Sansoucie v. Griffith

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (See Full Order) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Petitioner Theodore Sansoucie's Petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody 1 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioners Petition shall be DISMISSED, with prejudice. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on 2/1/19. (EAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
THEODORE SANSOUCIE,
Petitioner,
vs.
CINDY GRIFFITH,
Respondent(s).

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Case No. 4:18CV00122 ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Theodore Sansoucie’s under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody [1].
I.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner Theodore Sansoucie (“Petitioner”) pled guilty to first-degree assault on January

9, 2013. On March 19, 2013, the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Missouri sentenced
Petitioner to eighteen years imprisonment. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct the judgment or sentence pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, which was
denied by the Circuit Court. Petitioner now seeks relief in federal court.
II.

STANDARD
“A state prisoner who believes that he is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2005). In order for a federal
court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody by order
of a state court, the petitioner must show that the state court decision:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
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Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed
to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. at § 2254(e)(1).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if
the state court either ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme
Court] cases’ or ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.’” Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000)).
An unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent is found where the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle
to the facts of the case. Ryan v. Clark, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). Finally, a state court
decision may be considered an unreasonable determination of the facts “only if it is shown that
the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
Petitioner asserts one claim in his motion for relief. He alleges his counsel was

ineffective because he had a lack of knowledge of accomplice liability and informed Petitioner it
was impossible for Petitioner to be convicted of a lesser charge, which was not true. The Court
will not reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim because his petition is untimely.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides a oneyear statute of limitations for writs of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which begins
running on the date judgment becomes final. Williams v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 982 (8th Cir.
2002). The AEDPA’s one-year limitation period is tolled, however, while “a properly filed
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application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2).
Petitioner was sentenced on March 19, 2013. His sentence became final on March 29,
2013.1 Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief was filed on May 16, 2013. From March 29,
2013, to May 16, 2013, a period of 48 days, the limitations period for filing for federal habeas
relief was not tolled. See Bear v. Fayram, 650 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
limitations period is not tolled prior to the filing of the state application for relief). The
limitations period was tolled from May 16, 2013, the date he filed his motion for post-conviction
relief, to February 2, 2017, the date the appellate court issued its mandate denying his motion.
Petitioner filed the current petition on January 24, 2018. Three hundred fifty-six days passed
between February 2, 2017, and January 24, 2018. In addition to the 48 days which passed from
the time his sentence became final until he filed his state PCR motion, a total of 404 days have
elapsed; this surpasses the one-year statute of limitations set in AEDPA. Therefore, Petitioner’s
Petition to Vacate is untimely and must be dismissed, unless Petitioner can establish he is
entitled to equitable tolling.
Equitable tolling affords an otherwise time-barred petitioner an “exceedingly narrow
window of relief.” Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2001). In Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
the Supreme Court held equitable tolling may apply to petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
544 U.S. 408, 411-12, 418 (2005). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of
establishing: (1) he has pursued his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way. Id. at 418. Guided by Pace, the Eighth Circuit requires the circumstances to be
“external to the plaintiff and not attributable to his actions.” Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974,

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A defendant has ten days after his sentence to file an appeal. If he does not file an appeal, his conviction becomes
final on the tenth day.

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977 (8th Cir. 2002). The circumstances must also “rise above a ‘garden variety claim of
excusable neglect.’” Martin v. Fayram, 849 F.3d 691, 698 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Petitioner has provided no evidence to support additional tolling. Thus, the Court must dismiss
Petitioner’s Petition to Vacate.
IV.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The Court finds Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right, as required before a certificate of appealability can issue. See Cox v. Norris,
133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a “substantial showing” is a showing the
“issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the
issues deserve further proceedings”). Therefore, the Court shall not issue a certificate of
appealability as to any claims raised in Petitioner’s § 2254 Motion.
Accordingly
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Petitioner Theodore
Sansoucie’s Petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State
Custody [1] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition shall be DISMISSED, with
prejudice.
So Ordered this 1st day of February, 2019.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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