Clemons v. Brauer et al

Filing 27

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Brauer and Pappas motions to dismiss are DENIED. [ECF Nos. 22 and 23 ]A separate Case Management Order will issue with this Memorandum and Order.. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 12/13/2018. (AAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
REGINALD CLEMONS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH BRAUER, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 4:17CV2739 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants Joseph Brauer and Chris Pappas’s motions
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has not responded to the motions, and the time for
doing so has passed. For the following reasons, the Court will deny defendants’ motions to
dismiss.
Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint so as to eliminate claims “which are fatally flawed in their legal
premises ... thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity.” Young
v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 326B27 (1989)). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain facts with enough specificity
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-78 (2009), ”[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements,” will not pass muster under Twombly.

Upon considering a motion to dismiss, a federal court must accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Grp.,
378 F.3d 839, 842 (2004). The task of a court is then “to review the plausibility of the plaintiff=s
claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation.” Zoltek Corp. v. Structural
Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Braden v. WalBMart Stores, Inc.,
588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting “the complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed
piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible”)).
Discussion
Because plaintiff is a prisoner bringing this civil action against officers or employees of a
governmental entity, the Court was required to conduct an initial review of his complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The Court was required to dismiss the complaint, without serving

defendants, if the action is was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Under § 1915A, this Court performed a thorough review of plaintiff=s claims,
taking into account plaintiff’s litigation history, as well as the claims in his present complaint.
See ECF No. 8.
The Court specifically discussed in its initial review the statute of limitations argument
on which defendants base the entirety of their motions to dismiss. Id. at 4-5. The Court stated:
Carefully reviewed and liberally construed, plaintiff’s pro se complaint seeks
damages under § 1983 for the state’s Brady violation in his criminal case. Under
Heck v. Humphrey, “to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been . . . declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
Such a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional
conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated. Id. at 489-90.
2

ECF No. 8 at 4.
The Court found plaintiff’s § 1983 cause of action arising out of his Brady violations did
not accrue until November 24, 2015, when the Missouri Supreme Court vacated his convictions
and sentences for first degree murder. Id. Thus, the five-year statute of limitations will not run
until November 24, 2020, and plaintiff’s action was timely filed. Defendants’ motions to dismiss
will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Brauer and Pappas’ motions to dismiss are
DENIED. [ECF Nos. 22 and 23]
A separate Case Management Order will issue with this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 13th day of December, 2018

___________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3