Williams v. Chase Mortage, Inc.

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to file a first amended petition (ECF No. 18) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s motion to dismiss plaintiffs petition (ECF No. 9) for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 6) is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on June 18, 2018. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RONALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHASE MORTGAGE, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:18 CV 66 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ronald Williams brings this lawsuit against defendant JPMorgan
Chase Bank,1 claiming that Chase services his mortgage loan and misapplied
certain of plaintiff’s loan payments to plaintiff’s account. Chase has moved to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. Plaintiff did not respond to Chase’s motion or to my orders requiring him to
show cause why I should not dismiss his petition. Instead, plaintiff has filed a first
amended petition with the Court. Because plaintiff’s amendment would be futile, I
will deny him leave to amend. Furthermore, as plaintiff has not responded to
Chase’s motion to dismiss and has ignored my orders to show cause, I will grant
the motion to dismiss.
Background
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Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. was incorrectly named as Chase Mortgage, Inc. in the
petition.
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On January 12, 2018, plaintiff filed his petition and motion for temporary
restraining order in the Circuit Court of the City of Saint Louis, Missouri.
Defendant Chase removed the action on January 16, 2018, to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. In Count I of plaintiff’s petition, he seeks a temporary restraining
order enjoining the foreclosure sale. In Count II, plaintiff requests a declaratory
judgment that Chase’s records are incorrect and to set new values for the amounts
owed on plaintiff’s loan.
On February 2, 2018, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s petition
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-4.01, plaintiff was to file a response to
Chase’s motion to dismiss by February 9, 2018. After plaintiff failed to respond,
the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause in writing by March 30, 2018, why his
claims should not be dismissed. Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s order by
this deadline.
On April 9, 2018, the Court again ordered plaintiff to show cause by April
16, 2018, why this case should not be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons
stated in Chase’s motion to dismiss. On April 16, 2018, plaintiff did not respond
to the order to show cause, but, instead filed a first amended petition with the

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Court. To date, plaintiff has failed to show cause why his claims should not be
dismissed with prejudice.
Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), plaintiff was
permitted to amend his pleading as a matter of course 21 days after service of
defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Plaintiff, however, filed his
motion to amend 73 days after defendant filed its motion to dismiss. Accordingly,
plaintiff may only amend his petition with the Court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2).
A decision whether to allow a party to amend his complaint is left to the
sound discretion of the district court. Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488,
497 (8th Cir. 2008). While a district court “should freely give leave to a party to
amend its pleadings when justice so requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)[,]…it may
properly deny a party’s motion to amend its complaint when such amendment
would unduly prejudice the non-moving party or would be futile.” Id. “[W]hen the
court denies leave on the basis of futility, it means the district court has reached the
legal conclusion that the amended complaint could not withstand a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[.]” Hintz v.

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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 686 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In plaintiff’s first amended petition, he claims Chase’s negligent
mishandling and misapplication of his funds was a proximate cause of his
damages. He does not, however, ask for any specific relief. It is unclear exactly
what claim he is attempting to assert or how his allegations support a cause of
action. Moreover, plaintiff cites to no authority whatsoever to establish that his
new claim under Count I is legally sufficient. As such, I find permitting
amendment would be futile as the first amended petition fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the
proposed amendment.
B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
In its motion to dismiss, Chase argues that both counts in plaintiff’s petition
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In Count I, plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining
Chase from taking steps to arrange for a non-judicial foreclosure sale on January
17, 2018, relating to plaintiff’s property.2 Count II seeks a declaratory judgment

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When the case was removed to this Court, a motion for a temporary restraining order was
pending, but when contacted by the Clerk of Court to determine if an immediate hearing was
needed, plaintiff’s counsel informed the Clerk that he would withdraw the motion or file a
memorandum explaining what he is seeking. Because counsel did not do either of these things, I
ordered plaintiff to explain what he was seeking in the motion, or file a motion to withdraw it by
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that Chase’s records are incorrect and a recalculation of the amount owed on
plaintiff’s loan.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief “that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The factual allegations must be
sufficient to “‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Parkhurst v.
Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). More than labels and conclusions are required. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555.
Here, Chase correctly argues that plaintiff’s request for a temporary
restraining order to prevent a foreclosure sale on January 17, 2018 is now moot
because that date has passed and injunctive relief is unnecessary. Moreover, I note
that plaintiff did not reassert his request for a TRO in his proposed first amended
petition and refers to the TRO as “incorrectly presented” and a
“miscommunication.”
Likewise, Chase argues, and I agree, that Count II fails to state a claim.
Plaintiff does not allege the elements of any substantive claim, and he fails to
allege any basis for declaratory relief. To allege for entitlement to declaratory
relief under Missouri law, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a justiciable controversy
April 16, 2018. Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s order and instead filed his first
amended petition.
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that presents a real, substantial, presently-existing dispute as to which specific
relief is sought; (2) a legally protectable interest; (3) a controversy ripe for judicial
determination; and (4) an inadequate legal remedy. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs v. City of Lee’s Summit, 277 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Mo. App. 2008). Plaintiff
fails to address any of these elements or cite to any legal authority, and, therefore,
does not state a claim for declaratory relief that is plausible on its face.
As noted above, plaintiff failed to timely oppose Chase’s motion to dismiss
and did not comply with my orders to show cause. Pursuant to both of the orders
to show cause, plaintiff was explicitly warned that “if he fails to comply with this
order, plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons stated
in defendant’s motion to dismiss.” (ECF No. 17). Based upon the insufficiency of
the petition and plaintiff’s disregard for this Court’s deadlines and orders, I will
dismiss plaintiff’s petition with prejudice for the reasons stated by Chase in its
motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first
amended petition (ECF No. 18) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A.’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition (ECF No. 9) for failure to state a claim
is GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order (ECF No. 6) is DENIED.

_______________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 18th day of June, 2018.

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