Williams v. Norman
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED AND DISMISSED AS SUCCESSIVE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 8/23/17. (LGK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SHAWN K. WILLIAMS,
No. 4:17-CV-2223 RWS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner=s application for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition is successive and shall be summarily dismissed.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides
that a district court shall summarily dismiss a § 2254 petition if it plainly appears that the petitioner
is not entitled to relief.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in May
1996. Williams v. Bowersox, No. 4:96-CV-939 CAS (E.D. Mo.) He subsequently filed an amended
petition. On September 28, 1999, the Court dismissed petitioner’s petition and amended petition.
Id. Petitioner appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied
petitioner’s request for certificate of appealability on February 14, 2000. Williams v. Bowersox,
No. 99-3890 (8th Cir. 2000).
On June 28, 2010, petitioner filed, in his closed habeas corpus action, a “Petitioner Pro-Se
Motion for U.S.C.S. Fed. Rules Civ. Procedure 60(d)” along with a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. Respondent filed a response to the motion on July 19, 2010. Petitioner then filed a
separate motion requesting that his Rule 60(d) motion be filed as an independent action under Rule
60(d)(3). The Court granted petitioner’s request and analyzed petitioner’s request for relief as both
“fraud on the Court” and an end-run around the AEDPA’s limitations on filing a successive habeas
corpus action.1 See Williams v. Dormire, No. 4:10-CV-1413 CAS (E.D.Mo.). Petitioner’s action
was denied and dismissed on August 17, 2010. Id.
Petitioner filed a similar Rule 60(b) action, alleging “fraud” against the State of Missouri
for “failing to transcribe petitioner’s guilty plea” on September 7, 2010. See Williams v. Dormire,
No. 4:10-CV-1660 (E.D.Mo.). The Court denied and dismissed petitioner’s action on September
20, 2010. Id. The Eighth Circuit denied petitioner’s request for certificate of appealability on
January 19, 2011. See Williams v. Dormire, No. 10-3232 (8th Cir. 2011).
In the instant application for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner argues that the Supreme
Court case of McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013), provides him grounds for relief from
the procedural default he suffered in his original habeas action, in addition to solving his one-year
statute of limitations difficulties. He is incorrect.
In McQuiggin, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner filing a first-time federal habeas
petition could overcome the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) upon a
showing of Aactual innocence@ under the Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995), standard. See
McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1928. Critically, the holding in McQuiggin was based on the Supreme
Court's conclusion that Congress, through its silence on the issue, had not intended to eliminate the
pre-existing equitable Aactual innocence@ exception for an untimely first-time filer. See id. at
Petitioner requested relief from the denial of his habeas corpus action, alleging “fraud” by
respondent’s counsel for failing to provide the Court with a copy of the transcript of his guilty plea.
The Court was aware of the missing transcript at the time it reviewed petitioner’s application for
writ of habeas corpus. The absence of the transcript was clearly noted by the Honorable Mary Ann
Medler in her Report and Recommendation. See Williams v. Dormire, No. 4:96-CV-939 CAS,
Docket No. 28. Judge Medler found that because she accepted as true petitioner’s version of the
events at sentencing, the transcript was not essential for review of the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
1934. On the other hand, the Court expressly recognized that Congress, through § 2244(b), had
intended to Amodify@ and Aconstrain[ ]@ the Aactual innocence@ exception with respect to second
or successive petitions. See id. at 1933B34. Nothing in McQuiggin authorizes a court to ignore or
bypass these constraints.
To the extent that petitioner seeks to relitigate claims that he brought in his original
petition, those claims must be denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). To the extent that
petitioner seeks to bring new claims for habeas relief, petitioner must obtain leave from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit before he can bring those claims in this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).2 Petitioner has not been granted leave to file a successive habeas petition
in this Court. As a result, the petition shall be denied and dismissed.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner=s petition for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED AND DISMISSED AS SUCCESSIVE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.
Dated this 23rd day of August, 2017.
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The AEDPA=s restriction on filing successive petitions is retroactively applicable to cases that
were filed before the AEDPA was enacted. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180,
1188 (10th Cir. 2001).
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