Reuter v. Borbonus et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss (#13, #15, #18) are GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 3/3/2017. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JEFFREY D. REUTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN BORBONUS, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 4:16-cv-2126 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on defendants’ motions to dismiss (#13, #15,
#18). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, did not respond to the instant motions and the time to
do so has passed. For the following reasons, defendants’ motions are granted.
I.

Factual Background

In his complaint, plaintiff Jeffrey D. Reuter alleges that defendant associate circuit
court Judge John Borbonus issued an unlawful arrest warrant, leading to the arrest of
plaintiff by officers of defendant St. Louis County and that the violations of plaintiff’s
rights were not properly investigated by defendant state of Missouri. The allegations
arise over plaintiff’s dissolution proceedings in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County
presided over by Judge Borbonus. On June 26, 2013, Judge Borbonus ordered plaintiff to
pay $5,965 monthly in temporary maintenance and child support to his wife Monica
Reuter, for the duration of the dissolution proceedings. Plaintiff’s bank accounts were
quickly depleted, and plaintiff eventually ceased payments. On December 9, 2013, Judge
Borbonus held plaintiff in contempt of court for failure to pay. Judge Borbonus then

ordered plaintiff to submit $9,731.38 into the St. Louis County Court Registry by 5:00
p.m. on December 20, 2013, or else a warrant would ensue and plaintiff would be
detained.
Plaintiff explains that he submitted a check for the full amount to the Court
Registry prior to the deadline on December 20, 2013. However, three days later, St.
Louis County police officers arrived at plaintiff’s residence to execute an arrest warrant
signed by Judge Borbonus. Pursuant to the warrant, plaintiff was arrested and detained in
St. Louis County jail for approximately a day and half. While there, he was told he
would be able to appear before a judge but he never was given the opportunity to do so.
After his release, plaintiff describes that he attempted to “make things right” by
writing a complaint letter to the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline
(“Commission”) regarding his unlawful arrest and detention. The Commission declined
to give plaintiff the opportunity to present testimony on the matter and eventually denied
plaintiff’s complaint altogether. As a result of the Commission’s inaction, plaintiff filed
a separate claim against defendant Missouri.
Plaintiff’s action purportedly arises under the Constitution of the United States and
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “for violations of certain protections guaranteed to the
plaintiff by the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution by the
defendants.” Plaintiff’s alleged injuries include post-traumatic stress disorder in addition
to pain and suffering, and he claims that defendants owe him $15,000,000, with interest
accruing monthly, resulting from “the blatant disregard that government entities showed”
towards him. Plaintiff quit the practice of dentistry to better represent himself in this
2

action because no lawyer would take a case against a judge. Consequently, plaintiff
claims that defendants owe him an additional $2,400,000, which is “a conservative total
of lost wages from December 1, 2016 to October 5, 2033,” the latter being plaintiff’s
previous intended retirement date.
All three defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to
test the sufficiency of a complaint so as to eliminate those actions “which are fatally
flawed in their legal premises and deigned to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of
unnecessary pretrial and trial activity.” Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627
(8th Cir. 2001) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989)). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a claim must be facially plausible, meaning that the ‘factual content. . .
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court must “accept the
allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir.
2005)). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In addition to being facially plausible, the pleading must comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the
3

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This requirement is designed “to
give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
III.

Claims against Borbonus

The Court construes plaintiff’s claims against Judge Borbonus as alleging a
violation of plaintiff’s rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
because Judge Borbonus wrongfully issued a warrant that lead to plaintiff’s arrest and
detention. Additionally, it appears that plaintiff challenges Judge Borbonus’ decisionmaking within his capacity as a circuit court judge and asks this Court to find Judge
Borbonus abused his power within the same.
All of plaintiff’s claims against Judge Borbonus are raised against him in his
judicial capacity. Judicial immunity grants absolute immunity to judges from civil
lawsuits based on alleged judicial misconduct, subject to two exceptions: (1) when a
judge does not act within his judicial capacity or (2) when a judge takes judicial action in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991).
“[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 12. All of
Judge Borbonus’ allegedly unlawful actions were judicial in nature – including the
issuance of a warrant, presiding over dissolution proceedings, and issuing orders relating
to the same. Further, Judge Borbonus, acting as an associate circuit judge in the 21st

4

Circuit Court in St. Louis County, took judicial action pursuant to that court’s jurisdiction
granted to it by the Missouri Constitution. See Mo. Const. art V, § 17.
Judicial immunity applies “even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously.”
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Because Judge Borbonus acted within his
judicial capacity and within his court’s proper jurisdiction, Judge Borbonus is granted
absolute immunity from civil suit as to plaintiff’s claims against him. As such, plaintiff’s
claims against Judge Borbonus fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV.

Claims Against Missouri and St. Louis County

Plaintiff asks this Court to find that the Commission failed to properly investigate
his civil rights complaint against Judge Borbonus and to order Missouri, through the
Commission, to reopen its investigation in the matter. However, plaintiff’s allegations
against Missouri fail to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) because the
complaint lacks “a short and plan statement of the claim showing that [plaintiff] is
entitled to relief.” Plaintiff fails to identify the legal basis upon which his claims rest.
The legal conclusion that the government “has proven unwilling to protect my civil
rights” does not properly allege a complaint that complies with Rule 8(a)(2). Because
plaintiff’s allegations against Missouri fail to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Similarly, plaintiff’s claims against St. Louis County fail. Plaintiff does not bring
suit against the individual officers but rather asks this Court to order St. Louis County to
expunge the arrest from plaintiff’s record, to clear plaintiff’s jail phone charges incurred
during his detention, and to find that St. Louis County failed to uphold its duties to assist
5

plaintiff in “redressing the trampling of [plaintiff’s] civil rights.” The complaint does not
indicate what specific rights were violated as to give St. Louis County notice of the claim
against it. Plaintiff’s claims against St. Louis fail County to comply with Rule 8(a)(2)
and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
V.

Conclusion

Judge Borbonus is absolutely immune from civil actions under these facts because
he acted within his judicial capacity. Further, plaintiff’s claims against defendants
Missouri and St. Louis County fail to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) because the pleading does not provide a “short and plan statement of the claim
showing that [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” As such, defendants’ motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim are granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motions to dismiss (#13, #15, #18)
are GRANTED.
So ordered this 3rd day of March, 2017.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6