Belle-Bey v. AFL-CIO Local 420 Teachers Union et al
Filing
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OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. No. 6] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Petition is dismissed. 6 Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 10/18/18. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SHERIA N. BELLE-BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
AFL-CIO LOCAL 420 TEACHERS UNION
and MARY ARMSTRONG, d/b/a AFL-CIO
LOCAL 420 TEACHERS UNION,
Defendant,
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) Case No. 4:18CV369 HEA
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OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. No.
6]. Plaintiff filed a response in which she sought remand, however, Plaintiff has
subsequently asked to “rescind” the requested remand. Plaintiff has failed to
specifically address the basis for dismissal presented by Defendant. For the reasons
set forth below, the Motion will be granted.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff originally filed her Petition, pro se, in the Circuit Court of the City
of St. Louis. Defendant removed the case to this Court on March 6, 2018 under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 since Plaintiff’s Petition alleges violations of a variety of federal
constitutional violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims based on international law.
Defendant now moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Factual Background
Defendant has set forth the factual backdrop to Plaintiff’s Petition through
documents filed with the Missouri commission on Human Rights and the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis. When considering whether a complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must generally ignore
materials outside the pleadings, but may consider some materials that are part of
the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are
necessarily embraced by the pleadings. See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab.,
Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted).
These filings are part of the public record and do not contradict the Petition, and
therefore it is proper for them to be set out herein.
Plaintiff was a tenured teacher with the St. Louis Public School system
(“SLPS”) in 2015. On May 8, 2015, the SLPS issued a Statement of Charges and
Notice of Hearing (“SOC”) seeking plaintiff’s termination. The SOC alleged that
plaintiff displayed a number of performance problems which led her principal to
seek a meeting with her. The SOC further alleged that plaintiff failed to initially
appear for the meeting, and that when she was located and compelled to attend she
behaved in a bizarre manner by, inter alia, eating yogurt out of a container with her
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fingers and refusing to sign documents. The SOC claimed that at subsequently
scheduled meetings plaintiff either failed to appear or again behaved
unprofessionally (by engaging in personal text messaging, refusing to sign
documents, and leaving abruptly).
On June 10, 2015, a hearing was held on the charges raised in the SOC. The
hearing was conducted before a hearing officer appointed by the Special
Administration Board of the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis
(“SAB”) at which plaintiff was represented by attorney George Suggs, who at that
time was AFT Local 420’s legal counsel. Following the hearing, the SAB upheld
the SOC against plaintiff and discharged plaintiff from her employment with
SLPS.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri
Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) against AFT Local 420. Attorney Suggs
submitted a position statement to the MCHR. On November 22, 2016, the MCHR
issued a right-to-sue notice.
On February 22, 2017, plaintiff filed a petition against AFT Local 420 in the
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, alleging unlawful discrimination. Attorney
Suggs filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action was not filed within
ninety (90) days of the MCHR’s issuance of the right-to-sue notice, as required by
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Mo.Rev.Stat. §213.111.1. The case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice
due to plaintiff’s failure to appear.
Plaintiff’s Petition, though not a model of clarity, alleges that she was
discharged from her employment erroneously, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, 42
U.S.C. §1983, and the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1836 A.D. Between
Morocco and the United States.”
Legal Standards
In examining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court accepts all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes those
allegations in Plaintiff’s favor. Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 2017).
To survive such a motion, Plaintiff’s complaint “must include sufficient factual
allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests.” Drobnak v. Andersen
Corp., 561 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2009). Put simply, Plaintiff’s claim for relief
must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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Discussion
The Court agrees that the Petition fails to set forth facts adequate to establish
subject matter jurisdiction or sufficient to state a claim. In addition, Plaintiff’s
argument in favor of treating the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment fails since the CBA is at the heart of the matter and is “necessarily
embraced” by the Petition.
The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument that the Petition must be
dismissed. Title 18 of the United States Code is a criminal statute which provides
no private cause of action.
The Fifth Amendment provides for due process between the federal
government and individual citizens. The federal government is not a party to this
action, and therefore, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated in this action.
Likewise, the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from
unreasonable search and seizure, has no application to these defendants.
Section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 excludes
state governments and their political subdivisions, i.e., the SLPS, from coverage
under the NLRA. The NLRA is a statute which governs private sector employees
and labor unions.
Section 1983 of Title 42 United States Code mandates that a constitutional
right must be violated in order for a private citizen to bring an action against one
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acting under color of state law, i.e., a state actor. There are absolutely no
allegations that the defendants herein are state actors.
Plaintiff fails to make any allegations that the “Treaty of Peace and
Friendship of 1836 A.D. Between Morocco and the United States” provides her
with a right to bring any action against defendants.
Defendant AFT Local 420 is correct in arguing that Plaintiff’s claim that a
public employer must bargain in good faith pursuant to Article I, Section 29 of the
Missouri Constitution is misplaced. The collective bargaining obligation is
between the public employer and the union chosen by the employees as their
bargaining representative (in this case, AFT Local 420). Article I, Section 29of the
Missouri Constitution “requires the [school] board to meet and confer with the
union, in good faith.” American Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d
360 (Mo. banc 2012). The Local has made no such claim regarding Plaintiff’s
discharge.
The allegations against Mary Armstrong are minor; Plaintiff states that
Defendant Armstrong is/was the President of Plaintiff’s Local and that Plaintiff
lost the election for that office to Defendant Armstrong. These allegations are
insufficient to raise a plausible claim for relief.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff’s Petition fails to state a cause
of action and must be dismissed.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, [Doc.
No. 6] is GRANTED .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Petition is dismissed.
Dated this 18th day of October, 2018.
___________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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