Montgomery v. Berryhill

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and this cause is REMANDED for further proceedings. A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on August 20, 2018. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STACEY MONTGOMERY,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy
Commissioner of Operations for
Social Security,1
Defendant.

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No. 4:17 CV 1207 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Stacey Montgomery brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her claim for
supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. I will reverse the decision and remand the matter to the
Commissioner for further proceedings.
Procedural History
On April 3, 2014, the Social Security Administration denied Montgomery’s
December 2013 application for SSI in which she claimed she became disabled on
March 15, 2002, because of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and

1

Nancy A. Berryhill’s term as Acting Commissioner of Social Security expired in November
2017. She continues to lead the agency as Deputy Commissioner of Operations.

palpitations.2 Montgomery later amended her alleged onset date to October 11,
2013. At Montgomery’s request, a hearing was held before an administrative law
judge (ALJ) on December 7, 2015, at which Montgomery and a vocational expert
testified. A medical expert later responded to written interrogatories put to him by
the ALJ. On April 7, 2016, the ALJ denied Montgomery’s claim for benefits,
finding the vocational expert’s testimony to support a finding that Montgomery
could perform work as it exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
On March 6, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Montgomery’s request for review
of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision is thus the final decision of the
Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In this action for judicial review, Montgomery contends that the ALJ legally
erred by failing to submit to the medical expert questions proffered by her, which
she alleges violated the Commissioner’s policy on post-hearing interrogatory
evidence and deprived her of her due process right to confront witnesses.
Montgomery also claims that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence because she substituted her own opinion for the medical evidence of
record and, further, mischaracterized and improperly relied on vocational expert
testimony that was based on an incomplete hypothetical question. Montgomery
asks that I reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and remand the matter for
2

Montgomery also filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act
but later withdrew that application. (Tr. 138-44, 165.)
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additional proceedings. For the following reasons, I will remand the matter to the
Commissioner for further consideration.
Medical Records and Other Evidence Before the ALJ
Montgomery applied for SSI in December 2013, when she was forty years
old. She had recently begun medication therapy and psychological counseling to
treat her fear of leaving her home; she believed that the world was too dangerous,
and she was afraid that something bad would happen to her if she left her home.
Although she exhibited symptoms of anxiety and depression since at least 20113
and was treated intermittently with medication for the conditions, she was
diagnosed with chronic PTSD in October 2013 and thereafter received regular
treatment, including cognitive behavioral therapy and interpersonal therapy.4 In
2015, after two years of treatment, Montgomery continued to be too afraid to leave
her home; she traveled to the grocery store, church, and to doctor’s appointments
only when accompanied by a friend or family member.
With respect to the medical records and other evidence of record relevant to
the issues raised by Montgomery in this action, I adopt Montgomery’s recitation of
facts set forth in her Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (ECF #16-1) to

3

Fear and anxiety are also noted in emergency room notes dating back to 2005. (See, e.g., Tr.
519, 561, 601.)
4

Traumatic life events noted in the medical record include several car accidents, rape at age
fourteen, domestic violence, and robbery at gunpoint when she worked as a cashier.
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the extent they are admitted by the Commissioner (ECF #21-1). These admitted
facts provide a fair and accurate description of the relevant record before the Court.
Additional specific facts will be discussed as needed to address the parties’
arguments.
Discussion
A.

Legal Standard
To be eligible for SSI under the Social Security Act, Montgomery must

prove that she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.
2001); Baker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.
1992). The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual will be declared disabled “only if [her]
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not
only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a
five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
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137, 140-42 (1987). The Commissioner begins by deciding whether the claimant
is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the claimant is working, disability
benefits are denied. Next, the Commissioner decides whether the claimant has a
“severe” impairment or combination of impairments, meaning that which
significantly limits her ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant's
impairment(s) is not severe, then she is not disabled. The Commissioner then
determines whether claimant's impairment(s) meets or equals one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If claimant's
impairment(s) is equivalent to one of the listed impairments, she is conclusively
disabled. At the fourth step, the Commissioner establishes whether the claimant
can perform her past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. Finally, the
Commissioner evaluates various factors to determine whether the claimant is
capable of performing any other work in the economy. If not, the claimant is
declared disabled and becomes entitled to disability benefits.
I must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable
person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240
F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). Determining whether there is substantial
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evidence requires scrutinizing analysis. Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th
Cir. 2007).
I must consider evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision as well
as any evidence that fairly detracts from the decision. McNamara v. Astrue, 590
F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010). If, after reviewing the entire record, it is possible to
draw two inconsistent positions and the Commissioner has adopted one of those
positions, I must affirm the Commissioner’s decision. Anderson v. Astrue, 696
F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012). I may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision
merely because substantial evidence could also support a contrary outcome.
McNamara, 590 F.3d at 610.
B.

ALJ’s Decision
In her written decision here, the ALJ found that Montgomery last met the

insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 30, 2005, and
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 11, 2013, the alleged
onset date of disability. The ALJ found Montgomery’s anxiety and PTSD to be
severe impairments, but determined that they did not meet or medically equal a
listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 12.) The
ALJ found that Montgomery had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but could have “no direct interaction with the public, no work as a
cashier, no work in desolate places, and no more than occasional changes in the
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work setting.” (Tr. 14.) The ALJ found that Montgomery had no past relevant
work. (Tr. 18.)
Considering Montgomery’s RFC and her age, education, and work
experience, the ALJ found vocational expert testimony to support a conclusion that
Montgomery could perform other work as it exists in significant numbers in the
national economy, and specifically as a housekeeper, hand packer, and production
assembler. The ALJ therefore found Montgomery not to be disabled at any time
from October 11, 2013, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 18-19.)
C.

Denial of Due Process in Failing to Propound Interrogatories to Medical
Expert
As noted above, the ALJ held a hearing on December 7, 2015, at which

Montgomery and a vocational expert testified in response to questions posed by the
ALJ and counsel. In a letter to counsel dated February 22, 2016, the ALJ reported
that she had secured post-hearing opinion evidence from Joseph Carver, Ph.D., a
medical expert, by way of written interrogatories. The ALJ advised counsel that,
in response to this post-hearing evidence, Montgomery had “a right” to submit
“written comments concerning the evidence” and/or “written questions to be sent
to the author(s) of the new evidence.” (Tr. 251.) Counsel thereafter proffered
additional interrogatories for the ALJ to submit to Dr. Carver, stating that she
would provide comments upon his response. (Tr. 254.) The ALJ, however, did
not submit these questions to Dr. Carver. Nor did she inform counsel that she
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would not do so. Instead, the ALJ wrote in her final decision that she was denying
Montgomery’s request for additional interrogatories because Dr. Carver’s
responses “adequately address all of the issues contained therein.” (Tr. 17.)
Notably, the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Carver’s opinion in denying
Montgomery’s claim for benefits. (Tr. 16.)
In the circumstances of this case, the ALJ’s failure to submit Montgomery’s
proffered interrogatories to Dr. Carver and the resulting failure to allow
Montgomery to comment upon the post-hearing medical opinion deprived
Montgomery of due process.
As an initial matter, I note that Montgomery argues that the ALJ violated the
Commissioner’s own policies and procedures governing the receipt of post-hearing
evidence from medical experts as set out in HALLEX I-2-7-30 and HALLEX I-25-44.5 As repeatedly observed by the courts in this district, however, HALLEX
does not have the force of law in the Eighth Circuit. See Ellis v. Astrue, No.
4:07CV1031 AGF, 2008 WL 4449452, at *15-16 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2008). See
also, e.g., Hopper v. Berryhill, No. 4:16 CV 1309 JMB, 2017 WL 4236974, at *12
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2017); Renshaw v. Berryhill, No. 4:16-CV-1467 NAB, 2017
WL 4176437, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2017); Medvrich v. Colvin, No. 4:13 CV
1466 DDN, 2015 WL 58925, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2015). Accordingly, the

5

Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law (HALLEX) manual.
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ALJ’s alleged failure to follow the Commissioner’s internal manual is not itself a
basis for remand. Montgomery further argues, however, that the ALJ’s failure to
permit her to question Dr. Carver nevertheless violated her right to due process. In
the circumstances of this case, I agree.
While disability claimants have a procedural due process right to a full and
fair hearing, their right to cross-examine witnesses or those who submit reports is
not absolute given the non-adversarial nature of the social security process.
Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2008). The Commissioner argues that
the ALJ was therefore not required to permit Montgomery to question Dr. Carver,
and properly exercised her discretion to deny Montgomery’s request to submit
questions given that the evidence of record was sufficient to determine
Montgomery’s claim.
In her letter to counsel, the ALJ advised that Montgomery had a “right” to
submit interrogatories and to comment on Dr. Carver’s responses. At this
invitation, Montgomery indeed submitted additional interrogatories and advised
the ALJ that she intended to comment on the responses when made. But without
the interrogatories being sent, or at least being informed of this circumstance,
Montgomery was deprived of the opportunity to at least comment on Dr. Carver’s
responses to the ALJ’s own questions. The ALJ simply ignored Montgomery’s
request until she denied it in the final decision.
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As her reason to deny Montgomery’s request, the ALJ wrote that the
responses given by Dr. Carver to the ALJ’s own questions “adequately address all
of the issues” raised by Montgomery’s proffered questions. But they did not.
Unlike the ALJ’s questions, Montgomery’s inquired as to how often her
psychologically-based symptoms would cause her to miss full days of work and/or
cause her to be late for work. (Compare Tr. 1188-94 with Tr. 256-57.) None of
Dr. Carver’s responses to the ALJ’s questions address this issue. Questions
regarding absenteeism are directly relevant to determining Montgomery’s ability to
function full-time in the workplace, especially considering the substantial evidence
of record that Montgomery’s medically determinable mental impairments of
chronic PTSD and anxiety continued to prevent her from independently leaving her
home even after years of treatment, as well as the vocational expert’s hearing
testimony that a person could not maintain employment if they had six workabsences in a year or one absence in a thirty-day period within consecutive months.
(See Tr. 55.) By refusing to submit Montgomery’s additional interrogatories to Dr.
Carver, the ALJ denied Montgomery the opportunity to confront the evidence
against her and to have a full and fair hearing on her claims.
I also find it significant that the ALJ accorded great weight to Dr. Carver’s
post-hearing opinion without giving Montgomery the opportunity to question him
regarding relevant medical evidence or at least to comment on the opinion already
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given. Given the proffered interrogatories’ relevance and probative value, I cannot
say that the ALJ’s failure to propound them was harmless. Cf. Hopper, 2017 WL
4236974, at *13.
On this record, Montgomery’s interrogatories to Dr. Carver were reasonably
necessary to the full development of her case. The use of Dr. Carver’s opinion as
primary evidence upon which to deny benefits without providing Montgomery the
opportunity to cross-examine or comment violated Montgomery’s right to due
process. I will therefore remand the case so that the ALJ may submit the proffered
interrogatories to a medical expert, obtain Montgomery’s comments on this posthearing evidence, and conduct further proceedings as necessary. To the extent
Montgomery argues that the ALJ misconstrued Dr. Carver’s opinion regarding her
need for a travel partner, Montgomery can address this argument on remand.
D.

Incomplete Review of Record / Substitution of Opinion
After finding at Step 3 of the sequential analysis that Montgomery’s

impairments did not meet the criteria for listing level disability, the ALJ
determined Montgomery’s credibility and assessed her RFC. In discrediting
Montgomery’s complaints, however, the ALJ misapprehended significant evidence
and improperly substituted her own opinion for the medical evidence of record.
As noted above, Montgomery showed signs and symptoms of anxiety and
depression since at least 2011 and received intermittent treatment therefor from
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general practitioners at Family Care Health Center. In September 2013, Dr. Payal
Patel from Family Care referred Montgomery to Behavioral Health for evaluation
and counseling when she observed that Montgomery’s phobias associated with her
generalized anxiety disorder rendered her unwilling to take medication.6 Dr. Patel
questioned whether Montgomery suffered from PTSD versus generalized anxiety.
(Tr. 741-43.) Upon undergoing evaluation at Behavioral Health in October 2013,
Montgomery was diagnosed with chronic PTSD and anxiety and began receiving
regular and consistent treatment with mental health care providers, which
continued through at least August 2015.
In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged Montgomery’s claim that her history
of being robbed at gunpoint while working as a cashier and of being involved in a
car accident made her scared to work and afraid of driving and being in a car. The
ALJ found it “troublesome,” however, that Montgomery also testified at the
hearing that she had been raped, but that she never mentioned this event during her
therapy sessions. (Tr. 14-15, 18.) The ALJ found that this inconsistency appeared
to be an “exaggeration to obtain disability benefits.” (Tr. 18.) The ALJ also found
that, despite Montgomery’s claim that she cannot work because of her fear to leave
home, her therapy sessions focused on her relationship issues and not on issues that
6

Montgomery reported on several occasions that she was concerned about medication side
effects, that she wanted to research certain medications before taking them, and that she was
unsure and skeptical about their effectiveness. (See, e.g., Tr. 649, 652-53, 661, 669, 673, 682,
687, 691, 743, 941, 1050.)
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prevented her from working. (Tr. 15, 17.) These factual findings are belied by the
record.
First, contrary to the ALJ’s finding that Montgomery never mentioned rape
as a basis of her anxiety during treatment, the record shows that her treating mental
health provider made the following observation in September 2014:
Stacey discussed how she wants and needs a job, but feels like she
cannot because of difficulty leaving the house. She reported when she
is alone men often follow her, which makes her feel uncomfortable.
We discussed how her past histories of being raped and also being
held at gunpoint have contributed to this fear. She reported that she
has a desire to “move on” from these experiences.
(Tr. 1101.) Also, during an earlier visit to Family Care Health Center in April
2012, Montgomery reported to Dr. Khannia Thomas that she experienced anxiety
symptoms of shaking, racing heart, shortness of breath, and dry mouth; that she
had a history of traumatic events, including several car accidents, rape at age
fourteen, and domestic violence; and that she was afraid of driving for fear of
having an accident, and afraid when alone at home for fear of someone breaking
in. (Tr. 764-68.) On this record, for the ALJ to say that Montgomery’s hearing
testimony that she was raped appeared to be an exaggeration in order to obtain
benefits is itself troublesome, to say the least.
In addition, the ALJ’s finding that Montgomery’s therapy sessions did not
focus on her fear of leaving her home is contrary to the record evidence. While the
ALJ is correct that interpersonal relationships were discussed during many of these
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sessions, the record shows that over half of the thirty sessions with mental health
professionals primarily addressed Montgomery’s fears stemming from past
traumatic events, how these fears cause her to believe that the world and the people
in it are dangerous, how she is afraid to leave her home because of the
dangerousness of the world, and how she would like to work but is too afraid to
leave her home. Therapeutic and coping strategies were discussed during all of
these sessions in an effort to assist Montgomery in overcoming these fears. While
many of Montgomery’s therapy sessions also included discussions involving
interpersonal relationships, the nature of several of these discussions involved
Montgomery’s fear for her family members’ safety as well as how her anxiety
affects her relationships. The ALJ’s statements that Montgomery’s therapy did not
focus on issues that kept her from working appear to be based on a myopic view of
the record. These discrepancies between the ALJ’s findings and the actual
evidence of record undermine the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion of non-disability. See
Baumgarten v. Chater, 75 F.3d 366, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1996).
Finally, with her statement that she “believe[d] that, if she worked on it, the
claimant could make progress in going out on her own” (Tr. 17), the ALJ appeared
to improperly draw her own inferences from the medical evidence to conclude that
Montgomery’s participation in treatment should render her able to work. Not only
does this statement disregard the efforts made during Montgomery’s two-year,
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biweekly therapy sessions to devise strategies to overcome her fear of leaving
home but it also ignores her treating mental health professional’s August 2015
opinion that “[m]any of Stacey’s behaviors are deep-rooted” and that referral to
long-term therapy may be necessary to provide benefit to Montgomery. (Tr.
1029.) It is well established that an ALJ may not “play doctor” and draw upon her
own inferences from medical reports to make her own independent medical
findings. Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 946-47 (8th Cir. 2009 ); Nevland v.
Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2000); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th
Cir.1996). Nothing in the record shows that Montgomery was not pursuing a valid
course of treatment, and no treating provider questioned the severity of her
impairment. See Tate v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1999). That this
treatment had so far been unsuccessful in resolving Montgomery’s debilitating fear
does not mean that Montgomery did not “work on it.” To deny a claimant
disability because she “is not acting under a ‘reasonable fear’ mocks the idea of
disability based on mental impairments.” Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 947 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
E.

Reliance on Vocational Expert Testimony
As set out above, the ALJ failed to properly consider all the evidence of

record regarding Montgomery’s mental impairment. Accordingly, her RFC
assessment is called into question because it may not include all of Montgomery’s
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limitations. See Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 722 (8th Cir. 2001); PateFires, 564 F.3d at 944-45 (ALJ’s failure to properly evaluate evidence of mental
impairment resulted in RFC not supported by substantial evidence). And where a
hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert is based on an RFC that does
not contain all of a claimant’s limitations, the response given to that hypothetical
cannot constitute substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s decision to deny
benefits. Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 972 (8th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, I
cannot say that the vocational expert’s testimony here constituted substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
Moreover, the manner by which the ALJ relied on the vocational expert’s
testimony in the circumstances of this case requires remand. At the hearing, the
ALJ asked the vocational expert to consider a person of Montgomery’s age,
education, and work experience and to assume no physical limitations, but that the
person was “limited to work with no more than occasional changes in the work
setting, work that involves no direct interaction with the public, only occasional
interaction with coworkers, with no tandem tasks, and occasional interaction with
supervisors.” (Tr. 54.) The vocational expert responded that such a person could
perform work as a housekeeper and hand packer. (Id.) The ALJ and the expert
then had the following exchange:
Q. [ALJ]
If I further limit it to not being – not going to desolate
places like you might with housekeeping to hotel rooms, or offices
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that are empty, if I would put that further restriction in, no desolate
places, would that impact your answer?
A. [VE]
I’m not sure that housekeeping would be considered a
desolate environment. Do you mean working alone, or –
Q.
Well, working in a place where – like, for example, in a
hotel room, you know, where somebody could be hiding in the closet,
or in the bathroom, or something like that, or, I guess –
A.

So a more open work environment.

Q.
Yes, yes, less – yes, less contained, I guess, would be a
little better.
(Tr. 54-55.) The vocational expert testified that such a person could perform work
as a production worker/assembler. (Tr. 55.)
In her written decision, the ALJ found that Montgomery’s RFC limited her
to “no direct interaction with the public, no work as a cashier, no work in desolate
places, and no more than occasional changes in the work setting.” (Tr. 14.)
Concluding that this RFC would permit Montgomery to perform work as a
housekeeper, hand packer, or production assembler, the ALJ noted:
The hypothetical proffered to the vocational expert at the hearing
includes the above limitations, as well as a limitation with respect to a
more open environment (versus a desolate environment). With that
additional limitation, the undersigned would eliminate the job in
housekeeping. The undersigned finds there are sufficient jobs in
either scenario.
(Tr. 19 n.1.) Contrary to the ALJ’s statement, her hypothetical to the vocational
expert did not include all of the limitations contained in the RFC. While the failure
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to include “no work as a cashier” in the hypothetical may arguably be harmless
given that the expert did not testify to cashier work, I agree with Montgomery that
the “no work in desolate places” was not a vocational factor on which the
vocational expert could or did provide testimony given the lack of understanding
ascribed to its meaning. Although the vocational expert was able to testify to work
that could be performed in an “open work environment,” the ALJ nevertheless
included only the “no desolate places” limitation in the RFC and, as noted by the
ALJ in her decision, these factors are not interchangeable.7
The ALJ relied on vocational expert testimony that was given in response to
a hypothetical question that did not include all of Montgomery’s limitations and, at
the very least, did not include the limitations contained in the ALJ’s written RFC
assessment. Because this testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence, the
ALJ erred in her reliance on it to find Montgomery not disabled. Newton v.
Chater, 92 F.3d 688, 695 (8th Cir. 1996).
F.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this matter will be remanded to the

Commissioner for further proceedings.8
7

The ALJ acknowledges in her decision that these are two distinct limitations, i.e., a more open
environment “versus” a desolate environment. (Tr. 19 n.1.)
8

Although the record suggests that the combination of Montgomery’s severe impairments render
her disabled, I cannot conclusively say that she is. Regardless, in this action for judicial review,
Montgomery asks only that I remand the matter for further proceedings and does not seek an
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Upon remand, the Commissioner shall obtain and provide the parties an
opportunity to submit additional medical evidence that addresses Montgomery’s
ability to function in the workplace, which may include contacting Montgomery’s
treating mental health care providers to clarify her limitations and restrictions in
order to ascertain what level of work, if any, she is able to perform. See Coleman
v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930-31
(8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ is also permitted to order additional examinations and
tests in order for her to make an informed decision regarding the extent to which
Montgomery’s impairments, both severe and non-severe, affect her ability to
perform work-related activities. Dozier v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir.
1985); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, 416.907. Upon receipt of any additional evidence,
the ALJ shall reconsider the record as a whole, reevaluate the credibility of
Montgomery’s own description of her symptoms and limitations, and reassess
Montgomery’s RFC – including the extent to which her RFC is affected by
medication side effects. See Owen v. Astrue, 551 F.3d 792, 802 (8th Cir. 2008).
Such reassessed RFC shall be based on some medical evidence in the record and
shall be accompanied by a discussion and description of how the evidence supports
each RFC conclusion. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly,
award of benefits. The Commissioner may make this determination upon remand after proper
consideration of all the evidence from a fully developed record.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is
REVERSED, and this cause is REMANDED for further proceedings.
A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is
entered this same date.

____________________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 20th day of August, 2018.

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