Edmondson et al v. Pfizer, Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to stay [Doc. # 12 ] is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to remand [Doc. # 8 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall remand t his matter to the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri (City of St. Louis) from which it was removed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants motion to dismiss [Doc. # 6 ] is moot. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 2/7/2017. (CLO)(Certified Copy of Order and Docket Sheet mailed)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
DANIEL EDMONDSON, et al.,
Case No. 4:16-CV-1944 (CEJ)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion to stay and motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Also before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion
to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The issues are fully briefed.
Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court of
Missouri (City of St. Louis) arising out of defendant’s design, manufacture, sale,
testing, marketing, advertising, and promotion or distribution of Viagra. Plaintiffs
claim that use of Viagra caused serious injury, including melanoma and death. They
assert claims of (1) negligence, (2) strict liability, (3) breach of express warranty,
(4) breach of implied warranty, (5) fraudulent misrepresentation, (6) fraudulent
concealment, (7) reckless or negligent misrepresentation and concealment, (8)
gross negligence, (9) unjust enrichment, (10) wrongful death, and (11) loss of
On December 16, 2016, defendant removed the action to this Court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendant is a citizen of Delaware
where it is incorporated and it is also a citizen of New York where its principal place
of business is located.
Plaintiffs are citizens of Missouri, New York, Texas, Ohio,
California, Georgia, Wisconsin, Washington, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Michigan, Arkansas, Alabama, and Oklahoma.
Despite the lack of complete diversity on the face of the complaint, defendant
argues that the case should not be remanded. Defendant asks that the Court (1)
grant its motion to stay pending transfer to a multidistrict litigation case or, in the
alternative, (2) dismiss the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs for lack of personal
jurisdiction before addressing subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the Court decides
subject-matter jurisdiction first, defendant argues, exceptions to complete diversity
apply; specifically, defendants argue that the non-diverse plaintiffs’ claims are
fraudulently joined and fraudulently misjoined. Id. Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
argue that remand is required because this Court does not have subject matter
Motion to Stay
Defendant moves to stay the proceedings until the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) rules on its motion to transfer this case to the MDL
proceeding In re Viagra (Sildenafil Citrate) and Cialis (Tadalafil) Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 2691. However, “[a] putative transferor court need not
automatically postpone rulings on pending motions, or in any way generally
suspend proceedings, merely on grounds that an MDL transfer motion has been
filed.” Spears v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., Inc., No. 4:13-CV-855 (CEJ), 2013
WL 2643302, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2013) (quoting T.F. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:12CV-1221 (CDP), 2012 WL 3000229, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 23, 2012)); see also
Robinson v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:16-CV-439 (CEJ), 2016 WL 1721143, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 29, 2016); Clark v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-546 (HEA), 2015 WL 4648019, at
*1–2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 5, 2015) (denying a stay pending a ruling on a conditional
transfer); Simmons v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-340 (CEJ), 2015 WL
1604859, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2015); Matthews v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am.,
Inc., No. 4:14-CV-979 (JAR), 2014 WL 3579941, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2014).
“This is especially true where, as here, [a] pending motion is one for remand and
goes to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Spears, 2013 WL 2643302, at *1
(internal quotation marks omitted).1
Defendant argues that a stay is appropriate in this case because it would (1)
promote judicial economy, (2) avoid prejudice to defendant, and (3) impose no
prejudice on plaintiffs. The Court disagrees. “This Court is in the best position to
determine subject matter jurisdiction, and waiting for a decision by the JPML before
ruling on the motion to remand ‘would not promote the efficient administration of
justice.’” Spears, 2013 WL 2643302, at *1 (quoting Stone v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No.
4:08-CV-3207, 2009 WL 236116, at *2 (D. Neb. Jan. 30, 2009)). Accordingly,
defendant’s motion to stay will be denied.2
A conditional transfer order was entered on December 20, 2016. [Doc. #13 at 3]. Notably, Section
4.34 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Rule 2.1 states that
“[t]he pendency of a motion, order to show cause, conditional transfer order or conditional remand
order before the Panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not affect or suspend orders and pretrial
proceedings in any pending federal district court action and does not limit the pretrial jurisdiction of
that court.” R.P. J.P.M.L. 2.1(d).
Defendant offers several cases that run counter to the authority in this district, and the Court is not
persuaded by their reasoning. See Novy v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-1233 (CDP) (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9,
2016) (staying the matter without discussion); Simmons v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-1397
(CDP), 2015 WL 6063926 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 14, 2015); Miller v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc., No. 4:15CV-1401 (CDP), 2015 WL 5572801 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2015). Moreover, the cases of Toppins v. 3M
Co., No. 4:05-CV-1356 (ERW), 2006 WL 12993 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2006) and Bledsoe v. Janssen
Pharmaceutica, No. 4:05-CV-2330 (ERW), 2006 WL 335450 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2006) (noting that
plaintiffs did not oppose or respond to the defendants’ motion to stay), both cited by defendant, are
distinguishable, as the parties in those cases did not raise subject matter jurisdiction in response to
the motions to stay the proceedings.
Motion to Remand
“A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the action
originally could have been filed there.” In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d
613, 619 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.
2005)). Moreover, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Altimore v. Mount Mercy Coll., 420
F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2005). “All doubts about federal jurisdiction should be
resolved in favor of remand to state court.” In re Prempro, 591 F.3d at 620 (citing
Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 2007)). A case must be
remanded if, at any time, it appears that the district court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
“It is axiomatic that a court may not proceed at all in a case unless it has
jurisdiction.” Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir.
2001). “The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States,’ and
is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
382 (1884)). Defendant argues that, in this case, the Court should dismiss the
claims of the non-Missouri plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction before
addressing subject matter jurisdiction.3 [Doc. #14 at 5].
Under Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., the Court has discretion to determine
whether to consider its subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction first. 526
Defendant does not dispute that this Court has personal jurisdiction with respect to the claims of the
Missouri plaintiffs. They contend, however, that the non-Missouri plaintiffs cannot piggyback on this
U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (holding that “[c]ustomarily, a federal court first resolves
doubts about its jurisdiction, but there are circumstances in which a district court
appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry,” or otherwise
stated, “there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy”). “If personal jurisdiction
raises ‘difficult questions of [state] law,’ and subject-matter jurisdiction is resolved
‘as eas[ily]’ as personal jurisdiction, a district court will ordinarily conclude that
‘federalism concerns tip the scales in favor of initially ruling on the motion to
remand.’” Id. at 586 (quoting Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir.
1986)). Notably, however, “in most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will
involve no arduous inquiry.” Id. at 587.
Courts in this district addressing similar personal-jurisdiction arguments have
found it appropriate to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first. See,
e.g., Hall v. Bayer Corp., No. 4-16-CV-1523 (CEJ), 2017 WL 86011 (E.D. Mo. Jan.
10, 2017); Mcpeters v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16-CV-1680 (SPM), 2017 WL 57250
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2017); Dotson v. Bayer Corp., 4-16-CV-1593 (PLC), 2017 WL
35706 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2017); Spann v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No.
4:16-CV-902 (RLW), 2016 WL 7243535 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2016); Mounce v. Bayer
Corp., No. 4:16-CV-1478 (RLW), 2016 WL 7235707 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2016);
Dorman v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16-CV-601 (HEA), 2016 WL 7033765 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
2, 2016); Fahnestock v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-1013
(CEJ), 2016 WL 4397971 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2016); Timms v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. 4:16-CV-733 (JAR), 2016 WL 3667982 (E.D. Mo. July 11, 2016); Joseph v.
Combe Inc., No. 4:16-CV-284 (RLW), 2016 WL 3339387 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 2016);
Nickerson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1762 (RLW), 2016 WL 3030241
(E.D. Mo. May 26, 2016); Adler v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. 4:16-CV155 (RWS), Memorandum and Order (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2016) [Doc. #18]; Clark v.
Pfizer, No. 4:15-CV-546 (HEA), 2015 WL 4648019 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 5, 2015); Parker
v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-441 (CAS), 2015 WL 3971169 (E.D. Mo. June 30,
2015); Littlejohn v. Janssen Research & Dev., LLC, No. 4:15-CV-194 (CDP), 2015
WL 1647901 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2015).
For its part, defendant cites only one case from the Eighth Circuit in which
the court reached the opposite conclusion and decided personal jurisdiction first –
Addelson v. Sanofi, 4:16-CV-1277 (ERW), 2016 WL 6216124 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25,
2016). But after considering the complexity of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and
in light of the overwhelming consensus in this district, the Court respectfully
disagrees with Addelson. See Spann v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No.
4:16-CV-902 (RLW), 2016 WL 7243535, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 14 2016) (reasoning
that issues of personal jurisdiction require a more fact-intensive analysis). Where,
as here, the inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction is not arduous, the better
course is to address that issue first. See id. at 587–88 (“[B]oth expedition and
sensitivity to state courts’ coequal stature should impel the federal court to dispose
of [subject matter jurisdiction] first.”) Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by
defendant’s arguments, and finds that it is appropriate to determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires an amount in
controversy greater than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and complete
diversity of citizenship among the litigants. “Complete diversity of citizenship exists
where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds
citizenship.” OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir.
2007). In this case, defendant argues that diversity jurisdiction is not defeated
because the non-diverse plaintiffs are (1) fraudulently joined as the Court does not
have personal jurisdiction with respect to their claims, and (2) the non-diverse
plaintiffs are fraudulently misjoined.
The doctrine of fraudulent joinder is an exception to the complete diversity
rule. In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). “The
doctrine of fraudulent joinder allows a district court to assume jurisdiction over a
facially nondiverse case temporarily and, if there is no reasonable basis for the
imposition of liability under state law, dismiss the nondiverse party from the case
and retain subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims.” Murphy v. Aurora
Loan Servs., LLC, 699 F.3d 1027, 1031 (8th Cir. 2012), as corrected (Nov. 28,
“Fraudulent joinder occurs when a plaintiff files a frivolous or illegitimate
claim against a non-diverse defendant solely to prevent removal.” In re Prempro,
591 F.3d at 620. To prove fraudulent joinder, the removing party must show that
“the plaintiff’s claim against the diversity-destroying defendant has ‘no reasonable
basis in fact and law.’” Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 980 (8th Cir.
2011) (quoting Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003)). In
other words, “if it is clear under governing state law that the complaint does not
state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant, the joinder is
fraudulent.” Id. (emphasis
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Conversely, “joinder is not fraudulent where ‘there is arguably a reasonable basis
for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts
involved.’” Id. (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 811). Ergo, the Eighth Circuit has noted
that “[f]raudulent joinder is not easily shown by the defendant or lightly found by
the district court.” Vang v. PNC Mortg., Inc., 517 Fed. Appx. 523, 524 (8th Cir. May
22, 2013) (unpublished per curiam). Indeed “the defendant must ‘do more than
merely prove that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion’ since ‘we do not focus on the artfulness of the plaintiff’s
pleadings.’” Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980).
Courts in this district have repeatedly held that an alleged lack of personal
jurisdiction does not establish fraudulent joinder. See Mounce v. Bayer Corp., No.
4:16-CV-1478 (RLW), 2016 WL 7235707, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2016); Adler v.
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-155 (RWS), Memorandum and
Order, at 4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2016) [Doc. #18]; Joseph v. Combe Inc., No. 4:16CV-284 (RLW), 2016 WL 3339387, at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 2016); Triplett v.
Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2049 (AGF), at 9 (E.D. Mo. July 7, 2015) [Doc.
#30] (finding defendants’ personal jurisdiction argument failed to address whether
nondiverse plaintiffs had colorable claims as required to show fraudulent joinder);
Gracey v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-407 (CEJ), 2015 WL 2066242, at *3
(E.D. Mo. May 4, 2015) (rejecting defendants’ attempt to premise a fraudulent
joinder argument on the state court’s alleged lack of personal jurisdiction);
Littlejohn v. Janssen Research & Dev., LLC, No. 4:15-CV-194 (CDP), 2015 WL
1647901, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2015); Simmons v. Skechers USA, Inc., No.
4:15-CV-340 (CEJ), 2015 WL 1604859, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2015) (rejecting
defendants’ argument that the “theory of fraudulent joinder—an inquiry into
substantive viability of claims—countenances a procedural challenge to a court’s
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.”) This Court agrees that the “fraudulent
joinder doctrine requires the Court to consider the merits of plaintiffs’ claims under
state law, and a personal jurisdiction challenge does not go to the merits of the
claim.” Joseph v. Combe Inc., 2016 WL 3339387, at *2.
Defendant’s personal jurisdiction challenge does not constitute a valid
argument for fraudulent joinder, and they do not present any challenge to the
substantive viability of the plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant has therefore failed to meet
its burden to establish that plaintiffs’ claims are fraudulently joined, and the Court
finds that there are “colorable claim[s]” here. Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 628 F.3d
439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fraudulent misjoinder, a doctrine the Eighth Circuit has neither accepted nor
rejected, occurs when a plaintiff joins a viable claim, either by another non-diverse
plaintiff or against another non-diverse defendant, with “no reasonable procedural
basis to join them in one action” because the claim that destroys diversity has “no
real connection with the controversy.” In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d
613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010) (footnotes, internal quotation marks, and citations
omitted). Whether a party has been fraudulently misjoined depends on whether
there has been an “egregious and grossly improper” joinder “under the broadlyinterpreted joinder standards.” Id. at 624. Alleging fraudulent joinder “requires the
court to look, at least somewhat, at the substantive merits of the claim,” while
fraudulent misjoinder is a question of procedure. See Bowling v. Kerry, Inc., 406 F.
Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (referring to fraudulent misjoinder as
Here, defendant challenges the propriety of joining the non-Missouri
plaintiffs’ claims into a single action in which the Court has established personal
jurisdiction over defendants. Thus, the real issue is whether the non-Missouri
plaintiffs’ claims have been properly joined under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of
As in Prempro and several recent cases before this Court, even if the
fraudulent misjoinder doctrine is applied, it does not support this Court's exercise of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., R.A. v. Abbott Labs., No. 4:16-CV-1334 (JAR), 2016 WL
5791465 (JAR) (E.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 2016); Crockett v. Janssen Research & Dev. LLC,
No. 4:16-CV-522 (JAR), 2016 WL 3015186 (E.D. Mo. May 26, 2016); Beene v.
Combe Inc., No. 4:16-CV-282 (JAR), 2016 WL 3015183 (E.D. Mo. May 26, 2016);
Jackson v. C. R. Bard, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-465 (CEJ), 2016 WL 1732765 (E.D. Mo.
May 2, 2016); Robinson v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:16-CV-439 (CEJ), 2016 WL 1721143
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2016); Morgan v.
Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-1346
(CAS), 2014 WL 6678959 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2014); Butler v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharms., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-1485 (RWS), 2014 WL 5025833 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 8,
2014); Orrick v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 4:13-CV-2149 (SNLJ), 2014 WL
3956547 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 2014).
“Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible
scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and
remedies is strongly encouraged.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724
(1966). Rule 20 “allows multiple plaintiffs to join in a single action if (i) they assert
claims ‘with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences;’ and (ii) ‘any question of law or fact common to all
plaintiffs will arise in the action.’” Prempro, 591 F.3d at 622 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(1)). Missouri’s permissive joinder rule is substantively identical. Mo. Sup. Ct.
R. 52.05(a); State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, 581 S.W.2d 818, 826 (Mo. 1979) (en
banc). “In construing Rule 20, the Eighth Circuit has provided a very broad
definition for the term ‘transaction.’” Prempro, 591 F.3d at 622. “It may
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the
immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.” Mosley v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974). Accordingly, Rule 20
“permit[s] all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to
be tried in a single proceeding,” without requiring “[a]bsolute identity of all events.”
Prempro, 591 F.3d at 622 (quoting Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333)..
Defendant argues that the Court should find fraudulent misjoinder here
because plaintiffs “‘joined their claims to avoid diversity jurisdiction.’” [Doc. #14 at
13 (quoting Prempro, 591 F.3d at 623)]. Defendant primarily relies on In re
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), MDL No. 2243 (JAPLHG), 2012 WL 1118780, at *5 (D. N.J. Apr. 3, 2012), to support this contention.
But the Eighth Circuit has held, “if the nondiverse plaintiff is a real party in interest,
the fact that his joinder was motivated by a desire to defeat federal jurisdiction is
not material.” Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Medicine Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 404
(8th Cir. 1977); id. at 406 (“[I]f [a plaintiff] can avoid the federal forum by the
device of properly joining a nondiverse defendant or a nondiverse co-plaintiff, he is
free to do so.”). And furthermore, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that “the
bad faith referred to [in Prempro] must be something more than a desire to defeat
federal jurisdiction.” Spears v. Fresenius Medical Care North America, Inc., No.
4:13-CV-855 (CEJ), 2013 WL 2643302, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Jackson v. C. R. Bard, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-465
(CEJ), 2016 WL 1732765, at *5 (E.D. Mo. May 2, 2016); Simmons v. Skechers
USA, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-340 (CEJ), 2015 WL 1604859, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9,
2015). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ subjective intent in adding non-diverse parties is
irrelevant to the Rule 20 analysis.
The Court finds that plaintiffs’ claims satisfy Rule 20(a)’s standard.
Defendant has not demonstrated that the joinder of the non-Missouri plaintiffs with
the Missouri plaintiffs “borders on a sham.” Prempro, 591 F.2d at 624 (internal
quotation marks omitted). First, plaintiffs’ complaint raises common questions of
law or fact regarding injuries alleged from use of the same product and arising from
the same design, manufacture, sale, testing, marketing, advertising, and promotion
or distribution of a product. Also, because plaintiffs’ allegations relate to
defendant’s design, manufacture, testing, and promotion of Viagra—occurrences
common as to all plaintiffs—their claims also arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence, or series thereof. That is so even if the end-of-the-line exposures
occurred in different states and under the supervision of different medical
professionals. Thus, joinder of all of plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 20(a) is proper.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that subject-matter jurisdiction is
lacking and the matter must be remanded.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion to stay [Doc. #12] is
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to remand [Doc. #8] is
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall remand this matter
to the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri (City of St. Louis) from
which it was removed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss [Doc. #6] is
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 7th day of February, 2017.
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