Doe v. Francis Howell School District

Filing 54

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Francis Howell School District, Pam Sloan, Steve Griggs, Nancy Wade, William Vanderpool, Kathryn Greer, and Patrick Fitzgerald (Doc. Nos. 46 and 48 ) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff's action is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate Order of Dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 3/28/2018. (CLO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCIS HOWELL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:17-cv-01301-JAR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Francis Howell School District, Pam Sloan,
Steve Griggs, Nancy Wade, William Vanderpool, and Kathryn Greer’s second motion to dismiss
(Doc. No. 46) and Defendant Patrick Fitzgerald’s second motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 48). The
motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND
On April 12, 2017, Plaintiff Jane Doe, a high school student, filed a complaint through
counsel asserting violations of Title IX and 28 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of a sexual assault on
school grounds and the subsequent investigation conducted by Defendant Francis Howell School
District (“School District”), Defendants Pam Sloan, Steve Griggs, Nancy Wade, William
Vanderpool, and Kathryn Greer (“individual District Defendants”), and Defendant Officer Patrick
Fitzgerald. The Court dismissed with prejudice the Title IX counts on November 22, 2017 and
dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s § 1983 counts with leave to amend (Doc. No. 35).
On December 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint attempting to cure the

defects present in the first amended complaint (Doc. No. 39). In Count III, 1 Plaintiff asserts a
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim that she was treated differently from other
similarly situated female students who filed a complaint under Title IX, in that she was accused of
being complicit in the sexual conduct and suffered expulsion prior to any investigation. Plaintiff
further asserts that Defendants’ failure to follow the requirements of Title IX and investigate the
allegations support Plaintiff’s claims that she was treated differently.
In Count IV, Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim against the school district. There, she
contends that the individual Defendants and Defendant Fitzgerald were state actors who violated
her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by failing to properly train and supervise
school district employees as to mandated investigative requirements. Plaintiff claims that she
thoroughly and properly advised the school of the sexual assault, thereby constituting notice to the
school. She asserts that Defendants’ continued accusations of her complicity in the sexual act
constitute a persistent pattern of unconstitutional action. As a result, Plaintiff claims she suffered
emotional distress and psychological damage.
In their second motion to dismiss, Defendants 2 contend that Plaintiff again fails to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). With regard to her equal protection claim,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegation that she was treated differently than a similarly situated
female should have been treated is based on Plaintiff’s subjective belief “of the way things ought
to be.” They also argue that Plaintiff failed to name other females at the school who filed a

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Plaintiff does not re-number the counts contained in her second amended complaint. The
Court will refer to the counts as they are numbered in the second amended complaint.
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The second motion to dismiss was filed by the School District Defendants. However,
Defendant Fitzgerald joined their motion and adopted his previously-filed motion to dismiss.
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complaint under Title IX and were treated differently. As to Count IV, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff failed to plead notice and causation, as required to establish Monell liability.
Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not plead that Defendants had notice or
knowledge of some violation to which they were deliberately indifferent or tacitly authorized.
Moreover, Defendants claim that Plaintiff did not plead how this deliberate indifference or tacit
authorization caused Plaintiff to suffer harm.
Lastly, Defendants argue that sovereign immunity applies to the allegations against the
individual defendants in their official capacities, and qualified immunity applies to the allegations
against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a claim “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face,’ ” meaning that it must contain “factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in
plaintiff’s favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the
facts alleged. Id. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766,
768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). Ultimately, the question is not whether the claimant “will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court’s threshold.” Skinner
v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Count III)

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead “(1) that the defendant(s) acted under color of
state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally
protected federal right.” Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009). A
school district may be considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability. Keckeisen v. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1975).
The Equal Protection Clause may serve as the constitutional provision violated for
purposes of a § 1983 claim. See Cox v. Sugg, 484 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2007). The Equal
Protection Clause requires that government entities treat similarly situated persons alike. Hager
v. Arkansas Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). To state a
prima facie claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is otherwise similarly situated to members of the
unprotected class; (2) she was treated differently from members of the unprotected class; and (3)
the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 370 (8th Cir.
2000).
Here, Plaintiff claims that she, a female victim of sexual assault, was treated differently
when she filed her Title IX complaint from other females who file Title IX complaints, in that she,
unlike other females, was accused of being complicit in the sexual conduct. This is not sufficient
to state a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as the other “similarly situated individuals” are
members of the same protected (rather than unprotected) class. C.f. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77
(1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated,

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the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). Count III will be dismissed
without prejudice.
II.

Monell Liability (Count IV)
A school district may be subject to § 1983 liability on the showing of a “policy or custom”

of failing to act upon prior complaints of unconstitutional conduct, Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.
of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), provided the unconstitutional conduct of the
school district’s employees was widespread and persistent, was met with deliberate indifference or
tacit authorization of the school district’s policymaking officials, and resulted in constitutional
injury. Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 932–33 (8th Cir. 1991). In this case, there
must be some evidence of unconstitutional misconduct or a custom of failing to act on complaints,
thereby causing Plaintiff’s harm. See Bell v. Fowler, 99 F.3d 262, 269 (8th Cir. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to investigate her complaint of sexual assault
and failed to adequately train their employees regarding proper investigation procedures, and that
these failures constituted a widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct in violation of her
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as set forth in the previous
section, the basis of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is that her complaint was treated differently
from other similarly situated females. This does not constitute an equal protection violation.
Further, to assert a § 1983 claim for failure to train or failure to investigate, Plaintiff must
have pled that the school district had notice that its methods of investigation or employee training
were inadequate and likely to cause a constitutional violation. See P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas
City, Missouri, 265 F.3d 653, 658–59 (8th Cir. 2001). Nowhere does Plaintiff so plead, and the
failure to properly investigate Plaintiff’s complaint of sexual assault cannot, by itself, constitute
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prior notice necessary to establish Monell liability. Therefore, Count IV will be dismissed
without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Francis
Howell School District, Pam Sloan, Steve Griggs, Nancy Wade, William Vanderpool, Kathryn
Greer, and Patrick Fitzgerald (Doc. Nos. 46 and 48) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s action is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
A separate Order of Dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order.

JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of March, 2018.

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