Halilovic v. Krinninger

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to File an Amended Petition and Remand the Cause of Action 8 is GRANTED and Kharel Miller shall be added as a Defendant to this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri from which it was removed (copy mailed to St. Louis City Court). Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 8/18/17. (KXS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
HAMDIJA HALILOVIC,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAITLYN KRINNINGER,
Defendant.

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No. 4:17 CV 01794 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This diversity matter is before me on Plaintiff Hamdija Halilovic’s Motion
to File an Amended Petition and Remand the Cause of Action [8]. Based upon a
review of the record before me, I will grant Plaintiff’s Motion and remand this
case.
Background
Plaintiff Hamdija Halilovic (“Halilovic”) wishes to pursue negligence claims
arising from two separate car accidents. First, on August 31, 2016, Defendant
Kaitlyn Krinninger (“Krinniger”) allegedly caused a car accident in the City of St.
Louis. Halilovic asserts that he suffered physical injuries as a result of this
accident, including injuries to his neck, back, shoulders, and spinal disc. Less than
three months later, on November 18, 2016, Halilovic was involved in another car
accident in the City of St. Louis, which was allegedly caused by Kharel Miller
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(“Miller”). Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the second accident, he suffered
additional injuries and aggravation of his injuries from the first accident.
Halilovic filed an original petition against Krinninger as the sole defendant
in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on May 1, 2017. Krinninger removed
the case to this court on June 23, 2017 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, stating
that the lawsuit is between citizens of different states and the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Notice of Removal [1]
asserts that at the time of the institution of this action, Halilovic was a resident and
citizen of the State of Missouri and Krinninger was a resident and citizen of the
State of Illinois.
Plaintiff has requested leave to amend his complaint in order to add Miller as
a defendant to the action.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition [12] states

“Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Missouri and Defendant MILLER is a citizen
of the State of Missouri.” If Miller is joined as a defendant, the case should be
remanded back to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis because Miller’s
alleged Missouri citizenship will destroy complete diversity of citizenship and
subject matter jurisdiction. There is no federal question at issue.
Legal Standard
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) authorizes a plaintiff to amend his complaint with the
court’s leave, and the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
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“The classic ‘good reasons’ for rejecting an amendment are: ‘undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of
amendment.’” Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 943 (8th Cir.
2000). “Delay alone is not a sufficient reason for denying leave.” Buder v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 1981). “Rather,
the party opposing the motion must show it will be unfairly prejudiced.” Dennis v.
Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 207 F.3d 523, 525 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal citations
omitted). The decision of whether to grant leave to amend is within the court’s
discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-32
(1971).
Discussion
“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose
joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).
Although Halilovic asserts in his motion that Miller is a “necessary party,” he
seeks permissive joinder under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2) rather than required joinder
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. See Bailey v. Bayer CropScience L.P., 563 F.3d 302, 308
(8th Cir. 2009) (“Joinder would be required if the plaintiff satisfied Fed.R.Civ.P.
19 by showing that the new parties are necessary and indispensable to a full
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resolution of the case.”). Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2) authorizes permissive joinder of
defendants if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action.”1
Missouri courts have granted permissive joinder in cases involving separate
car accidents, finding that the accidents constituted a series of occurrences and
involved a common question of fact under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2) where the
plaintiff suffered injury to the same body parts, the same injuries, and/or
aggravation of the initial injuries. See, e.g., Hager v. McGlynn, 518 S.W.2d 173,
178 (Mo. App. 1974) (“[W]hen the injuries are alleged to be indivisible, or to have
been aggravated in another accident, then joinder is permissible. In that situation,
justice is far more likely to be served with all parties present and the issues being
fully presented to one jury, and that jury being charged with the responsibility of
finding both the question of negligence and the amount of damages, if any.”); State
ex rel. Nixon v. Dally, 248 S.W.3d 615 (Mo. banc 2008) (confirming authority to
permissively join defendants involved in discrete accidents where the “second

Likewise, Mo. Rule 52.05(a) provides for permissive joinder of defendants “if
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrences or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action.”
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collision aggravated injuries resulting from the first accident”); State ex rel. Kinsey
v. Wilkins, 394 S.W.3d 446 (Mo. App. 2013) (collecting and summarizing
applicable Missouri precedent). Here, the accidents sufficiently involve a series of
occurrences and a common question of fact, because Halilovic alleges that the
injuries from the first car accident were aggravated by the second accident and
involve the same body parts. As a result, permissive joinder under Fed.R.Civ.P.
20(a)(2) may permit adding Miller as a defendant.
In deciding whether to grant joinder and order remand, courts consider
factors including “[t]he extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat
federal jurisdiction, whether plaintiff has been dilatory in asking for amendment,
whether the plaintiff will be significantly injured if amendment is not allowed, and
any other factors bearing on the equities.” Alpers Jobbing Co. v. Northland Cas.
Co., 173 F.R.D. 517, 520 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (internal citations omitted); see also
Bailey, 563 F.3d at 307. Here, Halilovic satisfies the foregoing factors. With
respect to the first factor, defeating federal jurisdiction, it appears that Halilovic
would prefer remand since he initially filed the case in state court and now seeks
remand. Krinninger argues that Halilovic was aware of potential claims against
Miller when he filed the initial suit, but only sought to add Miller as a defendant
following removal to federal court, suggesting his primary motivation is to defeat
federal jurisdiction. However, Halilovic alleges that the injuries from the two car
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accidents are interrelated and liability would best be determined in a single action,
so the amendment would serve a worthwhile purpose beyond defeating federal
jurisdiction.

With respect to the second factor, whether plaintiff was timely,

Halilovic was not dilatory in requesting leave to amend, since his motion was filed
less than a month after the case was removed, and prior to the entry of any
scheduling order. With respect to the third factor, whether plaintiff would be
significantly injured if amendment was not allowed, Krinninger argues that Miller
is not a necessary party and Halilovic could simply file a separate case against
Miller in state court if Miller was not joined to this action. However, if Halilovic
had to litigate two separate lawsuits in two separate forums, he would likely incur
additional expenses and time and face “empty chair” arguments. As a result,
Halilovic could be unduly prejudiced if I did not allow amendment of the
complaint. Finally, with respect to any other factors bearing on the equities,
general considerations of judicial economy suggest that Halilovic’s claims would
be most effectively adjudicated in a single action. On the whole, the equities
weigh in favor of joinder of Miller as a defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the record before the Court, I will
grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint in order to join Miller as
a defendant. As a result, joinder destroys complete diversity of citizenship and
subject matter jurisdiction, and I will remand the case to the court from which it
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was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). See OnePoint Solutions, LLC v.
Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Complete diversity of citizenship
exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff
holds citizenship.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to File an Amended
Petition and Remand the Cause of Action [8] is GRANTED and Kharel Miller
shall be added as a Defendant to this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri from which it was removed.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 18th day of August, 2017.

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