Martinez v. Cassady

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (See Full Order) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Gerardo Martinez, Jr.'s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1 ) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah on 8/30/21. (EAB)

Case: 4:18-cv-00634-SPM Doc. #: 26 Filed: 08/30/21 Page: 1 of 9 PageID #: 323

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
GERARDO MARTINEZ, JR.

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Petitioner,
v.
JAY CASSADY,
Respondent.

Case No. 4:18-CV-00634-SPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the undersigned on the petition of Missouri state prisoner Gerardo
Martinez, Jr. (“Petitioner”) for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 9). For the following reasons, the petition will be denied.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree statutory

sodomy. Resp’t Ex. B, at 9-23. At the plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT:

And no one’s promised you, said this is exactly what you’re going
to get through your sentence? No one’s promised that; have they?

THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT:

No one can promise you what your sentence would be and I could
impose any sentence within the range of punishment permitted by
law, which these are unclassified.

[PLEA COUNSEL]: It’s five to thirty or life is my understanding, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

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[PLEA COUNSEL]: And I would just want to state for the record the only—This is an
open plea. The only agreement that the State and Mr. Martinez and
I have is that the agreement is that all the counts will run concurrent,
whatever happens.
THE COURT:

Okay.

[PLEA COUNSEL]: That’s the only—that’s the only agreement or cap so to speak on the
agreement.
THE COURT:

And you understand that the full range of punishment would be
available to me from no less to five years up to thirty years or even
life in prison? Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. . . .
THE COURT:

Have you been able to understand all my questions?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Id. at 15-16. Petitioner also testified that he had had enough time to discuss the case with his
counsel and was happy with how she had handled the case. Id. at 10. The court accepted
Petitioner’s guilty pleas. Id. at 12-13. On August 14, a sentencing hearing was held. Id. at 24-47.
On September 15, 2014, the court sentenced Petitioner to three terms of 25 years, to run
concurrently. Id. at 48-49.
In Petitioner’s amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 24.035, filed through counsel, Petitioner alleged (among other claims not relevant to
the instant petition) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in that his plea counsel
unreasonably assured him that if he entered guilty pleas, he would receive three concurrent terms
of five years’ imprisonment. Id. at 63. On December 2, 2016, the motion court held an evidentiary
hearing on the claim. Resp’t Ex. A.
At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified as follows. Id. at 3-40. His plea counsel told
him that if he pleaded guilty, he would get three concurrent five-year sentences. Id. at 8-9. He
relied on his counsel’s assurances, and but for those assurances, he would have rejected the guilty
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plea and proceeded to trial. Id. at 9. When asked about his answers to the judge’s questions
suggesting that he understood that the possible sentence could be longer, Petitioner testified that
his attorney had told him that all he needed to say was “yes, sir” and that she had the deal worked
out for him. Id. at 20, 24. 32. He did not actually understand what the judge was saying. Id. at 38.
Petitioner’s plea counsel also testified at the evidentiary hearing, as follows. Id. at 40-52.
She told Petitioner that the best thing she could see happening with the plea would be three fiveyear sentences, to run concurrently, and that the worst thing would be three twenty-five year
sentences to run concurrently. Id. at 43. She told him that she did not believe that the judge would
give more than what the state was asking for, which she believed was twenty-five years, but that
it was possible for it to be up to thirty years or life. Id. at 43. She thought Petitioner was focusing
on the five-year sentence and not the longer sentence. Id. at 43-44. She did not promise him that
he was only going to get five years. Id. at 47. She explained to Petitioner that the deal was for
concurrent time and a cap of twenty-five years, and that she explained “over and over” that the full
range of punishment was available to Petitioner. Id. at 47. She also had him explain that back to
her, which she does when she thinks someone is being too optimistic about something. Id. at 4748. In his own words, he indicated that he knew he was facing up to twenty-five years. Id. at 48.
After the hearing, the motion court entered an order denying Petitioner’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Resp’t Ex. B, at 71-76. The motion court found that plea
counsel’s testimony was credible, that Petitioner’s claim was directly refuted by the record, and
that plea counsel “cannot be deemed to be ineffective for explaining to Martinez, with perspicuity,
the possible outcomes of his case.” Id. at 74. Petitioner raised the claim on appeal, Resp’t Ex. C,
and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of the claim, finding the
claim was refuted by the record, Resp’t Ex. E.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal habeas review exists only “as ‘a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.’” Woods v.
Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011)).
Accordingly, “[i]n the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the AEDPA [the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying
state court decisions.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings unless the state
court’s adjudication of a claim “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedents “if the state
court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or
“if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court’s]
precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see also Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S.
133, 141 (2005). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly
established federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably
to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. See also Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that

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the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Jones
v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)) (stating that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State
court shall be presumed to be correct” and that the petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence”).
III.

DISCUSSION
In the instant pro se petition, Petitioner asserts a single claim: that his plea counsel was

ineffective in that she told him he would receive three concurrent terms of five years’
imprisonment if he pleaded guilty, and in that she did not tell him the judge could impose a longer
sentence. As discussed above, Petitioner raised this claim in his motion for post-conviction relief
and in the appeal from the denial of that motion, and the state court denied the claim on the merits.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). To show ineffective assistance
of counsel, a petitioner must show both that “[his] counsel’s performance was deficient” and that
“the deficient performance prejudiced [his] defense.” Id. at 687; see also Paulson v. Newton Corr.
Facility, 773 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court has held that the two-prong test
articulated in Strickland applies to ineffective assistance claims in the guilty plea context. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985). To satisfy the first prong (deficient performance), the
petitioner must show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 57. To satisfy the second prong (prejudice) in the guilty plea context, the
petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.

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When an ineffective assistance claim has been addressed by the state court, this Court must
bear in mind that “[t]aken together, AEDPA and Strickland establish a ‘doubly deferential
standard’ of review.” Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)). In the context of a habeas claim, it is not sufficient for a
petitioner to “show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed
in the first instance.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. “Rather, he must show that the [state court] applied
Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. at 699.
In evaluating this claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals correctly noted the same two-prong
test articulated in Strickland and Hill. Resp’t Ex. E, at 5. The court then affirmed the motion court’s
finding that the allegations underlying Petitioner’s claim were refuted by the record—in particular,
the testimony of plea counsel, which the motion court found credible, and Petitioner’s own
statements at the plea hearing. Id. at 6-7. The court noted that plea counsel testified that she told
Petitioner that only in a best-case scenario would he receive concurrent five-year sentences of
imprisonment, and that it was possible that the sentence could be up to thirty years or life. Id. at 6.
The court also noted that plea counsel testified that Petitioner had been optimistic about receiving
a five-year sentence, placing little consideration into the full range of punishment, but that when
she had him repeat back his understanding of the punishment he faced, he did so accurately. Id. at
6. Furthermore, the court noted that at the plea hearing, Petitioner had testified that no one had
promised him that he would receive any particular sentence and that he understood that the full
range of punishment he faced was from no less than five years up to thirty years or even life in
prison. Id. at 7. The court concluded that because the record showed that Petitioner understood the
consequences of his plea and that counsel never told him he would receive three concurrent fiveyear sentences, his claim was without merit. Id. at 7.

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The Missouri Court of Appeals’ rejection of this claim did not involve an objectively
unreasonable application of Strickland or Hill to the facts of this case, nor did it involve an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. Petitioner’s claim that his counsel’s performance is based entirely on his contention
that his plea counsel told him he would receive three concurrent terms of five years’ imprisonment
if he pleaded guilty and did not tell him that the judge could impose a longer sentence. The state
courts’ determination that the record refuted those allegations has ample support in the record,
including plea counsel’s testimony that she did not promise Petitioner that he would receive a
five-year sentence; plea counsel’s testimony that she told Petitioner the range of sentences he could
receive; plea counsel’s testimony that she explained to him “over and over” that the full range of
punishment was available; plea counsel’s testimony that when she had him repeat back his
understanding of the punishment he faced, he did so accurately; and Petitioner’s own statements
at the plea hearing that no one had promised him a specific sentence and that he understood that
the full range of punishment was available to the judge, from five years up to thirty years or even
life in prison.
Although Petitioner offered testimony at the evidentiary hearing that conflicted with this
evidence, the state court found plea counsel’s testimony to be more credible than Petitioner’s
testimony. In a federal habeas proceeding, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “The
deference owed to the state trial court pursuant to § 2254(e)(1) includes deference to its credibility
determinations.” Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 864 (8th Cir. 2008). “A federal court can only
grant habeas relief if the state court's credibility determinations were objectively unreasonable

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based on the record.” Id. See also Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1540 (8th Cir. 1984) (“In the
process of finding the underlying facts, credibility determinations are left for the state courts to
decide; we are not permitted to substitute our judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that
of the state court.”). Petitioner offers no basis on which this Court could find that it was objectively
unreasonable for the state court to credit plea counsel’s testimony regarding what she told
Petitioner regarding his possible sentence over Petitioner’s testimony, nor has Petitioner offered
any clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness of the state court’s
factual findings. This Court thus defers to those findings.
Because the state court reasonably determined that Petitioner’s plea counsel properly
advised Petitioner of the possible sentences he could receive, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was also reasonable. Plea counsel did not exhibit deficient
performance, Petitioner could not establish the first prong of Strickland, and the state court’s denial
of this claim did not involve an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland or Hill to the
facts of this case. This claim will be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2253, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a 28
U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit judge or district judge issues a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To grant such a certificate, the judge must find that the
Petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2).
This requires a “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84,

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The Court finds that Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right, so the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Gerardo Martinez, Jr.’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue because
Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. § 2253.

SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 30th day of August, 2021.

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