Dunivin et al v. Life Insurance Company of North America
Filing
36
OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Life Insurance Company of North America to dismiss Count III, [Doc. No 11], granted.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count III is dismissed as to Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America. 11 Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 3/23/18. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
REBECCA DUNIVIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA and CLOUD PEAK
ENERGY RESOURCES, LLC,
Defendants,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 4:17CV1530 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant Life Insurance Company of
North America d/b/a Cigna Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss Count III,
[Doc. No. 11]. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion is granted.
Facts and Background
On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action against defendants Life
Insurance Company of North America d/b/a Cigna Insurance Company and Cloud
Peak Energy Resources, LLC under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, to recover benefits owed under an
employee welfare benefit plan and damages from defendants’ breach of their
fiduciary duties and failure to provide certain documents upon request.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was a full-time employee of
Cloud Peak since July 17, 2006 until January 30, 2010.
During her employment, Plaintiff became permanently and totally disabled
through injury or sickness or both. She was not able to perform the material and
substantial duties of his job during the first twenty-four (24) months of her
disability, and thereafter has not been able to perform the material and substantial
duties of any gainful job for which she is reasonably fitted by his education,
training, or experience.
Plaintiff alleges that Cigna determined she was disabled, but later changed
the decision to claim she was not disabled. Her claim for Long Term Disability
benefits from Cigna was denied on September 2, 2014.
Plaintiff supported her claim with objective medical evidence including
medical records from her treating physicians, including a report from her primary
care physician and her back surgeon. Plaintiff also included a recorded statement
from herself and a neighbor who served as a caregiver and completed household
services and drove Plaintiff to and from the doctor.
Plaintiff claims Defendants conjured up a false valid review by focusing
only on the records that suggested a less severe disability that were not supported
by the record as a whole.
Despite her written requests, defendants failed to provide her with all the
documents she requested.
Plaintiff seeks to recover benefits owed under the Plan, damages, interest,
attorneys’ fees, and penalties for defendants’ failure to produce the Plan
documents.
Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America moves to dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) fails against it because it is
not the plan administrator. Plaintiff also responds that Life Insurance Company of
North America can be held liable for § 1132(c) penalties for failing to provide him
with the Plan documents because it performed plan administrator functions. 1
Motion to Dismiss Standard
1
The court may consider the Plan documents, despite not being attached to
plaintiff’s amended complaint, without converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment because the Plan documents are “necessarily
embraced by the pleadings.” Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Central, LLC, 543 F.3d
978, 982 (8th Cir. 2008); see Van Natta v. Sara Lee Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 911,
921 n.3 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (“It is not error for this court to examine the Plan in its
consideration of the merits of the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), even though it was not expressly part of the pleadings. This is so because
it was incorporated into the pleadings by reference—the complaint specifically
mentioned it as the Plan under which [the plaintiffs’] claims arose against [the
defendant].”); Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that plan documents could be considered in a motion to dismiss despite not being
attached to the complaint “because they were incorporated through reference to the
plaintiff’s rights under the plans, and they [were] central to plaintiff’s claims”).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of
the complaint. See Carton v. General Motor Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 454
(8th Cir. 2010); Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001). To
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet the plausibility standard, the complaint must
contain “more than labels and conclusions.” Id. at 555. Rather, the complaint must
contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009).
A complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2006). The Court
must accept the facts alleged as true, even if doubtful. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears that recovery is
very remote or unlikely. Id.; Young, 244 F.3d at 627.
Discussion
Under 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), the plan administrator, upon written request,
is required to furnish a plan participant with a copy of the latest updated summary
plan description, “the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining
agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is
established or operated.” § 1024(b)(4). The plan administrator has thirty days to
comply with this request. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B). A plan administrator who
fails or refuses to provide documents properly requested faces penalties of up to
$110 a day. § 1132(c)(1)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-3. The court retains discretion
whether to impose the penalty, and if so, in what amount. § 1132(c)(1)(B).
To succeed on a claim for § 1132(c) penalties based on a violation of
§ 1024(b)(4), the plaintiff must prove that (1) he requested the plan documents in
writing, (2) his request was clear and specific, and (3) the plan administrator failed
to provide them within thirty days of the request. Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott &
Co., 184 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 1999); Atkins v. M&S Acquisition Corp., No. 4:09
CV 1923 CAS, 2010 WL5441625, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2010).
“‘ERISA specifically makes the Plan Administrator responsible for
providing the Plan documents,’ so that an insurer that is not the plan administrator
is not subject to this penalty provision.” Settell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co, 633 F. Supp.
2d 695, 712 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (quoting Ross v. Rail Car Am. Group Disability
Income Plan, 285 F.3d 735, 743-44. Only a plan administrator can be liable for §
1132(c) penalties. Gates v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 07-4660 (JNE/JJG),
2008WL 2828871, at *2 (D. Minn. July 21, 2008). ERISA defines a “plan
administrator” as “the person specifically so designated by the terms of the
instrument under which the plan is operated.” White v. Martin, 286
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1044 (D. Minn. 2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)).
A Plan Administrator is not specifically designated in the Plan documents as
the “Plan Administrator.” In her complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Cigna2 is
the Plan Administrator.
The Eighth Circuit has clearly stated that § 1132(c) penalties are appropriate
only against “plan administrators” as defined by ERISA. Brown, 586 F.3d at 1088;
Ross, 285 F.3d at 743-44. Plaintiff is not at liberty to claim that Life Insurance
Company of North America, d/b/a Cigna is a “plan administrator.” An argument
that a defendant is “‘de facto plan administrator’ because the plan certificate and
policy do not name [the employer] as the plan administrator. . . is unavailing under
our cases. See Brown v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 586 F.3d 1079, 1088 (8th
Cir. 2009) (“Governing precedent forecloses ... argument that Prudential was the
‘de facto plan administrator.’ ”). Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 877 F.3d
384, 390–91 (8th Cir. 2017). Because Cloud Peak, not Cigna, is specifically
designated as the sole plan administrator, it is the sole plan administrator under
ERISA. § 1002(16)(A). Therefore, dismissal is proper as to Plaintiff’s claim for §
1132(c)(1)(B) penalties against Life Insurance Company of North America d/b/a
Cigna.
Conclusion
2
Cigna is, as previously noted, the name under which Life Insurance Company of North
America is doing business.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Dismiss is well taken.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Life Insurance
Company of North America to dismiss Count III, [Doc. No 11], granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count III is dismissed as to Defendant
Life Insurance Company of North America.
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2018.
_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?