The General, LLC v. Ryder System, Inc.

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Dismissal Order and Motion for Leave to Amend 19 is DENIED.. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 11/2/2018. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

THE GENERAL, LLC,

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Plaintiff,
v.
RYDER SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendant.

No. 4:18-CV-00442 JAR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal Order and
Motion for Leave to Amend. (Doc. No. 19) Defendant opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 21)
Background
The background of this case is set out in the Court’s October 15, 2018 Order. (Doc. No.
17) The case arose out of a dispute related to the condition and repair of a pre-owned,
commercial shipping truck purchased by Plaintiff from Ryder Vehicle Sales (“RVS”), a whollyowned subsidiary of Defendant Ryder System Inc. (“Ryder”) in 2013. Plaintiff alleged that RVS
misrepresented that the truck was of “road ready quality” and that Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.
(“RTR”), another Ryder subsidiary, failed to disclose, inter alia, the truck’s accident history. On
August 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed an action in St. Charles County Circuit Court against RVS and
RTR seeking damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent omission, and breach of
warranty. Plaintiff dismissed the case without prejudice 25 days prior to trial, on December 14,
2017 because “it became apparent that [Plaintiff’s expert] was not competent to provide coherent
testimony.” (Doc. No. 19 at ¶ 3)

On January 30, 2018, Plaintiff refiled its action in St. Charles County Circuit Court
against Ryder only, and alleged that RVS and RTR were acting as agents of Ryder at all relevant
times. Ryder removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and then
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Specifically, Ryder argued that the Court
lacked personal jurisdiction over it because it was not a party to the sales transaction and had no
contacts with Missouri regarding the sale or warranting of the truck at issue. Ryder further
argued that RVS and RTR are separate and distinct legal entities over which it “exercises no
control . . . with regard to day to day business operations” such that it could be considered their
alter ego for purposes of the transaction at issue. The Court agreed, and on October 15, 2018,
dismissed Ryder for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff urges the Court to vacate its order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) so that
it may amend its complaint to reinstate RVS and RTR as defendants, “which is how the case was
plead [sic] in the initial St. Charles County lawsuit.” (Doc. No. 19 at ¶ 5) Plaintiff asserts that
RVS and RTR routinely do business in Missouri and have offices in Missouri so “there should be
no issue with respect to the Court’s personal jurisdiction over these defendants” (id. at ¶ 6), and
that the parties will save time and expense should Plaintiff be allowed to proceed with its claims
against RVS and RTR (id. at ¶ 7).
Discussion
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the Court may relieve a party from an
order when the party demonstrates “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). “Relief is available under Rule 60(b)(6) only where
exceptional circumstances have denied the moving party a full and fair opportunity to litigate
[its] claim and have prevented the moving party from receiving adequate redress.” Harley v.

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Zoesch, 413 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Atkinson v. Prudential Property Co., Inc., 43
F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Richards v. Aramark Services, Inc., 108 F.3d 925, 927
(8th Cir. 1997). Rule 60(b) motions are viewed with disfavor and are addressed to the Court’s
discretion. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509, 515 (8th Cir. 1984). Rule
60(b) “is not a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits.” Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987,
990 (8th Cir. 1999).
In this case, Plaintiff has not provided any indication that this is a case of extraordinary
circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to
litigate its claim and offers no explanation for why it chose to refile against Ryder rather than the
subsidiaries it previously sued. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is not justified when the judgment was
based on the movant’s litigation choice. 12 Moore’s Federal Practice, §60.48[3][c] (Matthew
Bender 3d ed.); Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F. 2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Rule 60(b)(6) “should be only sparingly used” and may not “be employed simply to rescue a
litigant from strategic choices that later turn out to be improvident”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal Order and
Motion for Leave to Amend [19] is DENIED.

Dated this 2nd day of November, 2018.

JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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