Schneider v. United States Department of Justice et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 3) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith. I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (Docket No. 2) is DENIED as moot. IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on August 4, 2017. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARLENE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:17-cv-1630-DDN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Marlene Schneider for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Having reviewed the financial information provided with the
motion, the Court determines that plaintiff is financially unable to pay the filing fee. The motion
will therefore be granted. In addition, the Court will dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A
pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,” nor will a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of
“further factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
When conducting initial review pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the Court must accept as true
the allegations in the complaint, and must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the tenet that a court must accept the
allegations as true does not apply to legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and affording a

pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in
ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Even pro se complaints are
required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15
(8th Cir. 2004) (federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because
an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”).
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and “all persons similarly situated.”
(Docket No. 1 at 1). Named as defendants are United States Department of Justice, U.S. Bank
National Association, Alton Banking & Trust Company, Millsap & Singer LLC, William R.
Haine, Ronald C. Mottaz, and Alan Napp. Plaintiff describes herself as the “lead plaintiff,” and
as grounds for this Court’s jurisdiction states that this is the only court with “authority to bring
these breaches of federal and constitution rights to justice. There are multiple violations of the
Racketeering, Influence & Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act of 1970.” Id. Plaintiff alleges as
follows:
Beginning in before and about the year 1978, Chicago, Illinois “Outfit” controlled
American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial (AFL-CIO) labor trade
union people increased their arsons, threats, mob actions and assaults on we nonAFL-CIO people, which they contend are stealing their work. In federal case
number 78-5199 consolidated, we Congress of Independent Union (CIU) workers
with the aid of the National Labor Relations Board obtained an injunction and
settlement agreement wherein these organizations and people were to stop their
outrageous and unconstitutional conduct, which here continues. The Defendants
named here are still acting in breach of federal law and said injunction settlement
agreement and injunction. These natural person defendants are criminally
operating both in the states of Illinois and Missouri against me, my family and
others with impunity. I have met with FBI agents with others in order to obtain
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federal law enforcement officials to do their duty to no avail. Said defendants
have defrauded me and others out of multiple properties acting under color of law
and official right and laundered their ill gotten gains to enrich themselves. On
June 13, 2017 these defendants seek to again defraud me and others out of my
home 117 Hunters Ridge St. Charles, Missouri 63301. See attached list of
documents, newspaper articles and case files in support. I have sent the same in
prior years to the defendants and their attorneys. I want nothing more than the
honest administration and enforcement of public law and trail [sic] by a jury of
my peers.
(Id. at 4). Plaintiff attaches copies of claims for lien filed by another person (Docket No. 1,
Attchs. 1 and 2) and a letter apparently sent to her by defendant Millsap and Singer, P.C.,
notifying of a foreclosure sale. As relief, plaintiff asks that a lawyer be appointed for her, her
family and all other people wronged by the defendants, “true & due justice as is a constitutional
common law right,” monetary damages in excess of $20,000,000.00, and for property and
businesses to be returned to “all those wronged.” (Id. at 5).
Discussion
The complaint presents frivolous claims over which this Court lacks jurisdiction, and it
will therefore be dismissed. Plaintiff fails to specify what constitutional rights or federal laws
were violated, she fails to provide any details about an alleged injunction or agreement, and she
fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a claim against any defendant. Instead,
plaintiff pleads only unintelligible legal conclusions that are not explained or related to the facts,
and otherwise sets forth the type of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action
[that are] supported by mere conclusory statements” that the Supreme Court has found
insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In addition, plaintiff cannot bring claims on behalf of others
because she is not an attorney, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and she seeks to compel the criminal
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prosecution of the defendants, something this Court cannot do. See Ray v. Dep’t of Justice, 508
F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (“It is well settled that initiation of federal criminal
prosecution is a discretionary decision within the Executive Branch not subject to judicial
compulsion.” (citations omitted)). Finally, plaintiff asserts no plausible basis for this Court’s
federal question jurisdiction, and there could be no diversity jurisdiction because plaintiff alleges
that both she and Millsap & Singer, P.C. are Missouri residents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see
also Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (complete diversity
of citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff
holds citizenship).
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Docket No. 3) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. A separate order of
dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket No. 2)
is DENIED as moot.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this 4th day of August, 2017.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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