Branson v. FAF, Inc. et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 16 MOTION to Dismiss :Count II of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant FAF, Inc. motion is DENIED.. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 2/2/18. (LGK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DANIEL BRANSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
FAF, INC. and MADAR ALI,
Defendants.

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) Case No. 4:17 CV 2847 RWS
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant FAF, Inc., moves to dismiss plaintiff Daniel Branson’s claim of
negligent hiring, training, and supervision in this personal injury case. FAF argues
that Missouri law prevents plaintiffs from alleging negligent hiring, training, and
supervision claims against a defendant who admits respondeat superior liability for
an employee. I find that the cited case law does not prohibit Branson from
pleading claims on both of these theories of liability. As a result, I will deny FAF’s
motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Daniel Branson claims that Defendant Madar Ali, an alleged agent,
servant and employee of FAF, drove a tractor truck into Daniel Branson’s vehicle
causing him injury and damage. Daniel Branson alleges that Ali acted within the
course and scope of his employment when he caused this injury and damage. He

seeks compensation for his injuries, court costs, interest, and other relief that I
deem proper. Branson brings these claims under theories of negligence and
respondeat superior (Count I), and negligence in the hiring, training, and
supervision of Ali (Count II). In its answer to Branson’s first amended complaint,
FAF admits that Ali “was an agent and/or employee of [FAF’s] at all times
relevant and was acting in the course and scope of his employment at all times
relevant.” [No. 15]. FAF otherwise denies liability for Branson’s injuries in its
answer and moves to dismiss Count II in a separate filing. [No. 16].
JURISDICTION
This case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County in the
Twenty First Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri. With Defendant Ali’s
consent, FAF removed the case to this court within thirty days of being served with
the complaint, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over this case, I must find that the parties are citizens of
different states and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332. “[A] complaint that alleges the jurisdictional amount in good faith will
suffice to confer jurisdiction,” provided there is no apparent legal certainty to the
contrary. Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002). In support of the notice
of removal, FAF states it is a Tennessee corporation with its principal place of
business in Tennessee. It also states upon information and belief that Defendant Ali
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at all relevant times was and is a citizen of Ohio and that Branson is a citizen of the
State of Florida. FAF also believes that the amount in controversy will exceed
$75,000, noting that Branson has alleged over $140,000 in medical bills.
Accordingly, I find that diversity jurisdiction is satisfied and that I have subject
matter jurisdiction to decide this case.
LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, I must accept as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hager
v. Ark. Dept. of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). The federal rules
require only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A party may state as many separate
claims ... as it has, regardless of consistency.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(3).
ANALYSIS
FAF argues that, because it admits respondeat superior liability for Ali,
Branson cannot maintain a negligent hiring, training, or supervision charge against
it. In support of this argument, Branson cites the holding in McHaffie v. Bunch,
891 S .W.2d 822, 827 (Mo.1995), that “once the agency relationship was admitted,
it [is] error to permit a separate assessment of fault … based upon the negligent
entrustment or negligent hiring theories of liability. It was also error to submit
evidence on those theories.” Id. at 827. Some judges have interpreted this
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restriction to apply at the pleadings stage, with the purpose of conserving parties’
and judicial resources. See, e.g., Young v. Dunlap, 223 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (“[A]llowing [the plaintiff] to argue negligent entrustment when [the
employer] admitted imputed liability is both redundant and prejudicial.”). I decline
to reach that interpretation. See Cisco v. Mullikin, No. 4:11 CV 295 RWS, 2012
WL 549504, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2012). The holding in McHaffie concerns
assessment of fault and submission of evidence at trial. It does not prevent Branson
from pleading negligent hiring, training, and supervision. See Id.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that FAF’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 2nd day of February, 2018.

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