Coleman v. USA

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence 1 is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall docket a copy of this Memorandum and Order in Colemans Criminal Case No. 4:15CR418 CDP. A separate judgment in accord with this Order is entered in this case today. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on October 30, 2017. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CARLOS VALENTINO COLEMAN,
Movant,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 4:17 CV 882 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Movant Carlos Valentino Coleman seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
arguing that one of the statutes to which he pleaded guilty, 18 U.S.C. §924(c), is
unconstitutionally vague. Coleman argues that the same analysis that caused the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to be
unconstitutionally vague as held by Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551
(2015), should also apply to his conviction for possessing a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime under § 924(c). This argument is foreclosed by the United States
v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) and so I will deny Coleman’s motion.
Coleman was sentenced on June 16, 2016, to an aggregate term of 78
months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to three counts of a four-count
superseding indictment. The sentence was 18 months on each of Counts II and III
(possession with intent to distribute heroin and possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base) and a consecutive 60 months on Count III (possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense). In exchange for his guilty plea to those
three counts, the government dismissed Count I, which had charged him with
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Case No. 4:15CR418 CDP. He did not
appeal, but filed this motion challenging the constitutionality of the § 924(c)
conviction.
First, Coleman was not sentenced for possessing a firearm in connection
with a crime of violence, so the analysis of Johnson, which focused on the residual
clause of the definition of “crime of violence” in § 924(e)(2)(B), simply has no
application to Coleman’s case. Second, in United States v. Prickett, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered an argument that the definition of “crime of
violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is void for vagueness. The Court rejected that
argument, agreeing with several other Circuits to conclude that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague.
Coleman has no legal basis for relief and so I will deny his § 2255 motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to vacate, set aside or correct
sentence [1] is denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall docket a copy
of this Memorandum and Order in Coleman’s Criminal Case No. 4:15CR418
CDP.
A separate judgment in accord with this Order is entered in this case today.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 30th day of October, 2017

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