Barnes v. City of St. Louis et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs "supplemental" filing [Doc. # 7 ] shall be considered to be plaintiffs second amended complaint. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/30/2018. (NEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DISTRICT

WILLIE BARNES,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 4:18-CV-292 AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon review of plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
[Doc. #7]. After reviewing the second amended complaint, the Court will dismiss this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A
pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,” nor will a complaint suffice if it tenders bare assertions devoid of “further
factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
When conducting initial review pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the Court must accept as true
the allegations in the complaint, and must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the tenet that a court must accept the
allegations as true does not apply to legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and affording a
pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in
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ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Even pro se complaints are
required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15
(8th Cir. 2004) (federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because
an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”).
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action to redress violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff names the City
of St. Louis, Correctional Officers Unknown Washington, Unknown Sanders and Lieutenant
Gennaro as defendants in this action. Plaintiff brings this action against defendants in their
individual and official capacities, and he seeks monetary damages in his second amended
complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration in the St. Louis City Justice Center, he was
having chest pain, high blood pressure, migraine headaches and dizziness. He asserts that he
reported his symptoms to Correctional Officers Washington and Sanders, as well as to
Lieutenant Gennaro, and he asked the officers to “call medical.” Plaintiff claims that at the time
he asked, the officers “refused him” and denied him medical treatment. Plaintiff does
acknowledge that approximately five hours after he asked to see medical, he was seen by an
unnamed doctor, but he claims “nothing” was done afterwards. Plaintiff has not named the
doctor as a defendant in this lawsuit.
Plaintiff also attributes some of his symptoms to a “bug bite” and having bitten down on
a rock while eating pasta at the jail, thus, suffering a “toothache.”

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Plaintiff not only claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but he also claims that he was discriminated
against by defendants in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101, et seq. Plaintiff has not alleged how he was discriminated against, nor has he alleged his
purported disability.
Discussion
To state a claim against the City of St. Louis, a plaintiff must allege that a policy or
custom of the City is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The instant complaint does not contain any
allegations that a policy or custom of the City of St. Louis was responsible for the alleged
violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, he has failed to state a claim for relief against
the City of St. Louis
Additionally, plaintiff has not properly alleged a disability discrimination claim in this
lawsuit, or a violation of the ADA. Plaintiff has not alleged exactly what his purported disability
is or how exactly defendants discriminated against him in violation of his disability. Although
Title II of the ADA applies to inmates in state prisons, there are three things a plaintiff must
plead in order to state a claim for disability discrimination. See Pennsylvania Dep=t of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-11 (1998). “To state a prima facie claim under [Title II
of] the ADA, a plaintiff must show: 1) he is a person with a disability as defined by statute; 2) he
is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and 3) he was excluded from the benefit due to
discrimination based upon disability.” Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999);
see 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Plaintiff has failed to plead any of the aforementioned. Accordingly, his
claim for disability discrimination is subject to dismissal

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Plaintiff has also failed to allege a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs,
or a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although he states in a conclusory manner that
Lieutenant Gennaro and the other Correctional Officers at the Justice Center failed to
immediately grant his requests for medical care, he acknowledges that within five hours of his
request, he saw a doctor about his symptoms.
“To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs, an inmate must prove that he suffered from one or more objectively serious medical
needs, and that prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.”
Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999).

For a claim of deliberate

indifference, “the prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence,
and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.” Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995). “A serious medical
need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so
obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Cambreros v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff has admitted he saw a doctor within five hours of his medical complaints.
Presumably, plaintiff disagreed with the outcome of his doctor visit, as he states that “nothing”
was done to assist his medical needs.
Although plaintiff may have disagreed with the doctor’s diagnosis in his case, mere
disagreement with the doctor’s decision to treat or not to treat his dizziness and/or high blood
pressure at the time plaintiff was purportedly having symptoms is not enough to rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation. Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.
1995). Given that plaintiff saw a doctor within five hours of his medical complaints, the Court

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cannot state that he was not provided with medical treatment in this instance. As such, he has not
stated a constitutional violation in this instance.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s “supplemental” filing [Doc. #7] shall be
considered to be plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 30th day of April, 2018.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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