Williams v. Mitchell et al

Filing 123

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 116 ) is GRANTED.. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 3/3/20. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JARED MARTEL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
EKE GAYDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. 4:17CV1282 JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four
of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed January 6, 2020. (ECF No. 116). The motion is
fully briefed and ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 28, 2012, while he was incarcerated as a pre-trial
detainee at the St. Louis City Justice Center, Defendants Eke Gayden, Juannell Goodwin,
Brandon House, and Toriano Tate subjected him to unjustified, unnecessary, and unlawful
physical violence. (First Amended Complaint (“Complaint” or “Compl.”), ¶ 1). Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that while he was shackled, handcuffed and compliant, Defendants physically
struck him in an elevator. (Id., ¶¶ 30-35). Once off the elevator, Defendants momentarily
stopped beating Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 39). Upon opening the door to Plaintiff’s unit, however, all four
Defendants began beating him again with increased ferocity. (Id., ¶¶ 42, 43). Plaintiff alleges
the physical violence injured him so severely that he had to be taken to a hospital for treatment
and evaluation. (Id., ¶¶ 1, 54-57).

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this matter on April 6, 2017. (ECF No. 1). In his
First Amended Complaint, filed December 20, 2019, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of
action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count One); 42 U.S.C. §
1983—Conspiracy (Count Two); 42 U.S.C. § 1985—Conspiracy to Deprive of Rights or
Privileges (Count Three); and State Law Battery (Count Four). (ECF No. 115).
As stated above, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four
of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on January 6, 2020, claiming Count Three must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Count Four must be dismissed as time-barred. (ECF
No. 116). Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Four (see Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Partial Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four, P.
8), and so the Court limits its discussion to Count Three.
STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008).
The Court, “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039
(8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level,” however, and the motion to dismiss must be granted
if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (abrogating the “no set of
facts” standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Furthermore, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (pleading offering only “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not do)).
DISCUSSION
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint must
be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to show an agreement toward
unconstitutional action by Defendants. (See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four, P. 3). “In order to state a claim for conspiracy under
§ 1985, a plaintiff must allege with particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts
that the defendants reached an agreement.” Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 107778 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

“This standard requires that

allegations of a conspiracy [be] pleaded with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest
a meeting of the minds directed toward an unconstitutional action.”

Id. at 1078 (internal

quotations and citations omitted).
Upon consideration, the Court agrees that Plaintiff fails adequately to state a claim for §
1985 conspiracy. The Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals no facts suggesting the
individual Defendants reached an agreement or meeting of the minds; instead, Count Three relies
solely on Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendants “conspired with each other and with
other unnamed co-conspirators with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws
of Missouri and the United States, and equal privileges and immunities under the laws of
Missouri and the United States.” (Compl., ¶ 90). “[A]lthough an express agreement between the
purported conspirators need not be alleged, there must be something more than the summary
allegation of a conspiracy before such a claim can withstand a motion to dismiss.” Alton v.

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Faerber, Case No. 4:09CV1070 JCH, 2009 WL 2235913, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 27, 2009) (citing
Mershon v. Beasely, 994 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1993)). See also Kelly, 813 F.3d at 1078
(dismissing conspiracy claim when plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing how and when
defendants came to an agreement to violate her rights). Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is wholly
conclusory, and as a result, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Johnson
v. Perdue, 862 F.3d 712, 718 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (“The
complaint includes no facts suggesting the individual defendants reached an agreement; instead,
it relies on conclusory allegations that the defendants conspired through mutual decisions and
correspondence and acted in concert and with a mutual understanding. Because [plaintiff] was
unable to point to at least some facts which would suggest that [defendants] reached an
understanding to violate [his] rights, he has not sufficiently alleged a conspiracy.”). See also
Hardy v. City of Kansas City, Mo., Case No. 4:19CV237 DGK, 2019 WL 3842876, at * 2 (W.D.
Mo. Aug. 14, 2019); Williams v. Progressive Ins. Co., Case No. 4:16CV1214 JAR, 2017 WL
1155894, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2017).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and
Four of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 116) is GRANTED.

Dated this 2nd Day of Febrary, 2020.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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