Moomey et al v. State of Missouri et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. [ECF No. 2] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. ( Initial Partial Filing Fee due by 7/12/2018.). Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 6/12/2018. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL D. MOOMEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:18-CV-29 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Michael D. Moomey, an
inmate at St. Charles County Department of Corrections, for leave to commence this action
without payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that
plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial
filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, based upon a review of the
complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328 (1989). An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing
litigants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F.
Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff=d 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987).

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the
Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51.
This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show
more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.”

Id.

The Court must review the factual

allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id.
at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may
exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most
plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 1951-52.
The Complaint
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at St. Charles County Department of Corrections, brings this
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Missouri Revised Statute § 221.070 is unconstitutional.
Section 221.070 requires offenders committed to county jails, who plead guilty or are found
guilty, to bear the expense of transport to the jail and “support while in jail.” Plaintiff states that
he has not read the statute, but that he believes it violates the Equal Protection Clause, constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and violates the
Due Process Clause. He also brings state law claims for unjust enrichment and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

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Plaintiff alleges he has been charged a $10.00 booking fee, a wristband fee, medical fees,
and a fingerprint fee. He states that, according to his inmate account, he is in debt over $500.00
to the St. Charles County Department of Corrections.
Discussion
Prisoners do not have a clearly established federal right to receive free medical care. See,
e.g., Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Although the Supreme Court has
held that a state must provide inmates with basic medical care, the Court has not tackled the
question whether that care must be provided free of charge.”); Fant v. Fisher, 414 F. Supp. 807,
808 (D. Okla. 1976) (“The court cannot accept plaintiff’s claim that he is absolutely entitled to
free medical services. So long as free medical services may not be demanded of the State as a
right by its free citizens, it is unreasonable to suggest that such free services may be demanded
by a convicted felon. Persons convicted of felonies do not acquire by virtue of their convictions a
constitutional right to services and benefits that are not available as of right to persons never
convicted of criminal offenses.”). As a result, plaintiff’s claims for free medical services and
other free services and benefits do not state a claim under the constitution. Even if plaintiff’s
allegations that he is entitled to free medical care and other free services and benefits were to
state a claim under the constitution, defendant Scott A. Lewis would be entitled to qualified
immunity.
Additionally, the Court notes that plaintiff has pled not guilty to the charges for which he
is being held in St. Charles County—domestic assault and armed criminal action charges. See
State v. Moomey, No. 1711-CR02906-01 (St. Charles County, filed Aug. 29, 2017). Plaintiff’s
charges are pending, and his trial date is set for June 18, 2018. Section 221.070 applies to
“Every person who shall be committed to the common jail within any county . . . for any offense
or misdemeanor, upon a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt for such offense, . . . shall bear the

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expense of . . . his or her support while in jail.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 221.070 (emphasis added).
Because plaintiff has not plead guilty or been found guilty, § 221.070 is not applicable, and his
case is not ripe for adjudication. See Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d 873, 875-76 (8th Cir. 2014)
(“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”) (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296,
300 (1998) (internal quotations omitted)).
Finally, plaintiff’s arguments regarding violations of the Equal Protection Clause are
frivolous. Plaintiff states that federal inmates confined to the St. Charles County Department of
Corrections are not responsible to the jail for fees. He claims he is “similarly situated” to these
federal prisoners, and seeks the benefit of not having to pay fees. The Court notes for plaintiff
that federal inmates are confined under the laws of the United States of America, and not
Missouri state law, and therefore Missouri Revised Statute § 221.070 is inapplicable to these
inmates. Because these inmates are being held subject to different legal authority, they are not
similarly situated to plaintiff for purposes of applying Missouri’s statutes.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED. [ECF No. 2]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his
prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

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An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 12th day of June, 2018.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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