Arman v. Davis et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -....IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Jason Davis, Cindy Griffith, and Alan Earls is DENIED. [Doc. 17] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Jason Davis, Cindy Griffith, and Alan Earls shall file an answer to the First Amended Complaint no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order. ( Response to Court due by 6/15/2018.). Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 5/16/2018. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREW ARMAN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JASON DAVIS, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:17-CV-2360 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has not responded to the motion, and the time for
doing so has passed. For the reasons explained below, the motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Andrew Arman (“Plaintiff”) is currently incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional
Center. He filed the present pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against corrections
officer Jason Davis, Warden Cindy Griffith, and Deputy Division Director Alan Earls
(collectively, “Defendants”). The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred beginning January
16, 2017, when Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Potosi Correctional Center.
According to the First Amended Complaint, on January 16, 2017, defendant Davis was
moving Plaintiff from a restraint bench to a restraint chair. Plaintiff’s entire upper body was
restrained, and he was in a submissive and non-threatening posture. Defendant Davis struck
Plaintiff in the face with a closed fist.

Plaintiff filed grievances and Informal Resolution

Requests (“IRRs”), and in retaliation, defendants Griffith and Earls transferred him to a housing
unit run by Davis.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief
“must include sufficient factual information to provide the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests,
and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517
F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires
a plaintiff to plead “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint even if it appears that “actual proof of those facts is improbable,” id. at 556, and
reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Id. at 555–56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court must liberally construe a pro se
complaint, which is “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). The principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint does not apply to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice”). In addition, all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party. Young v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001).

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III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Davis
Plaintiff alleges that Davis used excessive force against him in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. It is well established that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
constitutes the cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986)). In the context of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim against a prison guard for the
use of excessive force, “the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Id. at 6-7. A plaintiff does not need to show that he was significantly injured:
“[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary
standards of decency always are violated.” Id. at 9.
In the instant motion, Davis contends that the First Amended Complaint contains insufficient
facts to state a claim that he applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. This argument is not well taken. Taken
as true, Plaintiff alleges that Davis punched him in the face even though his upper body was fully
restrained and he was in a submissive and non-threatening posture. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, there was no need for Davis to use force against Plaintiff to
maintain or restore discipline because Plaintiff was restrained and submissive.

The Court

concludes that the First Amended Complaint contains sufficient factual matter to state a plausible
claim for relief against Davis. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

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B. Defendants Griffith and Earls
Plaintiff alleges that he reported the physical abuse via the grievance and IRR procedure and
that, in retaliation, Griffith and Earls moved him into a housing unit that Davis runs. Although
prison officials generally may “transfer a prisoner for whatever reason or for no reason at all,”
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983), a prisoner cannot be transferred in retaliation for
the exercise of a constitutional right. Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1993). “The
filing of a prison grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, is protected First Amendment
activity.” Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v.
Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007)). To state a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiff
must allege that he engaged in protected activity and that defendants, to retaliate against plaintiff
for engaging in that activity, took adverse action against him that would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in that activity. See Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th
Cir. 2004).
Here, Griffith and Earls concede that Plaintiff is referring to his use of the prison grievance
procedure as the protected activity for which he faced retaliation. However, they argue that
Plaintiff’s allegation of an “obvious retaliation tactic by Potosi Correctional Center staff by
transferring me in an attempt to silence and hinder me” is “a conclusory allegation of law that
does not allege a sufficient factual basis for the claim or personal involvement by Defendants
Griffith and Earls.” (Doc. 18 at 6). Indeed, when considered in isolation, the statement is
conclusory, and the reference to “Potosi Correctional Center staff” fails to sufficiently allege the
personal responsibility of Griffith and Earls. However, in considering the instant motion, this
Court does not consider whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible. Instead, this Court
must read the First Amended Complaint as a whole. Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d

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585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (when considering a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s
complaint must be read as a whole, rather than “parsed piece by piece to determine whether each
allegation, in isolation, is plausible.”).
Elsewhere in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Davis attacked
him, that he filed he filed grievances and IRRs against Davis, and that “C. Griffith and A. Earls
refused to protect me and put me in danger by moving me to a house that J. Davis runs and
didn’t investigate the matter” in an attempt to silence and hinder him. (Doc. 10 at 6). Having
read the First Amended Complaint as a whole, the Court concludes that it sufficiently alleges that
Griffith and Earls were personally responsible for transferring him to a housing unit run by Davis
in retaliation for his use of the prison grievance procedure.
Griffith and Earls next argue that the First Amended Complaint fails to plead a sufficient
factual basis to allege that a transfer to a different housing unit within the same institution would
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to use the grievance process. In support,
Griffith and Earls argue that the First Amended Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to
indicate that plaintiff experienced more burdensome conditions as a result of the transfer. This
argument is not well-taken. Taken as true, Plaintiff alleges that Davis punched him in the face
while he was restrained and submissive, that he filed grievances and IRRs against Davis, and that
Davis is in charge of the housing unit into which Griffith and Earls transferred him. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a person of ordinary firmness would be dissuaded from
grieving an attack perpetrated by the very officer who controlled his housing unit, and therefore
presumably controlled many aspects of his day-to-day life.
Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss will be denied.

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Jason Davis,
Cindy Griffith, and Alan Earls is DENIED. [Doc. 17]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Jason Davis, Cindy Griffith, and Alan Earls
shall file an answer to the First Amended Complaint no later than thirty (30) days from the date
of this Memorandum and Order.

CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 16th day of May, 2018.

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