Johnson et al v. Bayer Corp. et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF REMAND IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (ECF No. 15 ) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, City of St. Louis, State of Missouri. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all other motions are DENIED as moot (copy mailed to St. Louis City court). Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 11/29/17. (KXS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
TIFF ANY JOHNSON, et al.,
BAYER HEALTH CARE, LLC, et al.
Case No. 4:17-CV-1533-RLW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF REMAND
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (ECF No. 15). This matter
is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, City
of St. Louis, State of Missouri, on March 30 10, 2017. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiffs allege injuries
resulting from Plaintiffs' use ofEssure® permanent birth control system. Plaintiffs are citizens of
the States of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Plaintiffs contend that there are several named plaintiffs that are not completely diverse with
defendants. As admitted by Defendants, Bayer Corporation is a citizen of Indiana and New
Jersey. Defendant Bayer HealthCare LLC is a citizen of Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Germany. Defendant Bayer Essure Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and New Jersey. Defendant
Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a citizen of Delaware and New Jersey .
. ., 1 . .,
On May 18, 2017, Defendants removed this action to this Court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a), federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331, and
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAF A). Although there appears to be a lack of complete
diversity based upon the face of the Petition, Defendants argue that they are not subject to personal
jurisdiction with respect to the non-Missouri Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants further assert that
personal jurisdiction should be resolved before subject matter jurisdiction because it presents the
"simpler question." See also ECF No. 16 at 8.
In response, Plaintiffs maintain that remand is appropriate because complete diversity does
not exist and Plaintiffs' claims are not fraudulently joined. Plaintiffs also put forth that the Court
does not have federal question jurisdiction. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that removal under CAFA
is not appropriate because the Court cannot consider the pending petitions in Hinton, Jordan,
Black, Hines and McClain to be tried in conjunction, and the Court cannot aggregate these
plaintiffs named in separate petition to create federal jurisdiction under CAFA.
Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the correctness of removal
are resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); In re Bus. Men's Assurance Co. ofAm., 992 F.2d 181, 183
(8th Cir. 1993); Manning v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625
(8th Cir. 1997)). A civil action brought in state court may be removed to the proper district court
ifthe district court has original jurisdiction of the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
"It is axiomatic that a court may not proceed at all in a case unless it has jurisdiction."
Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing See Ex Parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868). Under Supreme Court precedent set forth in
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.574 (1999), a Court has discretion to consider personal
jurisdiction first where personal jurisdiction is straightforward and presents no complex question
of state law, and the alleged defect in subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult question. Id. at
588; see also Crawford, 267 F.3d at 764 ("[C]ertain threshold questions, such as personal
jurisdiction, may be taken up without a finding of subject-matter jurisdiction, provided that the
threshold issue is simple when compared to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction."). However,
the Supreme Court has held that
If personal jurisdiction raises "difficult questions of [state] law," and subject-matter
jurisdiction is resolved "as eas[ily]" as personal jurisdiction, a district court will
ordinarily conclude that "federalism concerns tip the scales in favor of initially
ruling on the motion to remand."
Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 586 (citing Allen v. Ferguson, 791F.2d611, 616 (7th Cir. 1986)). "[I]n
most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry." Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S.
at 587. "In such cases, both expedition and sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature should
impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first." Id. at 587-88.
Courts in this district
addressing the same issue have found that personal jurisdiction requires a more fact-intensive
inquiry than the straightforward issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Joseph v. Combe
Inc., No. 4:16CV284 RLW, 2016 WL 3339387, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 13, 2016); Morgan v.
Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-1346 CAS, 2014 WL 6678959, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25,
2014) (finding the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in an action arising from the drug
Risperidone was a straightforward legal issue that judges in this district had already addressed and
that issues of personal jurisdiction required a more fact-intensive inquiry); Butler v.
.., 3 ..,
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 4:14CV1485 RWS, 2014 WL 5025833, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 8, 2014) (declining to rule on issues of personal jurisdiction first because the subject matter
jurisdiction issue was not arduous). Thus, the Court in its discretion will first determine the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, as the question of personal jurisdiction requires a more fact-intensive
inquiry. See Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting a
determination of personal jurisdiction requires looking at affidavits and exhibits in addition to the
face of the pleadings).
The Court holds that there is not complete diversity on the face of the Petition and no basis
for fraudulent joinder. "A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the
action originally could have been filed there." In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig., 591F.3d613, 619
(8th Cir. 2010) (citing Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005)). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ l 332(a), a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action where the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum of$75,000 and there is complete diversity of citizenship between the
litigants. "Complete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the
same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship." OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d
342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007).
Courts, however, "have long recognized fraudulentjoinder as an exception to the complete
diversity rule." In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d at 620. "Fraudulent joinder occurs
when a plaintiff files a frivolous or illegitimate claim against a non-diverse defendant solely to
prevent removal." Id. (citing Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2003)).
"When determining if a party has been fraudulently joined, a court considers whether there is any
reasonable basis in fact or law to support a claim against a nondiverse defendant." Id. (citing
Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 964 (8th Cir. 2007)). Here, Defendants argue that the
non-Missouri citizen Plaintiffs are fraudulently joined with the Missouri Plaintiffs because the
out-of-state Plaintiffs cannot establish personal jurisdiction under Missouri law.
Courts in this district have consistently held that an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction
does not establish fraudulent joinder. Joseph, 2016 WL 3339387, at *2; Triplett v. Janssen
Pharms., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-02049-AGF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160580, at *13 (E.D. Mo. July 7,
2015); Gracey v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-407 CEJ, 2015 WL 2066242, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. May 4, 2015); Simmons v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-340-CEJ, 2015 WL 1604859, at
*3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2015). "On numerous occasions, this Court has determined that the joinder
of plaintiffs alleging injury from a single drug is not 'egregious,' because common issues of law
and fact connect the plaintiffs' claims." Robinson v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:16-CV-439 (CEJ), 2016 WL
1721143, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2016)(collecting cases). The Court follows the approach taken
by the district courts in the Eastern District of Missouri, holds that Plaintiffs' claims are not
fraudulently joined, and finds that complete diversity is absent. See In re Prempro Prod Liab.
Litig., 591 F.3d at 623. Plaintiffs have filed suit against Defendants for injuries caused by the
same contraception system and arising out of the same practices for those products. The Court
finds that common issues of law and fact are likely to arise in this litigation. See In re Prempro
Prod. Liab. Litig., 591 F .3d at 623. Therefore, the Court holds that joinder is proper and complete
diversity does not exist.
In the notice of removal, Defendants also invoked federal question jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims tum on whether Defendants violated
federal regulatory requirements. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' right to relief depends on the
resolution of these alleged federal violations.
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a claim arises under federal law only if a federal
issue appears on the face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. See e.g. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 84~1 (1989). The proponents of federal jurisdiction bear "the burden
to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction," and "all doubts about federal jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remand." Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. Midwest lndep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 561 F .3d 904, 912 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Moore v. Kansas City Pub. Sch., 828
F .3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2016). "[T]he plaintiff is master of his claim and may avoid federal
removal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." M Nahas & Co., Inc. v. First Nat'/ Bank
of Hot Springs, 930 F.2d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1991). "[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a
state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). Rather, "the question is, does a state-law
claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities." Grable & Sons Metal Prod, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
314 (2005); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) ("federal jurisdiction over a state law
claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and
(4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' state law claims raise substantial federal questions,
because they are predicated on numerous alleged violations of federal requirements. Defendants
assert that Plaintiffs must prove these federal violations in order to maintain their causes of action.
(ECF No. 25 at 13 (citing In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fide/is Leads Prod Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d
1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA (or
else his claim is expressly preempted by§ 360k(a) ... ").
Defendants' argument is misplaced.
Plaintiffs' claims for Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) violations related to Essure® were necessary to escape preemption.
However, as courts in this district have noted that the "the federal issues raised by plaintiffs' state
law claims are not capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state
balance approved by Congress." Johnson v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16-CV-729 (CEJ), 2016 WL
3015187, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 26, 2016); Dorman v. Bayer Corp, No. 4:16CV601HEA,2016 WL
7033765, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2016). Congress specifically declined to create a federal private
cause of action under the FDCA and declined to preempt all state remedies or to divest state courts
of jurisdiction under the FDCA. Id. at 9-10 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804, 814 (1986) ("The assumed congressional determination to preclude federal private
remedies for violations of the FDCA is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that a claimed
violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to
confer federal-question jurisdiction."); Dorman, 2016 WL 7033765, at *4. The Court holds that
there is no federal cause of action under the FDCA. The purported federal issues raised in
Plaintiffs' Complaint are not substantial and cannot form the basis for federal question
jurisdiction. As held by other courts, accepting federal jurisdiction in a medical device products
liability case such as this would disrupt the federal-state balance contemplated by Congress.
Johnson, 2016 WL 3015187, at *3; Dorman, 2016 WL 7033765, at *4; Carmine v. Poffenbarger,
Case No. 1:15-CV-1207, 2015 WL 9581416 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2015); Mihok v. Medtronic, Inc.,
119 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D. Conn. 2015); Fenn v. Philips E/ecs. N Am. Corp., Civ. No.
14-96-DLB-JGW, 2015 WL 632154 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2015); Mauk v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 F.
Supp. 3d 654 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Anders v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00194 (ERW), 2014 WL
162352 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2014); Goade v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-5123-CV-SW-ODS, 2013
WL 6237853 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2013). Therefore, the Court declines to find federal question
Finally, the Court holds that this case cannot be combined with Hinton v. Bayer Corp., No.
4:16-cv-01679 (E.D. Mo.) (94 plaintiffs), L. Jordan v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16-cv-00865 (E.D. Mo.)
(94 plaintiffs), Black v. Bayer Corp., No. 4: 17-cv-01333 (E.D. Mo.) (95 plaintiffs), Hines v. Bayer
Corp., No. 4:17-cv-01395 (E.D. Mo.) (57 plaintiffs), and McClain v. Bayer Corp., 4:17-cv-01534
(E.D. Mo.) (98 plaintiffs) to form a single mass action under CAFA.
See 28 U.S.C.
§§1332(d)(ll)(B)(i), 1453(a). CAFA's "mass action" jurisdictional provision confers federal
jurisdiction over civil actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the
"monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that
the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l l)(B)(i).
Defendants note that the same Plaintiffs' counsel has filed nearly identical complaints on behalf of
a total of more than 100 plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1 at 36). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should
not be permitted to avoid CAF A simply by dividing their plaintiffs into groups ofless than 100 and
filing an identical complaint for each group. However, the Court agrees with the long line of
cases in this circuit permitting plaintiffs to file several separate cases, each containing fewer than
100 plaintiffs, to avoid removal as a mass action under CAFA. See Hammonds v. Monsanto Co.,
No. 4:11CV1660 DDN, 2011WL5554529, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2011) ("Defendants' theory
is contravened by the plain language of CAFA which, by its clear terms, restricts "mass actions" to
suits involving 100 or more plaintiffs."); Dublin v. Monsanto Co., No. 4:11-CV-1659 CEJ, 2011
WL 5330571, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) (case with 14 plaintiffs "does not satisfy the
requirements of a 'mass action"'); Walker v. Monsanto Co., No. 4:1 l-CV-1654 CEJ, 2011 WL
5330602, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011)(96 plaintiffs residing in 18 states); Stapleton et al. v.
Monsanto Co. et al., 4:11CV1656 (AGF) (95 plaintiffs residing in 21 states); Nunn et al. v.
Monsanto Co. et al., 4:11CV1657 (CEJ) (5 plaintiffs residing in 2 states); Rodriguez v. Monsanto
Co., No. 4:11CV01658 AGF, 2011 WL 5245251, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2011)(4 plaintiffs
residing in California); Anders v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 4:14CV01637 ERW, 2014 WL 5320391, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2014) ("Plaintiffs have not suggested a joint trial for Anders v. Medtronic,
Inc., Smith v. Medtronic, Inc., and Hendrich v. Medtronic, Inc., therefore, the Court finds this is
not a mass action."). Plaintiffs have not joined 100 or more plaintiffs in a single complaint, nor
have Plaintiffs attempted to consolidate the Hinton, Jordan, Black, Hines and McClain actions.
Therefore, the Court holds that CAF A does not apply here and CAFA cannot form a basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. This case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (ECF No. 15) is
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the Circuit Court for the
Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, City of St. Louis, State of Missouri.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all other motions are DENIED as moot.
thi~ th day of November, 2017.
RONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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