under the relevant standards, plaintiff plausibly alleges that
defendant violated the FDCPA by impermissibly adding court costs not awarded in
the default judgment in the subsequent garnishment action. See Hageman v.
Barton, 817 F.3d 611, 620 (8th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff plausibly alleges that these
court costs – from a prior action dismissed by defendant because it was filed in the
wrong court – were not awarded as costs in the default judgment and were
improperly added by defendant in the subsequent garnishment action. These facts
are sufficient to allege a violation of the FDCPA. See id. As such, plaintiff’s
complaint states a claim under the FDCPA.1

1

Defendant’s argument that it is insulated from liability because it has a “Transcript of
Judgment” listing the amount it sought to collect in the garnishment action fails for the reasons
set out in plaintiff’s opposition brief -- namely, that a “Transcript of Judgment” in associate
circuit court is not the actual judgment, but instead a document prepared in aid of execution of
judgment. Moreover, it is not this Transcript of Judgment, or the corresponding real estate lien
2

Defendant’s argument regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also fails.
Plaintiff is not seeking relief from the underlying state court default judgment itself.
Instead, he alleges statutory violations seeking statutory penalties based on
defendant’s actions in the process of obtaining a garnishment order. As such, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply or preclude his claim. See id. at 615-16
(“FDCPA claims often involve allegations of misconduct in underlying and
completed state-court litigation. The fact of prior litigation and the existence of a
prior collection-related judgment, however, does not in and of itself trigger
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine .”).
Finally, as the conduct violative of the FDCPA is alleged to have occurred on
June 10, 2016, and this case was filed in August of 2016, it is not barred by the
FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
Defendant’s arguments relating to issue and claim preclusion are not
considered by the Court as they were improperly raised for the first time in a reply
brief. See Jo Ann Howard & Associates, P.C. v. Cassity, 4:09CV1252 ERW, 2013
WL 797972, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013). For these reasons, defendant’s motion
to dismiss is denied.

that arose because of this document, that plaintiff is challenging. Instead, plaintiff is challenging
defendant’s actions in connection with garnishment proceedings, which affected his wages, not
his real property.
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This case will be set for a scheduling conference by separate Order.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss [7] is denied.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 27th day of December, 2016.

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