Clark v. Berryhill
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Noelle C. Collins on 08/21/2019. (KCB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
GINA CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:18-CV-00512-NCC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner denying the application of Gina Clark (“Plaintiff”) for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.
and for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401, et seq. Plaintiff has filed a brief in support of the Complaint (Doc. 21), and Defendant
has filed a brief in support of the Answer (Doc. 28). The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) (Doc. 9).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her applications for SSI and DIB on February 2, 2015, and February 11,
2015, respectively (Tr. 176-87). Plaintiff was initially denied on October 19, 2015, and she filed
a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on December 15, 2015 (Tr.
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Andrew M. Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul shall be substituted for Acting Commissioner
Nancy A. Berryhill as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to continue
this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
99-102, 105-06). After a hearing, by decision dated April 28, 2017, the ALJ found Plaintiff not
disabled (Tr. 13-33). On February 6, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review (Tr. 1-6). As such, the ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
II. DECISION OF THE ALJ
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2019, and that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since December 10, 2014, the alleged onset date (Tr. 18). The ALJ found
Plaintiff has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar
spine, obesity, affective disorder, anxiety disorder and a personality disorder, but that no
impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 18-19).
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work2 with the following limitations (Tr. 20). She
can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop and crouch (Id.). She should never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds (Id.). She should never be required to kneel or crawl (Id.). She can
only use her left, non-dominant hand for overhead reaching on a frequent basis and she can
tolerate only occasional exposure to vibration (Id.). She is capable of frequent handling, but only
occasional fingering with her left upper extremity (Id.). She should have no exposure to hazards
such as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery (Id.). She is capable of performing
“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying
of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in
this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting
most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable
of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all
of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or
inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.967(b), 404.1567.
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simple, routine tasks in an environment where contact with supervisors, co-workers and the
general public is occasional (Id.). The ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant
work but that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform, including garment sorter, shipping weigher, and inserting machine
operator (Tr. 26-27). Thus, the ALJ concluded that a finding of “not disabled” was appropriate
(Tr. 27). Plaintiff appeals, arguing a lack of substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
decision.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step process for
determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1529. “If a claimant fails
to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is
determined to be not disabled.” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the
claimant first cannot be engaged in “substantial gainful activity” to qualify for disability benefits.
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines “severe impairment” as
“any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant’s] physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities. . . .” Id. “‘The sequential evaluation process may
be terminated at step two only when the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments
would have no more than a minimal impact on [his or] her ability to work.’” Page v. Astrue, 484
F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir.
2001), citing Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996)).
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Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment which meets or
equals one of the impairments listed in the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d).
If the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of, these impairments, then the claimant is
per se disabled without consideration of the claimant’s age, education, or work history. Id.
Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(f), 404.1520(f). The burden rests with the claimant at this fourth step to
establish his or her RFC. Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 874 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Through step
four of this analysis, the claimant has the burden of showing that she is disabled.”). The ALJ
will review a claimant’s RFC and the physical and mental demands of the work the claimant has
done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Fifth, the severe impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any other work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 404.1520(g). At this fifth step of the sequential analysis, the
Commissioner has the burden of production to show evidence of other jobs in the national
economy that can be performed by a person with the claimant’s RFC. Steed, 524 F.3d at 874
n.3. If the claimant meets these standards, the ALJ will find the claimant to be disabled. “The
ultimate burden of persuasion to prove disability, however, remains with the claimant.” Young v.
Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931
n.2 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 51153, 51155 (Aug. 26, 2003)); Stormo v. Barnhart, 377
F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The burden of persuasion to prove disability and to demonstrate
RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at
step five.”). Even if a court finds that there is a preponderance of the evidence against the ALJ’s
decision, the decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v.
Heckler, 733 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but
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is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s
conclusion.” Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). See also Cox v.
Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007).
It is not the job of the district court to re-weigh the evidence or review the factual record
de novo. Id. Instead, the district court must simply determine whether the quantity and quality
of evidence is enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the ALJ’s
conclusion. Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing McKinney v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). Weighing the evidence is a function of the ALJ, who is the factfinder. Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus, an administrative
decision which is supported by substantial evidence is not subject to reversal merely because
substantial evidence may also support an opposite conclusion or because the reviewing court
would have decided differently. Krogmeier, 294 F.3d at 1022.
IV. DISCUSSION
In her appeal of the Commissioner’s decision, Plaintiff raises two issues. First, Plaintiff
asserts that the RFC assessment is conclusory and does not contain any rationale or reference to
the supporting evidence as required by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P, 1996 WL 362207
(July 2, 1996) (Doc. 21 at 3-6).3 Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not discussing or
finding Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome to be a severe impairment (Id. at 6-7). For the
following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit, and that the
ALJ’s decision is based on substantial evidence and is consistent with the Regulations and case
law.
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Plaintiff does not raise any issues regarding her mental health impairments. Therefore, the
Court will only address Plaintiff’s arguments as they relate to her physical impairments.
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A. Severe Impairment
The Court will first address Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ erred by not discussing or
finding Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome to be a severe impairment (Doc. 21 at 6-7). At Step 2,
the Commissioner must determine whether a claimant has a severe impairment. “An impairment
or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. While a claimant
has the burden of showing a severe impairment that severely limits her physical or mental ability
to perform basic work activities, the burden “is not great” and “[t]he sequential evaluation
process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on [his] ability to work.” Caviness, 250
F.3d at 605. Basic work activities are those “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b).
The Court finds the ALJ’s determination regarding Plaintiff’s severe impairments to be
supported by substantial evidence. First, Plaintiff did not list carpal tunnel syndrome as an
impairment on her application (Tr. 178). See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir.
2001) (observing that a failure to allege depression in an application for benefits is significant,
even if the evidence of depression was later developed). Second, the record does not establish
that Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome constitutes “more than a minimal impact on her ability to
do work.” Caviness, 250 F.3d at 605. Although Plaintiff was diagnosed with the condition and
exhibited some tenderness and diminished range of motion in her wrists, she was also noted as
having normal sensation and strength in her wrists (Tr. 344, 348, 353, 430, 497, 759, 506, 509).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome
when determining her RFC. Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008). See also
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Brockman v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-CV-00032 JAR, 2017 WL 4339502, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29,
2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2) (“If you have more than one impairment. We
will consider all of your medically determinable impairments of which we are aware, including
your medically determinable impairments that are not ‘severe,’ as explained in §§ 404.1520(c),
404.1521, and 404.1523, when we assess your residual functional capacity.”). Specifically, the
ALJ limited Plaintiff’s use of her left, non-dominant hand to overhead reaching on a frequent
basis4 and only occasional fingering with her left upper extremity (Tr. 20). In so limiting
Plaintiff, the ALJ noted that objective testing support carpal tunnel syndrome on her left side (Tr.
23). Therefore, to the extent the ALJ erred by not finding Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome to
be a severe impairment, such error was harmless in light of the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s
carpal tunnel syndrome in her RFC analysis. Givans v. Astrue, No. 4:10-CV417-CDP, 2012 WL
1060123, at *17 (E.D. Mo. March 29, 2012) (holding that even if the ALJ erred in failing to find
one of the plaintiff's impairments to be severe, the error was harmless because the ALJ found
other severe impairments and considered both those impairments and the plaintiff's non-severe
impairments when determining Plaintiff’s RFC). See also Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917 (8th
Cir. 2012) (noting that an error is harmless unless the ALJ would have decided the case
differently). In conclusion, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination regarding Plaintiff’s severe
impairments to be based on substantial evidence and consistent with Regulations and case law.
B. RFC
Regulations define RFC as “what [the claimant] can do” despite his “physical or mental
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). “When determining whether a claimant can engage in
substantial employment, an ALJ must consider the combination of the claimant’s mental and
“Frequent” basis means the activity or condition occurs from one-third to two-thirds of an 8hour workday. SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, *6 (Jan. 1, 1983). See also SSA Program
Operations Manual System, DI 25001.001.
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physical impairments.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ must
assess a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant, credible evidence in the record, ‘including the
medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own
description of his limitations.’” Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
McKinney, 228 F.3d at 863). See also Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 526 (8th Cir. 2013). To
determine a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must move, analytically, from ascertaining the true extent
of the claimant’s impairments to determining the kind of work the claimant can still do despite
his or her impairments. Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d. 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995). “Although it is
the ALJ’s responsibility to determine the claimant’s RFC, the burden is on the claimant to
establish his or her RFC.” Buford v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citations
omitted).
A “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer, 245 F.3d at 704
(quoting Singh, 222 F.3d at 451). The Eighth Circuit clarified in Lauer that “[s]ome medical
evidence . . . must support the determination of the claimant’s RFC, and the ALJ should obtain
medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace[.]” 245 F.3d
at 704 (quoting Dykes v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) and Nevland v.
Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2000)). Thus, an ALJ is “required to consider at least some
supporting evidence from a professional.” Id. See also Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1016
(8th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ bears the primary responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC and
because RFC is a medical question, some medical evidence must support the determination of
the claimant’s RFC.”); Eichelberger, 390 F.3d at 591.
As previously discussed, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work with
the following exertional limitations (Tr. 20). She can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
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stoop and crouch (Id.). She should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds (Id.). She should
never be required to kneel or crawl (Id.). She can only use her left, non-dominant hand for
overhead reaching on a frequent basis and she can tolerate only occasional exposure to vibration
(Id.). She is capable of frequent handling, but only occasional fingering with her left upper
extremity (Id.). She should have no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and
dangerous machinery (Id.).
The Court will first address the consistency of Plaintiff’s complaints with the record as
the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptoms was essential to the determination of other issues,
including Plaintiff’s RFC.5 See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[The
plaintiff] fails to recognize that the ALJ’s determination regarding her RFC was influenced by
his determination that her allegations were not credible.”) (citing Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d
953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005)). In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must consider: (1) the
claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of pain; (3) the precipitating
and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5) any
functional restrictions; (6) the claimant’s work history; and (7) the absence of objective medical
evidence to support the claimant’s complaints. Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir.
2008); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). “The credibility of a claimant’s
subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts.” Pearsall v. Massanari,
274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir. 2001). “If an ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant’s testimony
and gives good reason for doing so, [a court] will normally defer to the ALJ’s credibility
determination.” Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Halverson v.
Social Security Ruling 16-3p eliminated the term “credibility” from the analysis of subjective
complaints. However, the regulations remain unchanged; “Our regulations on evaluating
symptoms are unchanged.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529, 416.929.
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Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2010); Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006).
For the following reasons, the Court finds that the reasons offered by the ALJ in support of her
analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are based on substantial evidence.
First, the ALJ reviewed the objective medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s physical
impairments and found that the objective findings do not support the severity of the Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints (Tr. 21). In doing so, the ALJ conducted a thorough review of the medical
evidence encompassing nearly three full pages of her decision (Tr. 22-24). In her review, the
ALJ identified diagnostic testing that was “essentially normal” with no signs of significant root
encroachment, stenosis, or herniation (Tr. 23, 599). The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s clinical
findings to be largely normal (Tr. 22-23). For example, as the ALJ noted, an MRI of Plaintiff’s
lumbar spine in July 2014, shortly after Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling accident, revealed some
disc desiccation but upon examination she was found not to have any significant nerve
compression and was advised to engage in a home exercise program (Tr. 663-65). Subsequent
clinical exams indicate normal range of motion in Plaintiff’s neck, normal range of motion along
entire spine, normal gait, muscle strength of 5/5 in all muscle groups, and full range of motion in
arms and legs (Tr. 425, 428, 432, 440, 446, 475, 517, 628, 642, 779). The ALJ further found
Plaintiff’s emergency room visits to be unremarkable, noting that Plaintiff is often belligerent
when dealing with staff (Tr. 22). Indeed, as indicated by the ALJ, in March and April 2015 visits
to the emergency room, Plaintiff was uncooperative and belligerent, respectively, and relevant
measures were largely normal; she had full range of motion in her neck and extremities (Tr. 22,
475). An ALJ may properly consider the consistency of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints with
the objective medical evidence. Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2017). To the
extent the Plaintiff identifies records that support Plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary, “[i]f
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substantial evidence supports the decision, then we may not reverse, even if inconsistent
conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, and even if we may have reached a different
outcome.” McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).
Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not always comply with suggested treatment (Tr. 23).
For example, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff denied a diagnostic injection to pinpoint the precise
etiology of her left arm symptoms in July 2015 (Tr. 23, 632). A “failure to follow [a]
recommended course of treatment [ ] weighs against a claimant’s credibility.” Guilliams, 393
F.3d at 802 (citing Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2001)). See also Wildman, 596
F.3d at 968-69 (it is permissible for ALJ to consider claimant’s non-compliance with prescribed
medical treatment).
Third, while the ALJ did not explicitly address Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, it is
clear from the opinion that the ALJ found Plaintiff’s performance of certain tasks to be
inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reports regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her
symptoms (Tr. 19-20, 22-23). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff stated in her July 2015 Function
Report that she was able to cook, wash laundry and care for pets (Tr. 20, 260-61). Plaintiff also
indicated that she was able to change the sheets on her bed, mop and vacuum (Tr. 261). Indeed,
in her report, Plaintiff indicated that she gets out daily and walks or rides in a car and goes to the
store to shop, when necessary to get the food they need, for approximately an hour (Tr. 262).
The ALJ also found treatment notes to indicate the Plaintiff was more capable than her
testimony suggested. For example, the ALJ indicated that treatment notes dated August 2015
state that Plaintiff injured her foot while cleaning the bottom of a pool (Tr. 615) and, while
Plaintiff testified that it was her sister that was cleaning the pool, the ALJ found that assertion to
be “questionable” (Tr. 23, 51). The ALJ further found records indicating that Plaintiff was
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diagnosed with poison ivy to be inconsistent with her complaints as it evidenced that Plaintiff
was engaging in outdoor activities (Tr. 23). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff reported falling
three to five feet into dirt after being knocked over by a horse and that Plaintiff’s “proximity to
horses is not indicative of the level of debilitation the [Plaintiff] alleges” (Tr. 24, 781). See
Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114, 1121 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that “[t]he inconsistency
between [the claimant’s] subjective complaints and evidence regarding her activities of daily
living also raised legitimate concerns about her credibility.”).
Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff to have offered conflicting information throughout the
record (Tr. 22). For example, the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff describes the patient she was
assisting when she was injured as weighing 400 pounds, while at other times she states that he
weighed 350 pounds (Tr. 22, 409, 463, 487, 514, 632). See Julin, 826 F.3d at 1087
(“Contradictory statements that [the plaintiff] made to treating physicians are yet another reason
to discount her credibility.”).
Fifth, the ALJ noted that the independent medical examiner, Dr. Brett A. Taylor, M.D.,
indicated that Plaintiff was engaging in symptom magnification and exaggeration as well as
inappropriate pain behavior (Tr. 23, 588- 598). See Tr. 592 (“She has evidence of non-organic
findings, symptom magnification exaggeration and an inappropriate pain/illness behavior.”).
Indeed, Dr. Taylor noted that “[d]uring her exam[,] when distracted[,] her hand resumed normal
function and her ‘curled hand’ posturing was reversed and she used her hand normal[l]y to sit
onto the exam table” (Tr. 590). See Julin, 826 F.3d at 1087-88 (discussing evidence in the
record “from which the ALJ could infer [the plaintiff’s] claims were overstated or not entirely
reliable”).
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Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations to be inconsistent with her observed
behavior at the hearing (Tr. 22). Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “was able to use her
left arm to grab her purse and to toss an item in to the wastebasket” (Tr. 22). An ALJ may
properly rely on observations she makes of a claimant’s demeanor during a hearing in making
credibility determinations. Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that an
ALJ “is in the best position” to assess credibility because she is able to observe a claimant during
his testimony); Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ’s personal
observations of the claimant’s demeanor during the hearing is completely proper in making
credibility determinations.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ gave good reasons for finding Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the severity of her conditions not fully credible, and that the ALJ’s analysis
was carefully linked to the evidence of record. See Karlix v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 742, 748 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“If an ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and gives a good reason for
doing so, we will normally defer to that judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). As such, the Court further finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of the consistency of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is based on substantial evidence and is consistent with the
Regulations and case law.
Next, the ALJ additionally properly addressed the opinion evidence of record.6
Specifically, the ALJ considered the reports of Dr. Brett A. Taylor, M.D. (“Dr. Taylor”), who
performed two independent medical examinations of Plaintiff, one in April of 2014 and the other
in October of 2015 (Tr. 23, 488-495). Although the ALJ did not assign a specific weight to the
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The ALJ addressed the opinion evidence and other detailed reports as it relates both to
Plaintiff’s mental health impairments as well as her physical impairments. Plaintiff only raises
issues as it relates to her physical impairments, therefore the Court will not address the medical
opinion evidence as it relates to Plaintiff’s mental health impairments.
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opinions of Dr. Taylor, the ALJ conducted a detailed analysis of the examiner’s reports and
highlighted several of Dr. Taylor’s findings. See Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798, 806 (8th Cir.
2008) (an ALJ need not weigh the medical opinions of record unless the opinions are
inconsistent). The ALJ noted that while Plaintiff gave herself a neck disability index of 52 at the
April 2014 examination, indicating a disabling neck condition, this score was based solely on
Plaintiff’s own reports and thus afforded minimal weight (Tr. 23, 489). The ALJ also indicated
that Dr. Taylor noted Plaintiff’s gait was normal and found no evidence of instability (Tr. 23,
490). As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Taylor concluded that Plaintiff’s symptoms were a result of
aggravation of her pre-existing cervical degenerative disc disease and her pre-existing cervical
arthritis (Tr. 23, 492-93). At his second examination of Plaintiff, as indicated by the ALJ and
detailed above, Dr. Taylor noted that the Plaintiff was engaging in “symptom magnification
exaggeration” and inappropriate pain behavior” (Tr. 23; 592).
The ALJ also reviewed the opinion of Dr. David Volarich, D.O. (“Dr. Volarich”), who
performed an independent medical examination of Plaintiff in August of 2015 at the request of
her attorney (Tr. 23, 409-417). Again, although the ALJ did not assign Dr. Volarich’s opinion a
specific weight, the ALJ conducted a thoughtful analysis of the report in light of Dr. Volarich’s
determination to defer on most clinical findings and decision not to give an opinion on Plaintiff’s
functional limitations since Plaintiff had not reached maximum medical improvement (Tr. 23,
416). Regardless, as the ALJ correctly noted, Dr. Volarich found Plaintiff could perform most of
her activities of daily living independently (Tr. 23, 416 (“She is able to perform most acitivites
for self-care.”)).
Additionally, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Veronica Weston, M.D. (“Dr.
Weston”), a consultative examiner (Tr. 23, 443-53). The ALJ afforded the observations and
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objective findings of Dr. Weston “significant weight” because, although Dr. Weston did not offer
an opinion on any specific functional limitations, her clinical findings “illustrate that the
[Plaintiff] does not have any physical impairment severe enough to prevent her from performing
a restricted range of light-duty work activity” (Tr. 24). In doing so, the ALJ detailed Plaintiff’s
self-reports to Dr. Weston as well as Dr. Weston’s findings (Tr. 24). Specifically, the ALJ
highlighted Dr. Weston’s report that Plaintiff showed: mild deficits in her fine and dexterous
finger control; some reduced range of motion in her left shoulder; no clubbing, cyanosis or
edema in her extremities; no muscle atrophy; decreased range of motion in her neck; full range
of motion in her lumbar spine; intact reflexes in all extremities; some reduced pinprick sensation
in her left arm and lower legs; full muscle strength in all extremities other than her left arm;
mildly reduced strength in her left arm; and negative straight leg-raising test (Tr. 24, 446-47).
The ALJ also noted that imaging of both Plaintiff’s cervical and lumbar spine was negative (Tr.
24, 449-50). Although Plaintiff apparently argues that the findings of Dr. Weston are
inconsistent with previous reports, an ALJ may properly review and weigh conflicting evidence,
including opinion evidence. Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2017) (“It is the
function of the Commissioner to weigh conflicting evidence and to resolve disagreements among
physicians.”).
The ALJ also reviewed and properly considered the Third Party Adult Function Report
dated July 17, 2015, submitted by Plaintiff’s sister (Tr. 19, 22, 273-80). Plaintiff’s sister largely
concurred with Plaintiff’s own observations and those observations did not support the level of
limitation as alleged by Plaintiff (Tr. 19). For example, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s sister
indicated that Plaintiff either has no problem or takes longer in her own personal care (Tr. 22,
274). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in her review of the opinion evidence of record.
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In conclusion, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination is consistent with the
relevant evidence of record including the objective medical evidence, the observations of
medical providers, as well as the evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; that the ALJ’s
RFC determination is based on substantial evidence; and that Plaintiff’s arguments to the
contrary are without merit.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that substantial evidence on the record as
a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice.
A separate judgment shall be entered incorporating this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 21st day of August, 2019.
/s/ Noelle C. Collins
NOELLE C. COLLINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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