Molina et al v. St. Louis, Missouri, City of et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions of Defendants City of St. Louis, Missouri, and St. Clair County, Illinois to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint as to them are GRANTED. (ECF Nos. 11 and 17 .) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 24, 2018. (BRP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SARAH MOLINA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,
COUNTY OF ST. CLAIR, ILLINOIS, and
OFFICERS JOHN DOES I-VI,
Defendants.
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No. 4:17-cv-02498 AGF
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter, brought under 42 U.SC. § 1983, is before the Court on the separate
motions of Defendants City of St. Louis, Missouri, and St. Clair County, Illinois, to
dismiss Plaintiffs Sarah Molina, Christina Vogel, and Peter Groce’s amended complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons set forth
below, the motions will be granted.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a street protest in the City of St. Louis on August 19, 2015,
protesting the shooting death of a citizen by the police. Plaintiffs Vogel and Molina
allege that they participated in the protest and left the scene after officers directed the
crowd to disperse. Vogel and Molina allege that they walked to Molina’s neighborhood,
about three blocks away. Approximately one half hour later, they saw a SWAT vehicle,
“under the joint direction of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and St. Clair
County Sheriff’s Department,” on Molina’s street. ECF No. 1 ¶ 51. They further allege
that Defendant Officers John Does I-IV were on the SWAT vehicle and shot tear gas
canisters and/or smoke grenades directly at Vogel, Molina, and Molina’s neighbor and
friends, who were all standing and talking on the sidewalk.
Groce alleges that he also participated in the protest and left the scene after
officers directed the crowd to disperse. As he was walking home through a park, he
encountered the same SWAT vehicle that shot tear gas at Molina and Vogel. Groce
alleges that when he told the officers to get out of the park, the officers shot a tear gas
canister and pepper spray directly at him.
Plaintiffs claim that the Doe Defendants retaliated against them for engaging in
First Amendment activity (Count I) and used excessive force against them by deploying
tear gas and pepper spray (Count II). Plaintiffs name as Defendants the City of St. Louis
and St. Clair County, both of which allegedly employed and supervised the officers
involved in the challenged conduct; and Officers John Doe I−VI, in their individual
capacity.
Each count asserts that the City of St. Louis and St. Clair County are liable as
municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the constitutional violations were a result
of the City and County’s failure to supervise the individual officers, failure to train the
officers on lawful use of chemicals, and having “a custom or policy that resulted in the
unconstitutional, retaliatory use of chemicals against [Plaintiffs].” ECF No. 1 ¶ 92. All
Plaintiffs assert physical and emotional damages, as well as the chilling of their desire to
engage in activity protected by the First Amendment. In each count, Plaintiffs seek
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injunctive relief, nominal damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The City of St. Louis first argues that the complaint should be dismissed as to it
because Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts to support the claims of (1) failure to
train and supervise the individual officers, (2) an unconstitutional policy or custom that
resulted in the use of chemicals against Plaintiffs, or (3) a pattern of similar
unconstitutional acts committed by City of St. Louis officers, or that the City had notice
of such a pattern. In its separate motion to dismiss, St. Clair County first argues that
Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim against St. Clair County because Plaintiffs cannot
identify any individual St. Clair County officer that committed any act against Plaintiffs.
Next, St. Clair County contends that Plaintiffs assert an impermissible respondeat
superior claim in Count I. Further, St. Clair County argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations in
Count I are insufficient under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Lastly, St. Clair County asserts that Plaintiffs’ pleaded facts
in Count II are insufficient to establish municipal failure-to-supervise liability.
In response to St. Clair County, Plaintiff argues that Monell does not require that
individual defendants be sued, and further, Plaintiffs did sue individual County
Defendants by naming John Does I-VI. Otherwise, Plaintiffs raise essentially the same
arguments in response to both Movants. Plaintiffs acknowledge that a municipality may
be held liable under § 1983 only for its own illegal acts and may not be held vicariously
liable for the acts of its agents. However, Plaintiffs contend that a municipality can be
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held liable under § 1983 without proof of a “pre-existing” pattern of violations, where the
single act is so egregious. Plaintiffs argue that, based upon the factual allegations and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the
Movants failed to train and supervise the officers in the SWAT vehicle, and this failure to
train and supervise was the moving force behind the deprivation of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. Plaintiffs request leave to amend the complaint if the Court finds it
insufficient to defeat Movants’ motions to dismiss.
In reply, the City of St. Louis reiterates its argument that Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately support the allegations that the City of St. Louis officers engaged in a pattern
of unconstitutional acts, or that the City had notice of such a pattern.
DISCUSSION
For a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The reviewing court must accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor, but the
court is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts
alleged. Id.; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766,
768-69 (8th Cir. 2012).
To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a Plaintiff must allege that
the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights resulted from “(1) an official municipal
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policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or
supervise.” Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted).
Failure to Train and Supervise
The “inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis of § 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989). In the context of claims for failure to train and supervise, “deliberate indifference
is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence” of the action. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan County,
Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). When policymakers “are on actual or
constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes city
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the governmental entity may be
deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.”
White v. Jackson, No. 4:14CV1490HEA, 2015 WL 1189963, at *4 (E.D. Mo. March 16,
2015) (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to state a claim
for failure to train and supervise against Movants. Here, Plaintiffs allege two incidents of
constitutional violations, committed close in time and by the same individuals. This does
not state a claim for failure to train or supervise. See Pluma v. City of New York, No. 13
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Civ.2017(LAP), 2015 WL 1623828 at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (granting motion to
dismiss where plaintiff alleged only a “handful of instances” of inappropriate pepper
spray use, which occurred over the course of more than a decade); cf. White, 2015 WL
1189963 at *3, 4 (denying municipal defendants’ motions to dismiss where plaintiffs
alleged a “pervasive pattern of civil rights violations”−including deployment of mace,
physical assault, and shooting with rubber bullets−which were committed by numerous
officers over the course of three days).
Unconstitutional Policy or Custom
“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers,
the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to
practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. “Generally, an isolated
incident of alleged police misconduct . . . cannot, as a matter of law, establish a municipal
policy or custom creating [municipal] liability under § 1983.” Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715
F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013).
Liability may also be established “through proof that the alleged misconduct was
so pervasive among the non-policy making employees of the municipality as to constitute
a custom or usage with the force of law.” McGautha v. Jackson Cty., Mo. Collections
Dep’t, 36 F.3d 53, 56 (8th Cir. 1994).
[A] plaintiff may establish municipal liability through an unofficial custom
of the municipality by demonstrating (1) the existence of a continuing,
widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the
governmental entity's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking
officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff
was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that
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the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Corwin, 829 F.3d at
700).
Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to state a
claim of unconstitutional policy or custom against Movants. Plaintiffs fail to allege any
official policy or practice so persistent as to have the force of law. While the policy need
not exist in writing, Plaintiffs have not pointed to some choice made by municipal
officials to establish the existence of a policy. Cf. Rauen v. City of Miami, No. 06-21182CIV, 2007 WL 686609, at *10 (S.D. Fla. March 2, 2007) (denying municipal defendants’
motions to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that defendants developed and implemented
unwritten agreements to stifle protest). Additionally, as noted above, only two incidents
are alleged, which are insufficient to show that the actions taken against Plaintiffs were
customs or usages with the force of law. See Crump v. Boester, No.4:14 CV 1975 RWS,
2016 WL 1624017 at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2016) (granting municipal defendants’
motions to dismiss where the plaintiff failed to allege “facts to suggest that [plaintiff had]
a reasonable basis to believe that what happened to [plaintiff] was more than an isolated
incident”).
With respect to Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their complaint, Plaintiffs are
free to seek leave to amend before the deadline for doing so set forth in the Case
Management Order. Any such motion must be accompanied by the proposed amended
complaint.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions of Defendants City of St. Louis,
Missouri, and St. Clair County, Illinois to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint as to
them are GRANTED. (ECF Nos. 11 and 17.)
________________________________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of April, 2018.
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