Anderson et al v. Creve Coeur Urgent Care LLC et al
Filing
103
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 74 ], is GRANTED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 84 ], is DENIED as moot.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plainti ffs Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 96 ], is DENIED as moot.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall submit their request for relief to the Court, including proof of damages, within 10 days of this order.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall res pond to Plaintiffs request for relief and supporting exhibits within 10 days of their submission. Final judgment to be entered upon determination of damages.( Response to Court due by 10/4/2019.). Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 09/24/2019. (AAS)
Case: 4:16-cv-02136-HEA Doc. #: 103 Filed: 09/24/19 Page: 1 of 21 PageID #: 1584
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TORIA ANDERSON, et al., individually,
and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CREVE COEUR URGENT CARE LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No.: 4:16CV2136 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
[Doc. No. 74]. The Motion is opposed by Defendants. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted.
Facts and Background
On December 22, 2016, Plaintiffs Toria Anderson (“Anderson”) and Wendy
Medina (“Medina”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a three-count Complaint
alleging that Defendants, their former employers, violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Count I), violated the overtime provisions
of the Missouri Minimum Wage Law (“MMWL”), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505
(Count II), and committed breach of contract (Count III). Since then, Plaintiffs
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have seemingly abandoned Count III. Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment on
Counts I and II for Defendants’ failure to pay proper overtime.
Plaintiffs have, in accordance with the Court’s Local Rules, submitted a
“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.” Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’
Statement, admitting some facts and issuing substantively identical denials to the
remainder. Generally, the denials state:
This paragraph should be disregarded. Rule 7-4.01 of the Local Rules
of the United States District Court of Eastern Missouri requires the
indication of “whether each fact is established by the record, and, if
so, the appropriate citations.” (Emphasis Supplied). The [evidence,
i.e. deposition testimony and/or exhibits] cited by Plaintiffs does not
stand for the proposition advanced by Plaintiffs.
Defendants do not elaborate as to why the cited evidence does not stand for the fact
asserted by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ responses are noncompliant with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the responses do not “show[] that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B), nor “properly address [Plaintiffs’] assertion of fact,”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiffs also cite Local Rule 7-4.01(E), which states in
pertinent part, “All matters set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed
admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing party.”
[2]
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The Court agrees that Defendants’ responses denying Plaintiffs’ facts do not
specifically controvert Plaintiffs’ assertions; the generic denials provide no
specific indication as to why Plaintiffs’ submitted facts are inaccurate or in dispute.
Nevertheless, Defendants claim that they have put forth specific facts showing a
genuine dispute for trial. Assumedly, Defendants are referring to their “Statement
of Genuine Material Facts Remaining in Dispute.” Each of Defendants’ eight
purportedly disputed facts cites to corresponding fact(s) put forth by Plaintiffs,
presumably indicating which of Plaintiffs’ facts is/are genuinely disputed by
Defendants’ submission.
The Court, having carefully examined Plaintiffs’ “Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts” and Defendants’ “Statement of Genuine Material Facts Remaining
in Dispute,” finds that none of the facts submitted by Defendants are in dispute
with Plaintiffs’ facts. For example, Defendants’ paragraph 5 states that “Plaintiff
Medina never talked to Dr. Saggar about not being compensated at the proper
rate,” but none of Plaintiffs’ facts state anything to the contrary. The same is true
of the other seven facts put forth by Defendants – they simply do not controvert
Plaintiffs’ facts.
Because Defendants have failed to controvert Plaintiffs’ Undisputed
Material Facts either by specific denial or by raising facts that genuinely dispute
them, Plaintiffs’ facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion.
[3]
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (e); Local Rule 7-4.01(E). Accordingly, the following facts are
undisputed:
Defendants Creve Coeur Urgent Care LLC, Downtown Urgent Care LLC,
Eureka Clinic LLC, North City Urgent Care LLC, UCSL LLC (collectively, the
“Urgent Cares”) jointly operate urgent care facilities marketed under the name
“STLHealthWorks,” although the Eureka Clinic closed in 2016. The Urgent Cares
share a common business purpose, are under common management and control,
and share employees’ services. The Urgent Cares are covered employers for FLSA
purposes.
The Urgent Cares are owned by the Saggar Family Trust dated September 4,
2013, a Missouri trust. Defendant Sonny Saggar (“Saggar”) and his wife are the
sole trustees of the Saggar Family Trust. Saggar is the founder and managing
member of each of the Urgent Cares. He exercises operational and managerial
control over each of the Urgent Cares and provides direct patient care as a
physician.
Plaintiffs were formerly employed by the Urgent Cares. Plaintiffs received
an hourly rate of pay from the Urgent Cares (“Base Rate”), and a premium hourly
rate for shifts worked on weekends. The premium hourly rate for weekend shifts
was less than one and one-half (1.5) times the Base Rate paid to each Plaintiff,
respectively. To the extent an employee’s hours worked for all of the Urgent Cares
[4]
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combined exceeded 40 hours in a workweek, The Urgent Cares paid overtime
compensation. For some weeks, the hourly rate Plaintiffs received for these
overtime hours was less than 1.5 times their “regular rate” as defined by the FLSA,
as discussed in more detail below.
Saggar was directly involved in and has ultimate authority over the hiring,
firing, and pay rates of the medical assistants at the Urgent Cares. He personally
supervised the other members of the Urgent Cares’ management teams and
supervised the medical assistants in a clinical capacity.
The Urgent Cares and Saggar (collectively “Defendants”) relied on thirdparty companies to process their employee payroll. The decision to use a thirdparty company was made by Saggar and an accountant. Defendants took no
independent steps to ensure that Plaintiffs were being paid in accordance with state
and federal wage-and-hour laws. Prior to the commencement of this action,
Defendants did not seek or rely on any advice from legal counsel regarding their
compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour laws.
Legal Standard
“Summary judgment is proper where the evidence, when viewed in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, indicates that no genuine [dispute] of
material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Davison v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 490 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir. 2007);
[5]
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see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not appropriate if there are factual
disputes that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive
law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of
material fact is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Id. “The basic inquiry is whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Diesel Machinery, Inc. v.
B.R. Lee Industries, Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The moving party has the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Once the
moving party has met its burden, “[t]he nonmovant must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, the “nonmoving party must
‘substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit
a finding in [his] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or
fantasy.’” Putman v. Unity Health System, 348 F.3d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Wilson v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995)). The
nonmoving party may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but
[6]
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must substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit
a finding in his or her favor. Wilson, 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995). “Mere
allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving
party's own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-7 (8th Cir. 2007).
Discussion
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their FLSA and MMWL claims.
Plaintiffs address three issues in their motion: that Defendants violated the FLSA
and MMWL, that they are entitled to liquidated damages, and that Saggar is
individually liable.
Defendants violated the FLSA and MMWL 1
The FLSA requires covered employers to compensate non-exempt
employees at overtime rates for time worked in excess of forty hours per
workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). “Overtime rate” is defined as “a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [an employee] is
employed.” Id. An employee’s “regular rate” is defined by the FLSA as including
“all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee . . .” 29
U.S.C. § 207(e). “Premium rate[s] paid for work by the employee on Saturdays,
1
The MMWL is interpreted in accordance with the FLSA and the regulations promulgated
thereunder; the following discussion applies fully to both the FLSA and MMWL claims. Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 290.505(4); Tolentino v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 437 S.W.3d
754, 757 n.3 (Mo. banc 2014).
[7]
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Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest, or on the sixth or seventh day of the
workweek,” are included in the regular rate, unless “such premium rate is not less
than one and one-half times the rate established in good faith for like work
performed in nonovertime hours on other days.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(6).
“The regular hourly rate of pay of an employee is determined by dividing
his total remuneration for employment (except statutory exclusions) in any
workweek by the total number of hours actually worked by him in that workweek
for which such compensation was paid.” 29 C.F.R. § 778.109. In this case,
Plaintiffs were paid a Base Rate for non-premium, non-overtime work, plus an
extra “Shift Differential” on top of their Base Rate for work on Saturdays and
Sundays. In each of the weeks for which evidentiary hour and pay records were
introduced by Plaintiffs, this Shift Differential was $3/hour. Defendants do not
dispute that the Plaintiffs’ weekend Shift Differentials are not statutorily excluded
under the FLSA. The Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division (“DOL
WHD”) has provided specific guidance on how to calculate overtime rates for
employees who are paid a shift differential. See FACT SHEET #54 – THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY AND CALCULATING OVERTIME PAY (rev. July 2009), available at
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs54.htm (accessed September 22,
2019) (“Fact Sheet #54”). The “Single Shift Differential” example provided in
[8]
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Fact Sheet #54 applies to Plaintiffs’ situation.2 In essence, overtime rates are
determined by summing all base pay and shift differentials to which the employee
is entitled in the given week absent overtime considerations. That number is then
divided by the total hours the employee worked in the given week to find the
employee’s “regular rate” for that week. The regular rate is then multiplied by 1.5
to obtain the employee’s “overtime rate” for the given week.
In their Complaint and Statement of Undisputed Facts, each Plaintiff has
alleged three, two-week pay periods in which she claims she was paid less than the
FLSA-required overtime rate in one or both workweeks. For each workweek,
Plaintiffs have calculated their regular rate and overtime rate, and argue that their
2
The following, taken directly from Fact Sheet #54, illustrates the DOL WHD calculation that
applies in Plaintiffs’ situation. For more detail, see Fact Sheet #54:
Employers also must include shift differential pay when determining an
employee’s regular rate of pay. See Regulations 29 CFR 778.207(b). The
following examples provide guidance on how to calculate overtime for employees
who receive shift differential pay.
Example: Single Shift Differential
A personal care assistant at an assisted living facility is paid $8 an hour and
overtime on the basis of the 40 hour workweek system. She works three eighthour day shifts at $8 an hour and three eight-hour evening shifts. The assistant is
paid $1 shift differential for each hour worked on the evening shift. How much
should she be paid for her eight hours of overtime?
The additional half-time must be computed based on the regular rate of pay. The
regular rate is defined as the total remuneration divided by the total hours worked.
The assistant earned a total of $408 for the 48 hours that she worked ($8 an hour
times 24 hours plus $9 an hour times 24 hours). Her regular rate equaled $8.50
and her half-time premium is $4.25. Her total earnings for the 8 hours of overtime
are $102.
[9]
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actual overtime compensation was deficient. Defendants provide no evidence or
argument in support of their weak contention that Plaintiffs’ payroll “records at
best are inconclusive.” Therefore, the Court is left to verify that Plaintiffs’
calculations comport with the law.
The Court has concluded that Plaintiffs accurately calculated both their
regular rates and overtime rates for each workweek. However, Plaintiffs compare
the amount of overtime pay to which they were entitled to the amount they were
paid under the label of “overtime” on their pay stubs. In some cases, though, the
Base Rate used to calculate non-overtime pay on the paystubs is higher than the
undisputed Base Rate and the FLSA “regular rate” to which Plaintiffs were
entitled. Therefore, absent specific evidence to the contrary, the Court cannot say
that the labels on Plaintiffs’ paystubs are sufficient to show an FLSA violation.
Rather, the determination can be made by comparing Plaintiffs’ actual gross
remuneration to their gross FLSA required pay as calculated in Fact Sheet #54,
given their regular rate, overtime rate, and hours worked.
For the June 29 – July 12, 2015 pay period, Plaintiff Anderson received
$1,569.613 total gross pay from Defendants. Her undisputed Base Rate for this
period was $12 per hour, with a $3 per hour weekend Shift Differential. Based on
the hours she worked, Anderson was entitled to gross pay of $1,533.32 for the two3
Reflects multiple paystubs: Eureka Clinic LLC: $413.00 + Downtown Urgent Care LLC:
$961.61 + Creve Coeur Urgent Care LLC: $97.08 + North City Urgent Care LLC: $97.92
[10]
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week period. 4 Because her actual gross pay received exceeded the minimum gross
pay to which she was entitled, Plaintiffs have not shown an FLSA overtime
violation for Anderson’s June 29 – July 12, 2015 pay period.
For the December 14 – 27, 2015 pay period, Anderson received $1,475.79
total gross pay from Defendants. Her undisputed Base Rate for this period was
$15 per hour, with a $3 per hour weekend Shift Differential. Based on the hours
she worked, Anderson was entitled to gross pay of $1,477.18 for the two-week
period.5 Because her actual gross pay received was less than the minimum gross
pay to which she was entitled, Plaintiffs have shown an FLSA overtime violation
for Anderson’s December 14 – 27, 2015 pay period.
4
Plaintiff
Toria Anderson
Pay Period
6/29/15 – 7/12/15
Minimum gross pay due calculation:
Week 1
Week 2
Regular Rate × 40 $13.18 × 40
= $ 527.20 $12.87 × 40
hours
Overtime Rate ×
$19.77 × 4.18
= $ 82.64 $19.31 × 22.2
OT hours
Weekly gross
$ 609.84
= $ 514.80
Minimum
= $ 428.68 Gross Pay
Due
$ 943.48
$ 1,553.32
5
Plaintiff
Toria Anderson
Pay Period
12/14/15 – 12/27/15
Minimum gross pay due calculation:
Week 1
Week 2
Regular Rate × 40 $15.00 × 40
= $ 600.00 $15.64 × 40
hours
Overtime Rate ×
$22.50 × 6.26
= $ 140.85 $23.46 × 4.72
OT hours
Weekly gross
$ 740.85
[11]
= $ 625.60
= $ 110.73
$ 736.33
Minimum
Gross Pay
Due
$ 1,477.18
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For the March 21 – April 3, 2016 pay period, Anderson received $1,359.33
total gross pay from Defendants. Her undisputed Base Rate for this period was
$15 per hour, with a $3 per hour weekend Shift Differential. Based on the hours
she worked, Anderson was entitled to gross pay of $1,360.96 for the two-week
period.6 Because her actual gross pay received was less than the minimum gross
pay to which she was entitled, Plaintiffs have shown an FLSA overtime violation
for Anderson’s March 21 – April 3, 2016 pay period.
For the February 23 – March 8, 2015 pay period, Plaintiff Medina received
$1,616.16 7 total gross pay from Defendants. Her undisputed Base Rate for this
period was $12.40 per hour, with a $3 per hour weekend Shift Differential. Based
on the hours she worked, Medina was entitled to gross pay of $1,610.31 for the
two-week period. 8 Because her actual gross pay received exceeded the minimum
6
Plaintiff
Toria Anderson
Pay Period
3/21/16 – 4/3/16
Minimum gross pay due calculation:
Week 1
Week 2
Regular Rate × 40 $15.62 × 40
= $ 624.80 $15.66 × 40
hours
Overtime Rate ×
$23.43 × 2.82
= $ 66.07 $23.49 × 1.86
OT hours
Weekly gross
$ 690.87
7
= $ 626.40
= $ 43.69
$ 670.09
Minimum
Gross Pay
Due
$ 1,360.96
Reflects multiple paystubs: Downtown Urgent Care LLC: $1,004.90 + Creve Coeur Urgent
Care LLC: $258.42 + North City Urgent Care LLC: $352.84
8
Plaintiff
Wendy Medina
Pay Period
2/23/15 – 3/8/15
Minimum gross pay due calculation:
[12]
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gross pay to which she was entitled, Plaintiffs have not shown an FLSA overtime
violation for Medina’s February 23 – March 8, 2015 pay period.
For the April 6 – 19, 2015 pay period, Medina received $1,467.39 9 total
gross pay from Defendants. Her undisputed Base Rate for this period was $13 per
hour, with a $3 per hour weekend Shift Differential. Based on the hours she
worked, Medina was entitled to gross pay of $1,485.65 for the two-week period.10
Because her actual gross pay received was less than the minimum gross pay to
which she was entitled, Plaintiffs have shown an FLSA overtime violation for
Medina’s April 6 – 19, 2015 pay period.
For the April 4 – 17, 2016 pay period, Medina received $1,534.52 total gross
pay from Defendants. Her undisputed Base Rate for this period was $15 per hour,
Regular Rate × 40
hours
Overtime Rate ×
OT hours
Weekly gross
Week 1
$12.87 × 40
Week 2
= $ 514.80 $12.86 × 40
= $ 514.40
$19.31 × 14.15
= $ 273.24 $19.29 × 15.96
= $ 307.87
$ 788.04
$ 822.27
Minimum
Gross Pay
Due
$ 1,610.31
9
Reflects multiple paystubs: Eureka Clinic LLC: $250.07 + Downtown Urgent Care LLC:
$784.80 + Creve Coeur Urgent Care LLC: $127.60 + North City Urgent Care LLC: $304.92
10
Plaintiff
Wendy Medina
Pay Period
4/6/15 – 4/19/15
Minimum gross pay due calculation:
Week 1
Week 2
Regular Rate × 40 $13.49 × 40
= $ 539.60 $14.16 × 40
hours
Overtime Rate ×
$20.24 × 7.34
= $ 148.56 $21.24 × 10.88
OT hours
Weekly gross
$ 688.16
[13]
= $ 566.40
Minimum
= $ 231.09 Gross Pay
Due
$ 797.49
$ 1,485.65
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with a $3 per hour weekend Shift Differential. Based on the hours she worked,
Medina was entitled to gross pay of $1,562.68 for the two-week period.11 Because
her actual gross pay received was less than the minimum gross pay to which she
was entitled, Plaintiffs have shown an FLSA overtime violation for Medina’s April
4 – 17, 2016 pay period.
Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that they are entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of FLSA and MMWL violations. Defendants have failed to
come forward with specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial. Judgment on
the issue of FLSA and MMWL violations will be granted in Plaintiffs’ favor.
Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages
Next, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the issue of liquidated damages.
“Any employer who violates the provisions of . . . section 207 of this title shall be
liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of . . . their unpaid
overtime compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The award of liquidated damages is not considered
11
Plaintiff
Wendy Medina
Pay Period
4/4/16 – 4/17/16
Minimum gross pay due calculation:
Week 1
Week 2
Regular Rate × 40 $15.43 × 40
= $ 617.20 $15.65 × 40
hours
Overtime Rate ×
$23.15 × 13.03 = $ 301.64 $23.48 × 0.76
OT hours
Weekly gross
$ 918.84
[14]
= $ 626.00
= $ 17.84
$ 643.84
Minimum
Gross Pay
Due
$ 1,562.68
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punitive but is “intended in part to compensate employees for the delay in payment
of wages owed under the FLSA.” Hultgren v. County of Lancaster, 913 F.2d 498,
509 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707
(1945)). “An award of liquidated damages under section 216(b) is mandatory
unless the employer can show good faith and reasonable grounds for believing that
it was not in violation of the FLSA.” Jarrett v. ERC Props., Inc., 211 F.3d 1078,
1084 (8th Cir.2000); Braswell v. City of El Dorado, Ark., 187 F.3d 954, 957 (8th
Cir.1999) (citing Hultgren, 913 F.2d at 508–09); see also Joiner v. City of
Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (“the district court's decision whether
to award liquidated damages does not become discretionary until the employer
carries its burden of proving good faith. In other words, liquidated damages are
mandatory absent a showing of good faith.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 260.
To avoid an award of liquidated damages, the employer bears the burden of
establishing, by “plain and substantial” evidence, both subjective good faith and
objective reasonableness. See Chao v. Barbeque Ventures, L.L.C., 547 F.3d 938,
941–942 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132,
142 (2d Cir.1999)). That burden “is a difficult one, with double damages being the
norm and single damages, the exception.” Chao, 547 F.3d at 941–942 (citations
and quotations omitted).
[15]
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To establish subjective good faith, an employer is required to establish “an
honest intention to ascertain and follow the dictates of the FLSA.” Gustafson v.
Full Serv. Maint. Corp., No. 4:11CV00443 AGF, 2012 WL 2117768, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. June 11, 2012) (quoting Chao, 547 F.3d at 942) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
An employer must show that it “took affirmative steps to ascertain the
Act's requirements, but nonetheless, violated its provisions.” Ahle [v.
Veracity Research Co.], 738 F.Supp.2d [896,] 920 (internal quotation
omitted). The absence of evidence indicating a knowing or willful
violation of the FLSA is not by itself enough to support a finding of
good faith.” See Martin [v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co.], 940 F.2d [896,]
909. In addition, a showing that an employer “did not intentionally
violate the Act” falls short of satisfying the objective component of
the good faith requirement. Williams v. Tri–County Growers, 747
F.2d 121, 129 (3d Cir.1984).
Gustafson, 2012 WL 2117768, at *2. Lack of knowledge, lack of willfulness, lack
of employee complaints about overtime pay, and delegation of payroll functions to
a third-party do not demonstrate an employer’s “good faith” under the FLSA.
Chao, 547 F.3d at 942-43.
“To avoid a liquidated damages award ... the employer must also prove its
position was objectively reasonable.” Id. at 941–42 (quoting Hultgren, 913 F.2d at
509). “The reasonableness requirement imposes an objective standard by which to
judge the employer's conduct. Ignorance alone will not exonerate the employer.”
Id. at 942. The court need not reach the issue of reasonableness when an employer
cannot demonstrate good faith. Id. at 943.
[16]
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Defendants have not raised or argued good faith as a defense, whether in
their Answer or their opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Defendants’ opposition includes only the statement that “It was Defendants’ policy
to pay overtime at the rate of 1.5.” This bare assertion is in no way sufficient to
satisfy Defendants’ burden of establishing both subjective good faith and objective
reasonableness by plain and substantial evidence. At best, this statement evidences
a lack of knowledge or willfulness, neither of which demonstrates good faith.
Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages on their FLSA claims.
Sonny Saggar is individually liable
The FLSA defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee ...” 29 U.S.C. §
203(d). A “person” can be “an individual, partnership, association, corporation,
business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(a). There may be multiple simultaneous employers under the FLSA, and
recovery for FLSA violations is possible against all defendants found to be
“employers.” Rikard v. U.S. Auto Protections, LLC, 4:11CV1580 JCH, 2013 WL
5298460, at * 3 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 20, 2013) (citing Perez–Benites Candy Brand,
LLC, 2011 WL 1978414, at *5, 6 (W.D.Ark. May 20, 2011)).
“A determination of whether an individual is an employer within the
meaning of the FLSA is not governed by formalistic labels or a common law
[17]
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notion of the employment relationship.” Rikard, 2013 WL 5298460 at * 3 (citing
Perez–Benites, 2011 WL 1978414, at *8; Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695
F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1983)). “Rather, the focus is on the totality of the
circumstances of whether the individual in question is sufficiently involved in the
day-to-day operations of the corporation.” Id. Economic factors relevant to the
analysis include “the individual's ownership interest, degree of control over the
corporation's financial affairs and compensation practices, and the role in causing
the corporation to compensate or not compensate employees in compliance with
the FLSA.” Rikard, 2013 WL 5298460 at * 3 (citing Saunders v. Ace Mortg.
Funding, Inc., 2007 WL 4165294, at *4 (D.Minn. Nov. 16, 2007); see also
Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 677–78 (1st
Cir.1998)). “The overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate officer with
operational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is an employer along with
the corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid
wages.” Rikard, 2013 WL 5298460 at * 3 (citing Solis v. Hill Country Farms,
Inc., 808 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1115 (S.D.Iowa 2011)).
Here, Saggar’s deposition testimony was that he founded the Urgent Cares,
is one of two trustees of the trust which owns the Urgent Cares, is the managing
member of each of the Urgent Cares, exercises operational and managerial control
over each of the Urgent Cares, and provides direct patient care at the Urgent Cares
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as a physician. Saggar testified that although hiring and firing medical assistants
was not his “decision alone,” he “had a voice in everything.” He also testified that
he had a role on determining the pay rates for medical assistants. It was also his
decision to use a third-party payroll processing company.
As to whether Saggar should be subject to personal liability, Defendants
contend that “Saggar did not directly supervise Plaintiffs.” Defendants provide no
argument for why this fact would or should absolve Saggar of personal liability.
Defendants add, again without context, “Plaintiff Medina even admitted that she
never complained to Dr. Saggar about any allegation of improper compensation.”
In their Statement of Genuine Material Facts Remaining in Dispute, Defendants
state that Saggar had no role in keeping, maintaining, or accessing the medical
assistants’ payroll records and that “Saggar did not have access to payroll records.”
The former statement is self-serving and ignores the fact that Saggar made the
decision to use a payroll management company. The latter statement misconstrues
Saggar’s testimony, which is that he never had and never wanted to see the records
but is “sure” could have seen the records if he wanted to.
Saggar’s undisputed testimony shows, among other things, that he had and
exercised control over the operations and management of each of the Urgent Cares.
He is an “employer” under the FLSA and is therefore individually liable in this
action.
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Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Defendants have failed to raise any genuine disputes of material
fact. As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. All
pending pretrial motions will be denied as moot.
Clarification on the issues of Plaintiffs’ requested relief and damages is
necessary. Plaintiffs should submit their request for relief to the Court, including
proof of damages. Defendants should respond to these filings. After consideration
thereof, judgment will be entered.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, [Doc. No. 74], is GRANTED.
IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No.
84], is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No.
96], is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall submit their request for
relief to the Court, including proof of damages, within 10 days of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs’
request for relief and supporting exhibits within 10 days of their submission.
[20]
Case: 4:16-cv-02136-HEA Doc. #: 103 Filed: 09/24/19 Page: 21 of 21 PageID #: 1604
Final judgment to be entered upon determination of damages.
Dated this 24th day of September, 2019.
________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
[21]
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