Laramore v. Washington County Jail

Filing 70

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Shannon Thompson, Kevin Snow, and Christopher Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment 59 is GRANTED. A separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 9/16/19. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
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DENNIS LARAMORE,

)

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)
)
)
)
)
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Plaintiff,

v.
SHANNON THOMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:17-CV-01618 JAR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Dennis Laramore ("Plaintiff'), proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shannon Thompson ("Thompson"), Captain of the Washington County
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Sheriffs Office; Kevin Snow ("Snow"), a Washington County Sheriffs Deputy; and Christopher
Barton ("Barton"), a Washington County Sheriffs Road Deputy, in their individual capacities. 1
Plaintiff alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and
subjected him to unlawful conditions of confinement \Xhile he was incarcerated at the
Washington County Jail (the "Jail") from April 25, 2017 to September 1, 2017 awaiting
sentencing. This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Doc. No. 59). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the following reasons,
the motion will be granted.

Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists in the
case and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

On August 9, 2017, the Court dismissed Zach Jacobson, Steve Rhine, and Brandon Thomlinson. The
Court also dismissed Plaintiff's official capacity claims, grievance claims, and access to the courts claims.
(Doc. No. I 0).

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U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant,
Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op .• Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). If the record
demonstrates that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, the burden then shifts to the non-moving
party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing a genuine dispute on
that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate in a particular case, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co .• Inc., 853 F.2d 616, 619
(8th Cir. 1988). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are insufficient to defeat
summary judgment. Armour & Co .• Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts
("SOF") (Doc. No. 61), as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule
4.0l(E). Plaintiffs status as a pro se prisoner does not excuse him from responding to
Defendants' motion "with specific factual support for his claims to avoid summary judgment," or
from complying with local rules. Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001). With his
failure to respond, Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted all facts in Defendants' Statement of
Uncontroverted Facts. Turner v. Shinseki, No. 4:08-CV-1910 CAS, 2010 WL 2555114, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Jun. 22, 2010) (citing Deichmann v. Boeing Co., 36 F. Supp.2d I 166, 1168 (E.D. Mo.
1999), ajf'd 232 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877)). However, Plaintiffs
failure to respond properly to Defendants' motion does not mean summary judgment should be
automatically granted in favor of Defendants. Even if the facts as alleged by Defendants are not
in dispute, those facts still must establish they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cross
v. MHM Corr. Servs.• Inc., No. 4:11-CV-1544 TIA, 2014 WL 5385113, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10,
2014).

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Discussion
A. Deliberate indifference to medical needs

Defendants first argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for
deliberate indifference because his alleged medical conditions were not objectively serious and
because he received adequate medical care at the Jail. In addition, Plaintiff has not proffered
verifying medical evidence establishing that any alleged delay in treatment had a detrimental
effect on his medical condition.
It is well established that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment extends to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference may include intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with treatment or
medication that has been prescribed. Id. at 104-05. To establish deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) he suffered from an "objectively serious medical need"; and (2)
prison officials "acµially knew of but deliberately disregarded" that need. Jackson v. Buckman.
756 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2014). A medical need is sufficiently serious if it has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, unless it is so obvious that even a layperson
would easily recognize the need for medical attention. Ryan v. Armstrong. 850 F.3d 419, 425
(8th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard that requires a mental state "akin to
criminal recklessness." Jackson. 756 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 340
(8th Cir. 2014)). Thus. Plaintiff must show "more than negligence, more even than gross
negligence." Fourte v. Faulkner Cty.• Ark.. 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jolly v.
Knudsen. 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000)). He must demonstrate that Defendants' actions

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were "so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential
care." Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234. 1240--41 (8th Cir. 1997). Moreover, when a claim of
deliberate indifference is based on a delay in treatment, a plaintiff "must place verifying medical
evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to
succeed." Crowley v. Hedgepeth, 109 F.3d 500. 502 (8th Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Hager. 292
F.3d 560. 564 (8th Cir. 2002).
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has admitted he is not asserting any claim against
Barton for failure to provide him with proper medical care at the Jail. (SOF at ,i 66; Deposition
of Dennis Laramore. Doc. No. 61-1 at 141:11-17). The Court will. therefore. grant Defendants'
motion as it relates to Plaintiff's claim against Barton for deliberate indifference to medical
needs.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges he suffers from several medical conditions.
including an unspecified heart condition, COPD. and other respiratory conditions, for which he
was receiving regular treatment, and that upon his arrival at the Jail, Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to provide him with his heart medication
for thirty days and his other medications for sixty days. In his deposition, Plaintiff also claimed
that he required a daily aspirin and a special diet. and needed to be examined by a cardiologist.
There is no record evidence showing Plaintiff was diagnosed with any of the medical
conditions he claims to have. During the relevant period. a family nurse practitioner was
assigned to work at the Jail pursuant to a contract between Washington County. Missouri and
Washington County Memorial Hospital to provide medical services at the Jail. Although the
nurse practitioner provided medical care to Plaintiff, she was unable to confirm his alleged
medical conditions within a reasonable degree of medical certainty because she had not received

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Plaintiff's medical records from his providers by the time he was transferred out of the Jail. In
any event, the Court need not reach this issue. Even assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff
had objectively serious medical needs, he has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
Thompson and Snow knew of Plaintiff's medical needs and deliberately disregarded them.
The undisputed facts show that Thompson and Snow were unaware that Plaintiff had any
medical conditions requiring treatment and that they did not instruct or direct anyone on the
nature and extent of the medical care, including medications, that should be or was provided to
Plaintiff. As Captain of the Washington County Sheriff's Office, Thompson had supervisory
authority over the Office's Road Division, which provides general law enforcement services
within the County, and the Jail Division, which administers the Jail. Captain Thompson did not
personally administer or manage the daily operations of the Jail and was not responsible for
addressing and responding to written grievances and medical request forms submitted by
inmates. Deputy Snow was primarily assigned to work at the Washington County Courthouse as
a bailiff, and occasionally assigned to provide assistance at the Jail. Neither Thompson nor Snow
reviewed any of the written grievances or medical request forms allegedly submitted by Plaintiff.
Snow transported Plaintiff from the Washington County Memorial Hospital back to the Jail;
however, without something more, this does not establish that Snow actually knew Plaintiff had
any serious medical conditions requiring care. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (a prison official
cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference); Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (same).

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Moreover, the record clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff received extensive medical care
at the Jail. Based upon the medical history she received from Plaintiff, the nurse practitioner
prescribed ProAir HFA, a bronchodilator that increases the air flow to the lungs, to treat his
complaints of COPD, asthma, histoplasmosis, and other respiratory problems. She also
authorized Plaintiff's use of a nebulizer, which creates a mist that administers albuterol and other
respiratory medications to a patient, as well as Vicks VapoRub to help his breathing. The nurse
practitioner prescribed Isosorbide to treat Plaintiff's complaints of angina, chest pain, high blood
pressure, and an unspecified heart condition; Gabapentin to treat his complaints of leg pain and
restless leg syndrome; and Cetirizine, an antihistamine, to temporarily relieve the symptoms
caused by Plaintiff's alleged allergies. Plaintiff was examined by the nurse practitioner for a skin
rash and prescribed antibiotics for the rash. The nurse practitioner also prescribed viscous
lidocaine to treat Plaintiffs complaints of tooth pain and authorized a dental appointment for him
to treat his tooth decay; however, Plaintiff was transferred out of the Jail before he could be seen
by a dentist. For a claim of deliberate indifference, "the prisoner must show more than
negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d
488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.
1995)).
In addition to the medical care Plaintiff received at the Jail, the record shows he was
taken to the Washington County Memorial Hospital on May 19, 2017, shortly after arriving at
the Jail. Although the reason for the visit is unclear, the medical records indicate that Plaintiff
denied any cardiovascular problems or skin problems and he was discharged that same day. On
Plaintiff testified he did not have any complaints when he was taken to the hospital but that the
individual performing Plaintiff's sentencing recommendation believed he may have been exposed to
tuberculosis.
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July 12, 2017, Plaintiff received additional medical treatment at the Washington County
Memorial Hospital for complaints of chest pain. The medical examination of Plaintiff revealed
that his "[h]eart rate was normal and the rhythm was regular." The medical examination also
revealed that Plaintiffs "lung sounds were clear, and breath sounds were equal bilaterally." The
treating

physician

characterized

Plaintiffs

medical

condition

as

"CHEST

PAIN,

UNSPECIFIED."
In his response, Plaintiff has not set forth any specific facts to rebut Defendants' showing
or to support his contentions that the medical treatment provided him was inadequate, nor has he
produced verifying medical evidence to establish that any alleged delay in treatment had a
detrimental effect on his alleged medical conditions. Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th
Cir. 2006) (citing Crowley. 109 F.3d at 502). Without actual evidence to refute Defendants'
testimony, Plaintiff cannot defeat Defendants' motion. See Reed v. Lear Corp., 556 F.3d 674,
678 (8th Cir. 2009) ("To overcome a motion for summary judgm~nt, a Plaintiff may not merely
point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but must substantiate allegations with sufficient
probative evidence that would permit a finding in the Plaintiffs favor."); Moore ex rel. Moore v.
Briggs, 381 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating an analysis for summary judgment must be based
on the record of evidence, not conclusory allegations of deliberate indifference). Because
Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence from which a reasonable jury might find that
Thompson and Snow deliberately disregarded his allegedly serious medical needs, the Court
finds and concludes that Thompson and Snow are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiffs claim of deliberate indifference.

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B. Conditions of confinement
Next, Defendants argue they are entitled to swnmary judgment on Plaintiffs conditions
of confinement claim because he was not subjected to an extreme deprivation that posed a risk to
his health or safety.
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide "humane conditions of
confinement" to its inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Conditions are not
cruel and unusual merely because they are harsh or uncomfortable; however, officials must
ensure that inmates receive "adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care," and ''take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates." Id. To establish an Eighth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement claim, Plaintiff must show that the deprivation alleged was
"objectively, sufficiently serious," resulting "in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities," and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to "an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety," meaning that the officials actually knew of and disregarded the risk.
Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837);
Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370, 1373 (8th Cir. 1993). Again, mere negligence and inadvertence
are insufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement. Choate, 7 F.3d at 1374.
Here, Plaintiff alleges the Jail is overcrowded, lacks running water and functional
restrooms, and is contaminated with black mold. Plaintiff further alleges he has been denied a
proper sleeping mat, towel, care package, and cleaning supplies. As a result, Plaintiff claims his
medical condition has worsened. According to Plaintiff, Defendants advised the inmates "We are
not a Federal Jail and we do not have to abide by any State or Federal Rules." During his
deposition, Plaintiff claimed he did not have a towel for the first three months he was at the Jail
and that he had to use his clothes to dry off after taking a shower. He also claimed the Jail lacked

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adequate ventilation and that chains and padlocks were used on some of the cell doors because
the locking systems did not work.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has not stated how the Defendants were responsible for
these conditions. "Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility
for, the deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,370 (1976)); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th
Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was
personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox,
47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat superior theory does not apply in § 1983 suits).
Thus, Plaintiff has not established a causal link between any of the Defendants and his claims.
Moreover, Plaintiff's own testimony conclusively refutes his allegations. At his
deposition, Plaintiff testified he was provided with a mat to sleep on, a blanket, and a pillow, as
well as soap, toothpaste and a toothbrush. He had access to bathroom facilities and could shower
whenever he wanted. Plaintiff was provided three meals per day, and he and the other inmates
were given a mop, bucket, and a broom about once a week. Despite his claim that chains and
padlocks were used on cell doors at night, Plaintiff testified he had never actually experienced
any problems in this regard. A § 1983 action is a type of tort claim, and a plaintiff must suffer
some actual injury before he can receive compensation, and the injury must be more than de
minimus. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441,448 (8th Cir. 2008).
While Plaintiffs conclusory allegations of overcrowding, mold, inadequate ventilation,
and unsanitary conditions raise serious concerns, without more, they fail to demonstrate
objectively serious conditions that violate the constitution. See Williams, 49 F.3d at 445 (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (To state an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, an

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inmate must show that the alleged deprivations denied him "the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities," and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to "an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety."). As for Plaintiffs claim that he did not have a towel for the first three
months he was at the Jail, this too fails to rise to the level of an objectively serious condition of
confinement. See Dundee v. Rambo, No. 4:08-CV-4127, 2011 WL 776161, at * 8 (W.D. Ark.
Feb. 3, 2011) (ruling that a lack of towels and other items did not violate the constitution);
Henderson v. Greeley. 6:13-CV-06137, 2015 WL 1280312, at *13 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 20, 2015)
(same).
There is also no medical evidence in the record from which a jury could find that
Plaintiffs condition was exacerbated by the conditions of his detention. See Jackson v. Riebold,
815 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2016); Gibson, 433 F.3d at 646.
Lastly, Defendants' affidavits establish they cannot be liable for many of the conditions
of confinement of which Plaintiff complains. Tribble v. Ark. Dept. of Human Servs., 77 F.3d
268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996). Defendants state they were unaware of any conditions at the Jail that
posed an excessive risk of harm to the health and safety of Plaintiff or any other inmates.
Because Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence from which a reasonable jury might
find that his conditions of confinement posed a substantial risk of serious harm and that
Defendants knew of but disregarded, or were deliberately indifferent to, his health and safety, the
Court finds and concludes that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claim.
C. Qualified immunity

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Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. Because Plaintiff has failed to show the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right, the Court will grant summary judgment on this alternative ground as well.
An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified

immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
establishes a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the violation. Capps v. Olson, 780 F.3d 879,884 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Courts are "permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first." Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236). Because an official is entitled to qualified immunity unless both prongs are satisfied, the
analysis ends if either of the two is not met. See id
As discussed above, the Court has found that the facts, even when viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, do not establish a plausible claim for an Eighth Amendment violation
because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs or that his conditions of confinement posed a substantial risk of serious harm that
Defendants knew of but were deliberately indifferent to. If no constitutional violation occurred,
the evaluation ends there. Crumley v. City of St. Paul 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003)
("Without the requisite showing of a constitutional violation, summary judgment is proper
because [plaintiff] has failed to establish the existence of an essential element of [his] case.").
The Court need not proceed to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis to determine
whether the alleged constitutional violation was also clearly established at the time in question.
See Kulkay. 847 F.3d at 645--46 (citing Ransom v. Grisafe, 790 F.3d 804, 812 n.4 (8th Cir.

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2015)); Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886, 894 (8th Cir. 2011)). Defendants are therefore entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim and conditions of confinement
claim.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court finds and concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff's claims for deliberate indifference and unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.
Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Shannon Thompson, Kevin Snow, and
Christopher Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment [59] is GRANTED.
A separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 16th day of September, 2019.

J~.ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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