McDaniel v. Boyles

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Jasmine McDaniel's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 5/24/2018. (CAR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JASMINE MCDANIEL,
Petitioner,
v.
ALANA BOYLES,
Respondent.

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Case No. 4:16 CV 1608 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before me on Petitioner Jasmine McDaniel’s petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, I
find that McDaniel’s claims are without merit and, as a result, her petition will be
denied.
I.

Background
On October 10, 2012, Jasmine McDaniel was charged with robbery in the

second-degree under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.030 (2012). On March 5, 2013, in the
Circuit Court of Warren Country, Missouri, McDaniel pleaded guilty to the charge.
At the plea hearing she admitted that, on June 25, 2012, she forcibly stole money
in the care of a bank teller at First State Community Bank. She entered the bank,
approached the teller’s window, and threw the teller an envelope which had written
on it, “This is a robbery.” McDaniel snatched money from the teller’s hand and left

the bank. Police reviewed the surveillance footage and made contact with
McDaniel based on the description they were given. McDaniel was interviewed by
the FBI and she told them that she had given a note to a teller, got the money, and
left. When the circuit judge asked McDaniel if she agreed those were the facts the
State would have to prove if the case went to trial, McDaniel initially protested by
stating, “I gave the teller two pages of documents that said ‘cry for help’ on the
note . . . .” She then followed this statement by adding: “but I do understand what
you’re saying.” When the judge asked for clarification from McDaniel whether she
knew these were the facts that would be presented at trial, McDaniel said, “Yes.”
At the plea hearing, McDaniel testified that she understood her constitutional
rights relating to a criminal trial and that she further understood that she was
waiving those rights by pleading guilty. McDaniel testified that she understood that
by pleading guilty, she was admitting the essential elements of the charge: namely,
that on or about June 25, 2012, she forcibly stole money from a bank. McDaniel
testified that she had not received any threats or promises to cause her to plead
guilty, nor had she received any promises regarding the sentence she would
receive. The judge found a factual basis for her plea, and finding her plea to be
knowing and voluntary, accepted the plea.
On May 7, 2013, McDaniel appeared for sentencing. Evidence was
presented that five days before she robbed the bank in Missouri, McDaniel had
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robbed a bank in Pennsylvania. The judge sentenced McDaniel to fifteen years
imprisonment.
On June 17, 2013, McDaniel filed a Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035
post-conviction motion. Her post-conviction motion was amended by appointed
counsel on October 18, 2013. The amended motion alleged there was an
insufficient factual basis to support a guilty plea to second-degree robbery because
there were no facts set forth that McDaniel “forcibly stole.” The amended motion
further alleged ineffective assistance of counsel by asserting that McDaniel’s plea
attorney did not tell McDaniel that she had a defense to the “forcibly stole”
element of second-degree robbery.
At an evidentiary hearing held August 26, 2014, McDaniel’s plea attorney
testified that she went over all of the discovery with McDaniel. Her attorney also
reviewed possible defenses and trial strategies with McDaniel. McDaniel’s
attorney thought there was enough evidence to establish the elements for robbery.
Her attorney specifically recalled that McDaniel wanted the charge to be reduced
to a misdemeanor stealing and that she told McDaniel that she didn’t think that was
realistic to expect based on the evidence including the note McDaniel used which
stated, “This is a robbery.” McDaniel’s plea attorney stated that based on the
evidence, “there was no way a prosecutor would agree to a misdemeanor and no
way that we would be able to get one from a jury.” [Doc. # 6-2, Ex. B, p.12] The
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attorney recalled that the State was seeking the maximum penalty of fifteen years.
The attorney testified that she explained to McDaniel what a blind plea of guilty
was and that it was McDaniel’s own choice to enter a blind plea of guilty.
McDaniel’s testimony consisted mostly of her insistence that she had merely
committed stealing, not robbery, however she admitted that the envelope that she
handed to the bank teller stated, “This is a robbery.”1 [Id. at 20] The envelope
contained papers (a note) about human rights issues. McDaniel characterized the
note as a “cry for help.” [Id. at 18] McDaniel testified at the hearing that her
attorney did not tell her she had a potential defense to robbery based on insufficient
proof of force. [Id. at 15] After the hearing, the motion court denied the motion in a
written judgment without making specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
[Doc. # 6-1, Ex. A, p.60]
On October 1, 2014, McDaniel appealed the denial of her post-conviction
motion to the Missouri Court of Appeals. She raised three grounds for relief. First,
McDaniel claimed that the motion court clearly erred denying her Rule 24.035
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[Q.] … And on the outside of the note
on the envelope itself there was an envelope with the
note; correct?
A. It was an envelope, yes.
Q. And it said what on the envelope itself? Three
words, four words?
…
Q. It said this is a robbery; right?
A. It was not a robbery.
Q. That’s what the note said, that’s what the
envelope said right; ma’am? Yes or no?
A. I believe that’s what it said.
[Doc. # 6-2, pp. 19–20]

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motion after an evidentiary hearing because her guilty plea to second-degree
robbery was invalid given that no adequate factual basis was shown to support the
plea. She argued that the State neither alleged nor did McDaniel admit any facts
supporting the use or threat to immediately use force against the bank teller per the
requirements for finding second-degree robbery. Second, McDaniel asserted that
the motion court erred in denying her ground for relief, claiming that plea counsel
was ineffective for failing to advise her that she could have asserted the State’s
inability to establish the force or threat of force element of second-degree robbery
as a defense at trial. Third, McDaniel asserted that the motion court clearly erred in
denying her motion without entering specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law in its order and judgment because this failure rendered meaningful appellate
review of her motion impossible. The court affirmed the motion court’s judgment
in a per curiam opinion, and in an attached nonprecedential memorandum rejected
all three of McDaniel’s claims. [Doc. # 6-5, Ex. E, p. 9] On October 14, 2016,
McDaniel filed the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
II.

Legal Standard
A federal district court’s power to review state court criminal decisions in a

federal habeas corpus proceeding is limited. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92
(2011). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
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determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court
is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)
(citations omitted). A federal court’s power to grant a writ of habeas corpus is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Supreme Court construed § 2254(d) in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000). With respect to the “contrary to” language, a majority of the Court held
that a state court decision is contrary to clearly established Federal law “if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a
question of law” or if “the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court
has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a writ may issue if
“the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme
Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies [the principle] to the facts of the particular

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state prisoner’s case.” Id. Thus, “a federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable
application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly
established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Without
providing a specific standard, the Court noted that “an unreasonable application of
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 410.
Specifically, for a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner
must show that “the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal
court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
As with legal findings, “a determination of a factual issue by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).
In addition, claims in a habeas petition “that have not been presented to the
state courts, and for which there are no remaining state remedies, are procedurally
defaulted.” Skillicorn v. Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965, 976 (8th Cir. 2007). “Unless a
habeas petitioner shows cause and prejudice or that he is actually innocent of the
charges, a court may not reach the merits of procedurally defaulted claims in which

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the petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising the
claims.” Id.
III.

Discussion
McDaniel asserts four grounds for relief. First, McDaniel claims that her

guilty plea violated due process because there was no trial; she received ineffective
assistance of counsel; and the court failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court
24.02(a). [Doc. # 1, Pet. p. 5] Second, McDaniel contends that the guilty plea was
improper because there was no factual basis for her guilty plea to second-degree
robbery. [Id. at 7] Third, McDaniel claims that her counsel was ineffective because
counsel did not explain that her conduct did not qualify as second-degree robbery.
[Id. at 8] Fourth, McDaniel repeated a broad claim that her due process and equal
protection rights were violated at her guilty plea. [Id. at 10]2
A. Due Process Rights
McDaniel’s first claim contains three separate and distinct arguments. She
asserts that her right to due process was violated because she was denied a trial;

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Additionally, McDaniel appears to suggest an argument that her conviction under Missouri law relies on a statute
that has been explicitly revised to require that second-degree robbery involves the forcible stealing of property
which “causes physical injury to another person,” a requirement which McDaniel alleges she had not committed.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.025; (Doc. 1, 13–14). Under the statute that McDaniel was convicted under, and which applies
to her case, the additional statutory language requiring physical injury to another person was not included. Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 569.030 (2014); see In Matter of the Care & Treatment of Murphy, 477 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015)
(“[N]ew statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless ‘otherwise expressly provided.’”); see also Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 1.150 (“[N]or shall any law repealing any former law, clause or provision abate, annul or in any wise affect
any proceedings had or commenced under or by virtue of the law so repealed, but the same is as effectual and shall
be proceeded on to final judgment and termination as if the repealing law had not passed, unless it is otherwise
expressly provided.”).

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she was denied the effective assistance of counsel; and because the state court
failed to follow Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.02(a).
The argument that McDaniel’s due process rights were violated by being
denied a trial, if construed broadly, is one that lacks any supporting factual basis. If
this claim is instead narrowed to conform generally with McDaniel’s overall
assertion that her guilty plea was deficient either due to a lack of sufficient factual
basis for her guilty plea or due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, then this
aspect of her first claim is appropriately addressed below in discussing McDaniel’s
second claim. Similarly, McDaniel’s argument here, to the extent that it relates to
the ineffective assistance of counsel, is appropriately addressed below as part of
her third claim.
McDaniel’s final assertion in her first claim that the state court failed to
comply with Rule 24.02(a) is not cognizable in a § 2254 proceeding. A claim
disputing whether the state court followed a local rule is not grounds for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If construed in this way, this claim is the same as that
alleged in McDaniel’s third claim and is addressed below.
B. Factual Basis of Guilty Plea
McDaniel’s asserts that her guilty plea was rendered involuntary,
unknowing, and unintelligent because she was induced to plead guilty for a charge
of second-degree robbery when facts of her case fail to show that she forcibly stole
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money. She asserts that she only committed a stealing offense. The state trial and
appellate courts previously addressed this issue, finding that under Missouri law,
the actions that McDaniel was charged with committing would be sufficient to
satisfy the statutory requirements for second-degree robbery. [Doc. # 6-1, p. 18; 65, p. 8]
The trial court judge appropriately clarified the facts that would have been
presented at trial and implications of pleading guilty to McDaniel, and concluded
that “there’s a factual basis for the plea [of guilty]. I will find the defendant
understands the nature of the charge, her plea is voluntary and unequivocal. Her
plea will be accepted.” (Doc. 6-1, 18).
The appellate court addressed the legal basis for McDaniel’s guilty plea in
detail, stating:
In State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. banc 2015), the
defendant bank robber argued that unlike the defendant in Brooks, he
did not make any threatening physical gestures or raise his voice in a
threatening manner to the bank teller when he robbed the bank. Id. at
354–55. He asserted that he simply walked into the bank, asked for
money and then left the bank once the teller gave him the bag of
money. Id. at 355. The Court found this distinction to be without a
difference because determining the existence of a threat is an
objective test that depends on whether a reasonable person would
believe the defendant’s conduct was a threat of the immediate use of
physical force. Id., citing Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676. The Court noted
that banks are regular targets of robberies, and bank employees have a
heightened awareness of security threats. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d at
355; Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676. A demand for money in that context
is an implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself. Coleman, 463
S.W.3d at 355; Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676, citing United States v.
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Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402–03 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that oral or
written demands for money in a bank “carry with them an implicit
threat: if the money is not produced, harm to the teller or other bank
employee may result”).
In the instant case, Appellant concedes the facts presented at the
guilty plea hearing were that she went to the teller window of the
bank, threw the teller an envelope which had written on it, “This is a
robbery,” snatched the money from the teller’s hand, and left the
building. These facts, like those set forth in Coleman, are sufficient to
constitute second-degree robbery as defined in Sections 569.030 and
569.010(1). A demand for money in that context is an implicit threat
of the use of force in and of itself, Coleman, 463 S.W.3d at 355;
Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676, thus fulfilling the requirements of the
second-degree robbery statutes.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s actions as set forth and
admitted at the guilty plea proceeding were sufficient to satisfy the
elements of second-degree robbery as laid out in the relevant statutes
and as charged in the State’s information. Appellant admitted these
facts were true and correct and thus her plea of guilty to seconddegree robbery was satisfactory and the motion court did not err in
accepting it. . . .
[Doc. # 6-5, pp. 7–8]
McDaniel does not provide any factual grounds or analysis to overcome the
previous decisions of the state courts. The state court’s legal findings are not “so
lacking in justification” that there is reason to set aside these determinations and
subject the prior decision to review by this Court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 102 (2011). Moreover, McDaniel does not provide any evidence that the state
courts’ decisions were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law. Nor did McDaniel establish that the state courts’
decisions were based on unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

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evidence presented in the state court proceedings. As a result, this ground for
relief will be denied.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must satisfy the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
For a convicted defendant to prove that his counsel was ineffective, the defendant
must first show that the counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687. This requires the defendant to show “that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.” Id. A defendant can demonstrate that counsel’s performance
was deficient where counsel’s performance “‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688). But “[s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” United States
v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
And “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). If the defendant fails to show that his counsel was deficient, the court need
not address the second prong of the Strickland test. Brown v. United States, 311
F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2002).
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Second, a defendant must demonstrate that the deficient performance was
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
The Eighth Circuit has described the Strickland test as follows: the questions
a court must ask are “[w]hether counsel’s performance was in fact deficient and, if
so, whether the defendant was prejudiced by the inadequate representation. If we
can answer ‘no’ to either question, then we need not address the other part of the
test.” Fields v. United States, 201 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2000). When
evaluating counsel’s performance, the court “must indulge in a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Considered objectively, counsel’s
performance is gauged by “whether it was reasonable ‘under prevailing
professional norms’ and ‘considering all the circumstances.’” Fields, 201 F.3d at
1027 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). “[W]e avoid making judgments based
on hindsight.” Id. A reviewing court’s “scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
McDaniel asserts that her trial attorney should have advised her not to plead
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guilty and proceed to trial because of the State’s inability to establish the element
of force for second-degree robbery. This claim is without merit. McDaniel’s
attorney’s determination that “there was no way a prosecutor would agree to a
misdemeanor and no way that we would be able to get one from a jury,” based on
the evidence is not unreasonable. [Doc. # 6-2, p. 12]3 McDaniel does not state any
factual basis to dispute the reasonableness of her attorney’s assessment of her case
other than insisting that her actions would not qualify as “forcible” as required for
establishing a conviction of second-degree robbery. The finding of the state
appellate court which concluded that McDaniel’s actions were in fact sufficient to
qualify as “forcibly stealing property” is not an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the trial court. McDaniel’s attorney
provided reasonable professional assistance, and was not constitutionally
ineffective. Because McDaniel fails to show her counsel’s representation was
deficient under the first prong of Strickland, I need not address whether McDaniel
was prejudiced.

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Q. . . . [I]f I’m not mistaken, I mean you felt
the prosecutor’s evidence was overwhelming in this case?
A. I thought they could make a robbery, yes.
Q. Sure. You felt it was a pretty strong case from
a prosecutor’s perspective?
A. Yes.
[Doc. # 6-2, p. 13]

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D. Equal Protection Rights
To the extent McDaniel’s final claim asserts claims not previously
addressed, McDaniel further argues that the lack of a trial and ineffective
assistance of counsel resulted in due process and equal protection violations under
the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When a state prisoner asserts
challenges to the “very fact or duration” of her imprisonment, as McDaniel claims
here, a writ of habeas corpus is her sole federal remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Construing this claim under the standards for a habeas
corpus claim, McDaniel fails to provide factual support for her allegations. To the
extent this claim intends to raise issues not previously raised in state court,
McDaniel’s claims are procedurally defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability
I have considered whether to issue a certificate of appealability in this

matter. To grant a certificate of appealability, I must find a substantial showing of
the denial of a federal constitutional right. See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518,
522 (8th Cir. 1997). A substantial showing is a showing that issues are debatable
among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues
deserve further proceedings. Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997)
(citing Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882–83 (8th Cir. 1994).

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I believe that McDaniel has not made such a showing on the grounds raised
in her petition. As a result, I must defer to the state court of appeals’ ruling and
deny McDaniel’s request for habeas relief. Therefore, I will not issue a certificate
of appealability.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Jasmine McDaniel’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be
entered this same date.

_______________________________
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of May, 2018.

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